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Abstract 
This dissertation investigates the passionate qualities of emotional life for the challenges they 
pose to theories of teaching, learning, and mental health in education. While orientations to 
mental health frequently manifest in the phantasy of mastery over the mind and the body, this 
dissertation offers an orientation that conceives of the unknown qualities of the mind from the 
vantage of unconscious life. Drawing on Julia Kristeva’s study of passion and maladies and 
Deborah Britzman’s theory of education as an emotional situation, the dissertation offers a study 
of breakdowns in emotional life as a site for investigating the passionate qualities of teaching and 
learning. This research investigates such moments of breakdown through a study of three 
figurations: the mad student, the mad group, and the mad teacher. Through each, the research 
interprets phantasies of mastery, compliance, omnipotence, control, and cure as unconscious 
responses to narratives of passionate object relating. Methodologically, the investigation makes 
use of aesthetic objects, namely film, to interpret phantasies that passionately drive meaning-
making even as they also threaten this creative work. The research posits the passionate mind as 
what binds education to its unconscious “underside” and argues that education may support 
mental health by allowing both time and space for its symbolization. 
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Introduction 
Theorizing Passionate Ties and Breakdown in Education 
Following the Vancouver Canuck’s loss in the Stanley Cup hockey finals in June 2011, 
Canadians watched as the city of Vancouver became a site of riotous destruction. In the days to 
follow, 17-year-old Nathan Kotylak came forward to publicly admit his involvement in the riot.  
He offered an apology to his city, peers, teachers, coaches, and family for acting in a way that 
“does not reflect the education and support that I’ve been given” (mrbearduck3, 2011). Reduced 
to tears and unable to explain his actions, the graduating senior exhibited feelings of shame and 
regret. He cited a host of consequences to register the seriousness of his actions. Asked by a 
reporter of his involvement in the riots he replied: “just, just, just don’t know. Just caught up in 
the moment, just, just, no, no, reasons really” (mrbearduck3, 2011). Unlike race riots recently 
erupted in the United States, this revolt served no purpose beyond the pleasures of destruction.  
Kotylak’s apology was received publically with surprise and scepticism. Along with 
many other unexpected rioters, including a young woman recently crowned “Miss Congeniality” 
in a local beauty pageant, this adolescent did not fit the profile of a so-called anarchist or 
“hooligan.” A young, white male from an affluent family, Kotylak’s actions shocked the public.  
Similarly female rioters also garnered public attention insofar as this form of destruction is 
typically associated with male subjects. A national level athlete, Kotylak successfully completed 
high school with scholarships for athletic and academic achievement in hand. He was also 
preparing to take his place as a first year student at the University of Calgary. To those who 
might otherwise regard him as an adolescent or educational success story, his actions came as 
quite a surprise. As devastating as the destruction was on that June night, the other blow was the 
seemingly normal teenagers and young adults perpetrating the riots. 
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 Cathy Caruth (1996) argues that traumatic experiences are those that are “unclaimed”—
they occur in the absence of our being able to understand and respond adequately. The work of 
making meaning from these experiences is belated, undertaken with a degree of distance from 
the force of the event’s affects. But trauma is also one of the more ubiquitous qualities of 
learning: As Deborah Britzman (2003) suggests, “learning begins in the breakdown of meaning” 
(p. 15). Kotylak’s inability to offer the interviewer an explanation for his involvement in the riots 
may testify to the belated work of interpretation and the ways in which breakdown manifests as 
fierce defences against thinking. But perhaps to the extent that he cannot yet enter into meaning-
making’s folds, it is not yet an apology. Arguably, so too may be the case for those who sought, 
listened to, and carried on with life following Kotylak’s destructive act and his apology. The 
experience remains unclaimed, not yet learned from. Why is it so difficult to learn from passion 
and what can this mean for thinking about education?  
 
Statement of the Problem 
I begin with this story of a young man’s destructive impulse and his tragic apology to 
open questions about the place and displacement of passion in education.1 This story of passion 
gone wrong unseats what is typically imagined as learning in the field of education. Where 
passion is frequently idealized—“Turn your passion into a career,” advertises the Government of 
Ontario’s (2015) student financial assistance program—this story represents passion’s “shadowy 
underside” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 21). My dissertation focuses on such shadowy moments of passion 
                                                
1 Throughout the dissertation, I define passion as a libidinal attachment to an object or part object: the (m)other, 
student, sibling, group, teacher, and an idea or theory (for instance the idea of education). This definition borrows 
from Julia Kristeva (2010a), who defines passion as an imaginary construction and as “emotion put into signs” (p. 
94). As a sign, the force of passion takes many forms in this dissertation, displayed in fiction, dance, play, pedagogy, 
and theorizing. I read each of these manifestations as an instance of passion: that is, as a sign of the libidinal, 
emotive, and largely unconscious qualities of attachments. For example, in chapter two, I read the student’s passion 
for the classical form of ballet as a sign of a libidinal bond that cannot allow for the separation between mother and 
child.  
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where unruly actions and inhibited thinking manifest in outbursts of destructiveness that are 
deemed unintelligible. My thesis asks: What else might be said about “unclaimed” passion that 
erupts, sometimes violently and destructively, to unsettle our understandings of students’ 
seemingly settled identities, relationships, and ways of knowing? If even the “best” students are 
susceptible to losing their minds, how do our various forms of “education and support” respond 
to this susceptibility? Violent action notwithstanding, can we imagine the loss of the mind as a 
site of possibility—as, following Britzman, the place where learning begins—even as it may also 
court punishment? In what ways is passion a problem for the social world, including the world of 
education?  
The question of passion and its shadowy underside is timely for the field of education. In 
rapidly changing times, education is caught in a “crisis” about how to support students’ mental 
well-being, health, and illness (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2015; Hanlon, 2012; Lunau, 
2012, September 5). As part of a larger turn to issues of mental health, compulsory schooling and 
post-secondary education are freighted by a growing recognition of the human susceptibility to 
breakdown. Increasingly, teachers and administrators are charged with the responsibility to 
create conditions of learning that support the student’s emotional life and difficulties. As such, 
governments, school boards, non-governmental agencies, and researchers have initiated 
educational and public policy in response to instances of anxiety and depression, antisocial 
behaviour, self-harm, substance abuse, and suicide as symptoms of emotional and social conflict.  
The highly publicized attention on mental health spans all levels of schooling, from 
young children to university students, collectively inserting into the heart of education questions 
of vulnerability, accessibility, and support. The prevailing idea is that education can—or 
should—be in the business of producing mental health, rather than admit the opposite: that 
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education can make us feel ill-minded. For example, the Mental Health Commission of Canada 
(MHCC, 2012) released Canada’s first Mental Health Strategy in May of 2012. The strategy 
specifically addresses children and youth deemed mentally unwell and the people who are in 
contact with them. Provincial governments have also produced policy documents such as, Open 
Minds, Healthy Minds: Ontario’s Comprehensive Mental Health and Addictions Strategy 
(Government of Ontario, 2012). This strategy, like its federal counterpart, emphasizes the need 
for mental health promotion and interventions directed towards young people and their 
caregivers. Both documents identify education as the site through which to achieve the aim of 
mental health. Open Minds, for instance, urges “building resilience through schools” 
(Government of Ontario, 2012, p. 15). Recognizing that mental health issues are often first 
experienced in childhood and/or adolescence, the MHCC launched the program Headstrong in 
November 2014. This “youth mobilization initiative” targets stigma associated with mental 
illness and aims to “[give] Canadian youth the encouragement, knowledge, and tools they need 
to lead this fight” (MHCC, 2015). This initiative joins with many resource documents created 
specifically for educators: the Canadian Mental Health Association’s Mental Health and High 
School Curriculum Guide (CMHA & Sunlife Financial Chair, 2012); the Government of 
Ontario’s (2013) Supporting Minds: An Educator’s Guide to Promoting Students’ Mental 
Health; Children’s Mental Health Ontario’s (2013) Building a Better School Environment for 
Youth with Mental Health and Addiction Issues; and School Mental Health ASSIST’s (2013) 
Leading Mentally Healthy Schools: A Resource for School Administrators. At the local level, 
school boards are focusing attention on administrators and teachers as first responders to the 
challenges of mental health and illness. For example, in 2014 the Toronto District School Board 
(TDSB) launched its own mental health strategy, Healthy Schools. Healthy Relationships: 
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Children and Youth Mental Health and Well-Being. The strategy includes five key commitments, 
including professional development and training for 100% of its staff. Its overarching aim is to 
improve mental health and academic outcomes for all students. 
Mirroring the need for strategic leadership at the federal, provincial, and school-board 
level, the Canadian Association of College and University Student Services (CACUSS) and 
CMHA (2013) released Post-Secondary Student Mental Health: Guide to a Systemic Approach. 
This document is described as a “resource to support the creation of campus communities that 
are deeply conducive to transformative learning and mental well-being” (p. 15). A majority of 
Canadian universities have also responded by establishing task forces and steering committees 
charged with the responsibility to assess available resources to students and to provide direction 
on how better to support them. Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, for instance, formed its 
Mental Health Commission in 2011 following a number of student deaths/suicides on campus. 
Other universities followed suit, such as the University of Alberta in 2012 and the University of 
Toronto in 2013, joining those who already had a task force in place, such as McGill 
University’s, established in 2005. Still more universities are raising awareness through dedicated 
days, weeks, and even months that aim to foster discussion about mental well-being, reduce 
stigma associated with mental illness, and promote support services. Regarding the latter, 
university accessibility programs, centers, and services have been developed to attend to issues 
of access related to mental health and illness, for example, anxiety related to test-taking. As well, 
a notable majority of institutions have created specific programs to facilitate students’ transition 
from high school to post-secondary education. The assumption underlying this bid to support 
student well-being is also an economical problem. Emotional stress negatively impacts 
enrolment and achievement.  
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Theoretical interventions are not far behind, such as Margaret Price’s (2011) Mad at 
School: Rhetorics of Mental Disability and Academic Life and Doris Iarovici’s (2014) Mental 
Health Issues and the University Student. Price discusses exclusionary practices and frameworks 
that keep students and teachers with mental illness outside of education, particularly the 
university. “Perhaps because of the popular conception that unsound minds have no place in the 
classroom,” she argues, “academic and especially pedagogical research seems almost obsessed 
with the diagnosis of sound and unsound minds” (p. 33). In an effort to “protect academic 
discourse as a ‘rational’ realm” (p. 33), she continues, mental fragility is effectively ignored, as 
are students who express emotional difficulty. Iarovici (2014) writes for a clinical audience, 
offering a close discussion of the issues students both bring to the university and that emerge 
during their time there, from sleep disturbance to anxiety to psychosis. Part of the work for 
health care professionals, she argues, is pedagogical: “We need to empower students to 
recognize the range of problems they may encounter during their years in higher education” (p. 
219). This impulse to empower students is mirrored, too, in the discourse of “mindfulness” or 
“contemplative practice” that promotes the identification and working through of emotional life 
as an everyday practice, that is, before crisis erupts (Roeser & Zelazo, 2012). While de-
pathologizing emotional difficulty, this turn carries the risk of individualizing emotional life 
(Hoffman, 2009), the consequences of which Britzman (1986) identified in her very first 
publication: When emotional difficulty is cast as a problem of the individual, the role of social 
structures and conditions in the production of alienation, loneliness, and self-blame goes 
unchallenged.   
If there is indeed a crisis of mental health on university campuses, as Maclean’s 
magazine’s Kate Lunau reported in 2012, there is a simultaneous question as to what came 
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before. As the above initiatives show, education carries with it a larger question about how to 
think about and handle emotional life, for better or for worse. Following on the heels of the 
field’s attention to issues of social justice and anti-oppression education, the turn inwards to 
mental life manifests a new question for the field: How can education do justice to the 
complexity of emotional life brought to and brought out in scenes of learning?  
This psychological turn in thinking is not new. Traditionalist views of education 
emphasized denying passion in favour of repetitive activities that required constant focus and 
bland engagement (memorization, recitation, and manual training) (Axelrod, 1997; Walkerdine, 
1984). Progressives, who emerged in opposition to traditionalist frames (Dewey 1938/1997), 
returned the language of passion to education, even while reproducing the old aim of rationality 
and self-control, however implicitly. Valerie Walkerdine (1984), for example, finds this 
repetition in the contradiction between progressivism and the principle of naturalism on which it 
is based. This naturalist principle extended Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s figuring of “children as 
innocents, budding flowers who required nurturing and cultivation rather than repression or 
restrain if they were to blossom into effective adults” (Axelrod, 1997, p. 34). In this view, 
passion is no longer denied but cast in evolutionary terms of “natural” progress. The story of 
development at stake here repeats the logic of rationality that it originally sought to critique, 
where the child moves “from animal infant to civilised adult” (Walkerdine, 1986, p. 56; see also 
Popkewitz, 1998). 
 Accordingly, research of the Industrial era and its legacy bequeathed a view of “the 
mind” and “the child” as objects of scrutiny, empirical observation, and ultimately control, albeit 
sometimes of a covert variety. “Development” emerged as a concept and “developmental 
psychology,” through the work of Jean Piaget, emerged as a field of inquiry (Walkerdine, 1984). 
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In these early studies of childhood and development, a progress narrative set the terms for 
pedagogy, fashioning a psychology of learning based on the key idea that “development…could 
be observed, normalized and regulated” (Walkerdine, 1984, p. 170). Reaching back to Rousseau, 
the idea of “education according to nature” crystallized in developmental models that aimed to 
assist and monitor natural progression towards reason. The key idea is that rationality was 
thought to emerge at the expense of passion: 
...the best course for mankind was to channel children’s development away from the 
dominance of the emotions towards that rationality which alone would be the guarantor 
of progress...from childhood sexuality towards adult rationality which leaves the “animal 
passions” behind. (Walkerdine, 1984, p. 176, emphasis added) 
What Walkerdine (1984) calls the “rational dream” (p. 171) of education implies a passion for 
controlled passion, even a wish for no passion. This dream held that the rational mind would 
triumph over the excesses and unruliness of human existence with the right education. Indeed, 
this rational narrative of progress persists still today insofar as education continues to be 
interpreted as a project of mastery over both the self and knowledge.  
Here, then, is where the irrepressible quality of passion—the student’s question, wild 
thought, or even firebomb, or conversely, the depressed and suicidal student—returns to haunt 
the field’s dreams of a “right” education. Mental breakdown rattles “the very thought of 
education” (Britzman, 2009). But rather than attend to the significance that breakdown may 
present to theories of teaching and learning, the aforementioned avalanche of policy intended to 
improve mental health is suggestive of denial. This “passion for ignorance” (Lacan, 1998, p. 
121) functions to secure the ideality of education to resolve crisis rather than face its implication 
in precisely such breakdowns. This dissertation lifts the veil on ideality to suggest a theory of the 
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passionate mind that can address the implication of education in breakdown and risk inquiring 
into its emotional significance, what Paula Salvio (2007) calls the “weird abundance” of the 
unconscious (p. 6). In this way, the dissertation unearths a complex picture of the mind as made 
and re-made from passion. Implied in this theory is a view of the human as a generator of 
passion that exceeds the educational wish for mastery through reason. My main concern, 
therefore, is to slow down the talk of mental health in education to consider how the 
contingencies of teaching and learning are touched by passion that is also subject to its 
destructive underside, as evidenced in my opening example. I argue that passion is the grounds 
of creativity that drives private life into symbols that circulate in the social world. Where this 
fails, in the individual but also the institution, madness emerges and threatens to overtake the 
creative capacity of the passionate mind.2 
To examine this claim, I bring to the educational focus on mastery a question found in 
Julia Kristeva’s (2010a) writing on passion. She asks about the possibility of accessing a 
relationship to passion that “works through its imaginary substance indefinitely” (p. 94, emphasis 
added). Working through passion’s “imaginary substance” opens up a fertile middle ground 
between reason and destruction, or between, in Kristeva’s words, “a humanity without passion” 
and “a humanity whose most passionate passion is one for death” (p. 94). Kristeva’s rendering of 
                                                
2 My use of the term madness here and throughout the dissertation refers to the breakdown of the capacity to make 
distinctions, specifically between reality and phantasy, self and other. I argue that madness goes hand in hand with 
passion insofar as both modify reality, whereby part and whole objects become infused with libidinal force. But 
madness is distinguished by its obstruction of meaning-making processes that transform passion into insight about 
its role in social and emotional life. In madness, the subject suffers from an inability to make distinctions that would 
allow one to think about the difference between internal and external reality. In my analysis of the film Black Swan 
in chapter two, for example, I read the maternal relationship between Nina and Erica as a manifestation of madness 
because both characters lose the ability to distinguish their phantasies of the self/other from an idea of the self/other 
as exceeding these constructions. That is, the figure in the mind is collapsed with the figure in reality and the 
capacity to differentiate and allow for a gap between these is lost. Chapter four’s analysis of Monsieur Lazhar, 
meanwhile, finds madness in a group of teachers’ inability to distinguish between their wish for education that is 
devoid of aggression and erotic ties and the suicide of one teacher, Martine Lachance, as connected to precisely 
these affects inside the walls of education. In this fourth chapter, I describe the sanity of the teacher, Bashir Lazhar, 
as tied to his capacity to symbolize the passionate elements of pedagogical relationships without literalizing those 
impulses. I find a similar version of sanity in The Hunger Games’ Katniss Everdeen. 
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a middle ground asks us to imagine creative ways of being that stand between null and 
destructive passion. In the former, “humanity without passion,” compliance reigns, whereas the 
latter, “the passionate passion…for death,” leaves behind chaos, such as was witnessed in 
Vancouver. Kristeva’s plea for a third term of passion pictures an existential possibility rooted in 
the capacity to represent an aspect of being that, “constitutes the secret motor of the human 
condition” (p. 152). Through her writing in the areas of psychoanalysis, philosophy, and literary 
criticism, she unveils such a possibility. In her view, analysis and writing give symbolic life to 
the ineffable. Passion can “work through its imaginary substance indefinitely” in words and 
symbols alive with emotional significance (Kristeva, 2010a, p. 94). Through her analysis of the 
aesthetics of literature and psychoanalysis, Kristeva returns a discourse of passion to the study of 
the social, political, and psychological ills of this historical moment. There, she finds 
contemporary subjectivity and sociality suffering a crisis of giving symbolic form to an inner 
vulnerability that lies at the heart of the human condition, made from passionate ties lost and 
found in relations between self and other.  
With Kristeva’s concern over null and destructive passion in human existence, I examine 
two related questions for education. What would it mean to conceive of education as a site for 
“work[ing] through its imaginary substance indefinitely” (Kristeva, 2010a, p. 94)? And, how 
might a theory of passion as “indefinite” inform the field’s engagement with questions of mental 
health and illness? To develop these questions more substantially, I begin by elaborating the 
conceptual terrain of this dissertation and its orientation to rethinking education as a human 
endeavour in support of the passionate mind.  
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Passion and its Maladies 
For Kristeva (2010a), the term “passion” signifies an imaginary formation, connected 
both to the body and the symbolic, a bridge between affect and language. She argues that passion 
is the imaginary—the “organ of passion”—and that there is no such thing as passion prior to or 
outside of the symbolic expression of it (p. 81). Rather, with the biologist J-D. Vincent, she 
suggests that passion is “an emotion put into signs” even while it remains close to the affective 
realm that is prior to language (p. 94). Passion’s first words comprise the odd language of the 
unconscious, a language we glimpse in our dreams, in slips of the tongue, and bungled words 
and actions. Passion registers the ties we make and break with others, and has its beginning in 
the relation to our first (m)other. Kristeva puts it this way:  
…passion is an alchemy of binding and unbinding that preserves nothing of our 
hypothetical identities. Passion is our madness. We are not all psychotic, but we can all 
be crazy. Crazy for one another (men and women, women and women, men and men), 
because we are crazy for our crazy mothers. (p. 247, emphasis in original) 
The craze about which Kristeva writes is not a diagnosis of illness (although it can become this). 
It is a quality of our earliest relationships that extends throughout the lifespan. We can think of 
this passion as a “kernel of negativity we all share” and that drives signification (Farley, 2011, p. 
10; see also Winnicott, 2005/1971). Passion is a force of being that connects us to the world, but 
also one that wreaks havoc on our seemingly settled ideas about the self and other. Passion 
makes meaning uncertain even as it can drive the wish for certainty. 
Passion goes hand in hand with psychical reality, what Sigmund Freud (1925/1989) 
argued comprises the internal representations we make from our early attachments to material 
(and maternal) reality. Freud arrived at this version of reality in his work with hysterics. In these 
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cases, he proposed that what mattered for hysterical symptoms was not an actual event but the 
meaning assigned to that event in the unconscious by way of wishful—passionate—phantasies.3 
By listening to the hysteric, he came to understand something fragile about the emotional world, 
its vulnerabilities, and its means of expression that demanded a new way of thinking about 
reality. That is, Freud came to understand a quality of mind that he thought was common to all 
humans and not only those who are formally diagnosed as neurotic. Within the discourse of 
psychoanalysis, psychic reality is a facet of being that describes “subjective experience” (Caper, 
1999, p. 54, emphasis in original) that, like Kristeva’s “passion,” is a meeting of both the internal 
and the external realms. Its most basic model is dreaming: material events of day residues find 
their way into imaginative constructions when unconscious wishes and anxieties attach to them. 
Dreaming is thus a passionate discourse at the “interface of drives and meaning” (Kristeva, 
2010a, p. 94). 
Britzman reminds us that psychic reality is not confined to our sleeping adventures. Her 
extensive body of research inaugurated a field of study that examines how the passionate 
discourse of early life permeates the world of education. Mirroring Kristeva’s idea of “indefinite 
working through,” Britzman’s interventions into the study of teaching and learning treat 
education as a dream: an “interminable ‘inside/outside’ encounter” (Britzman, 1998, p. 5), where 
old conflicts of love and hate find new objects, where anxiety may become a passion for 
knowledge and ignorance, and where feelings may compel action unhinged from thinking. For 
Britzman, education is our human condition precisely because the human is made through an 
interminable combination of internal and external dependencies:  
Somewhere between reality and fantasy, between need and want, between the affect and 
                                                
3 Throughout the dissertation, I adhere to the ph-spelling of phantasy to emphasize its unconscious qualities. See 
Laplanche and Pontalis (1973, pp. 315-318) for a discussion on the distinction between phantasy and fantasy. 
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the idea, and between dependency and autonomy, there can emerge the material from 
which the subject spins a life. (Britzman, 2003, p. 67)  
It is this “material” that requires indefinite working through, and, if all goes well, that education 
may engage. Britzman’s research spans a range of contexts. Her work examines the emotional 
significance of teacher education (Britzman, 1991/2003), affective resonances of violent social 
histories (Britzman, 1998), the history of psychoanalysis (Britzman, 2003, 2010), conflicts of 
narrating teaching and learning (Britzman, 2006b), the impossibility of education (Britzman, 
2009), and the teacher’s emotional world (Britzman, 2015). Across this range, she demonstrates 
that education and pedagogical knowledge are not given but belatedly made. Moreover, her work 
reminds us that unconscious forces interminably contour meaning-making even as one works to 
symbolize these forces and their affects (Britzman, 2013). Teaching and learning is thus a 
complex “emotional situation” (Britzman, 2009, p. ix) that involves an indefinite working 
through of the return of repressed emotional history as it comes to shape ideas about the self and 
others. Cast in the language of this dissertation, Britzman’s work offers a way to think about 
passion as that which makes education possible but also necessary. Precisely because we are 
susceptible to null and destructive passion, there is the need for a third term.  
Education, I suggest, may be this third term: the human’s “chance” (Britzman, 2003, p. 
67) to fashion a life from our passionate ties to the world. To build this claim, I work from 
Britzman’s use of psychoanalysis to interpret pedagogical conflicts in order to re-find passion in 
education amid concerns over mental health. Indeed, the absence of a discourse of passion risks 
losing what is alive about education. For Kristeva (1995) the passion of psychic reality is life. 
She opens New Maladies of the Soul with precisely this point: 
You are alive if and only if you have a psychic life. However distressing, unbearable, 
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deadly, or exhilarating it may be, this psychic life—which combines different systems of 
representation that involve language—allows you access to your body and to other 
people. (pp. 5-6)  
The passionate imaginary is the human’s discourse. We are neither wholly biologically 
programmed by drives, nor strictly effects of social discourse. Instead we have a “psychic life”—
a “soul”—that “registers representations and their meaningful values” (Kristeva, 1995, p. 8). 
Psychic life, for Kristeva, is the place where we experience and give meaning to the body and the 
outside world: a passionate discourse to listen to and learn from.  
 Psychic life suffers, Kristeva (1995) argues, in the disappearance of the time and space 
needed to create and symbolize a relationship to this private life. That is, Kristeva finds 
impoverishment of mental life when “the mere hint of such activity seems frivolous and ill-
advised” (p. 7). She might have been talking about the preference of schooling for efficiency 
over frivolity. The consequences of this preference are not, however, frivolous. Indeed, to divest 
education of psychical life is to deny education its humanness. One consequence of this 
emptying out is that education may become the ground for what Kristeva terms the “new 
maladies of the soul” (p. 9). In her words, such maladies “embody difficulties or obstacles in 
psychic representation, difficulties that end up destroying psychic life” (pp. 9-10).  
Yet an education attentive to this passionate discourse also means confronting the 
unaccountable and often seen as crazed ways humans attach to and find meaning in the world. 
Psychic life does not fit conveniently within life’s—and education’s—normative ideals. Psychic 
life and its maladies exploit, destroy, pervert, create, and ignore. In this view, the crisis of mental 
health may reflect a pedagogical landscape unable to symbolize the pains and pleasures of 
making contact with otherness. Without symbolization, education risks fostering maladies that 
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emerge from the “impossibility of communicating this passion, this madness” (Kristeva, 2010a, 
p. 247). For Kristeva (1995, 2010a), a discourse of passion involves both a capacity to establish a 
lively relation to psychic life and the capacity to communicate this state of mind in a social 
world with others. The time/space of education, I argue, is where the capacity for representing 
passion might begin. Yet, as we will see in the following section, the discourse of mental health 
and illness in education struggles to symbolize these conflicts, manifesting in place of 
representation an anxious discourse in search of cure. Without a symbolic attachment to passion, 
education is itself at risk of going mad in shutting out psychic life. 
 
The Spectacle of Mental Health: Madness and Experts  
In the discourse of mental health and illness in education, I find the inability to represent 
psychic life. In place of representations of passion and its breakdowns, the attention to mental 
health risks becoming a “spectacle” (Kristeva, 1995, p. 8), in the words of Patti Lather (1993), a 
“fertile obsession” unable to conceptualize that which drives it (p. 674). I have already 
mentioned that headlines abound detailing crises of student mental health: suicide rates, 
overwhelming anxiety, hopelessness, and destructive outbursts over a lost hockey game. 
Research into how best to approach such issues calls for better mental health supports. 
Politicians and administrators regularly commit to developing mental health strategies that are 
backed by promises of increased funding for those who need it. Growing numbers of people are 
taking to the Internet to write blogs on how mental health and illness discussions are affecting 
them. Indeed, an entire industry devoted to the mental health of young people has emerged. Yet 
there is very little debate or disagreement about either the status of the problem or how to 
represent it. Instead, we find a “fertile obsession” with phantasied solutions that fall short in 
making significance from the anxiety that fuels them.  
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One feature of this anxious discourse positions mental health as both everywhere and 
nowhere, necessary but elusive. We are told that, “mental health is essential to students’ 
academic success” (CACUS & CMHA, 2013, p. 6). Yet many educators cite mental and social 
well-being as the number one obstacle to learning, according to a recent survey by the Canadian 
Teacher’s Federation (Adey, 2015, February 15; see also TDSB, 2014, p. 7). Mental health 
stretches beyond worries about stressed-out students to include concerns about students’ 
interpersonal lives writ large. Jessica Whitley, J. David Smith, and Tracy Vaillancourt (2013), 
for example, frame bullying as related to mental health. Others emphasize active participation in 
extra-curricular activities on campus as conducive to mental health: “By creating conditions for 
meaningful participation in the campus community including the fluid and authentic exchange of 
ideas, such an environment helps students feel connected and facilitates holistic, integrated 
learning and development” (CACUS & CMHA, 2013, p. 10). Melonie Fullick (2012, December 
10) calls for representation of mental health challenges beyond individualizing or minimizing 
frameworks. In her University Affairs post “Student (Mental Health) Problems are ‘Real’ 
Problems,” she responds to others’ dismissal of mental health problems “as if it is merely the fad 
of the month,” an observation that is itself evidence of the spectacle. Fullick’s intervention also 
suggests the either/or logic of mental health representation and breakdown. Are mental health 
problems an individual matter or an effect of social institutions?  
According to the World Health Organization: 
Mental health is the capacity of each and all of us to feel, think, and act in ways that 
enhance our ability to enjoy life and deal with the challenges we face. It is a positive 
sense of emotional and spiritual well-being that respects the importance of culture, 
equity, social justice, interconnections and personal dignity. (as cited in Government of 
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Canada, 2006, p. 2)  
This enigmatic definition, used by governments and educational institutions alike, describes 
mental health elusively as a “capacity.” Ironically, this definition raises more questions than 
answers. For example, how can we think about times when we might “feel, think, and act” in 
ways that undermine our own or another’s “enjoyment”? What does “enjoyment” mean exactly, 
and who gets to decide? What if mental life is annexed by emotional pain? And, what if learning 
is itself that which disrupts enjoyment? If mental health means an ability to “deal with the 
challenges we face,” what are we to make of our failures to adequately address mental health 
problems, particularly in schools and universities? To cite mental health as a desirable or 
necessary capacity, therefore, is to open questions about human existence that are not easily 
addressed because, as this definition shows, mental health is elusive at best. To the extent that 
mental well-being remains largely un-theorized, mental health risks becoming a spectacle that 
circumvents interpretation of the passionate mind and education’s role in making it.  
 Because signs of mental illness typically first appear in childhood and adolescence, the 
field of education has become a key site of identification and prevention. Educators, and not 
psychologists alone, work on the front lines of identifying students “at risk.” Representations of 
teaching regularly picture a heroic teacher who rescues students from their own failing minds. 
But also, teacher education involves learning to accommodate students with diverse mental 
health needs. For David Woolf, principal of Queen’s University, the role of the institution can no 
longer be cast in traditional terms of research, but also the work of care: “Our role is education 
and research, and to some degree community service. That said, we do have a care and nurturing 
role over the young people that come to us” (as cited in Lunau, 2012, September 5). In 
compulsory schooling, discussions about how to best educate students with mental health 
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problems are typically located in the domain of “special education” (Winzer, 1993, 2009). This 
discourse is dominated by debates over inclusion, as well as frustrations over funding models 
that regularly leave specialized education with insufficient resources (Jordan, 2001; Lupart, 
1998; People for Education, 2014; Slee, 2011). Researchers also cite mental illness as a reason to 
be wary of special education. Here, the idea that education can cause pain is permitted, if only to 
defend against its possibility: “If we cannot be very certain that removing a student from the 
regular classroom will improve his or her functioning, then we should not do it” (Specht, 2013, 
p. 47). In universities, the desire to include students with mental illnesses has led to the 
development of disability services and accessibility programs, as well as policies relating to 
accommodation. Increasingly, the mandate of the university is to “alleviate difficulties or aid 
students in overcoming” barriers to their academic success (Markoulakis & Kirsh, 2013, p. 78). 
Some of these supports include bursaries, tutoring services, and letters of accommodation that 
students can give to their professors to specify accommodations needed to succeed in the course 
(such as additional time for examinations, extended deadlines, or the ability to record class 
lectures). The medical model comes into play here in particular, as access to these services is 
largely dependent upon medical recognition of illness/disability.  
Through these policy and support initiatives, mental illness is constructed as something 
that need not be an impediment to academic success, even if those with mental illnesses and 
disabilities may require specialized support. The move to provide accommodations and support 
to students carries with it the assumption that students arrive at institutions with varying needs 
that are not necessarily met by traditional approaches to teaching and learning. These measures 
are “meant to remove barriers faced by students with disabilities” and to “level the playing 
field,” with the ultimate aim to help more students to be successful in their studies (York 
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University, 2014). To the extent that these discussions draw attention to the ways in which 
teaching and learning are affected by the psychological needs of students, they also touch on 
questions of pedagogy. However, what remains under-theorized is the very idea of mental health, 
dominated as this discourse is by un-interrogated questions of need and access. Moreover, there 
is little room in this discourse to examine how learning is an emotional situation that can at times 
make us feel quite mad. 
In a similar vein, educational research tends to advance a diagnostic view of mental 
health and illness, while leaving unexplored how we might interpret the distress it implies. In a 
2013 special issue of Canadian Journal of School Psychology, for example, mental health is a 
significant problem for which “schools have an essential role to play in not only assessment, 
intervention, and prevention but also in engagement and meaningful involvement of local 
communities” (Leschied, Flett & Saklofske, 2013, p. 8). This research seeks to identify at risk 
populations and behaviours that indicate difficulties in mental health. For example, adolescents 
are frequently described as vulnerable (Wei, Kutcher & Szumilas, 2011), as are students 
marginalized for not adhering to traditional modes of development (Specht, 2013). Gordon Flett 
and Paul Hewitt (2013) suggest that mental health problems may be underestimated and that 
many “seemingly adjusted children and adolescents” actually “fly under the radar” because they 
embody characteristics, such as perfectionism or compliance, that the school reads as academic 
success (p. 16). Such research moves beyond traditional definitions of what distress looks like; 
however, it nonetheless positions emotional conflict as a barrier to mental health and 
development rather than an interminable facet of learning and growth (Britzman, 2003).  
Implied in such expert knowledge is the aim for a cure through “prevention, promotion, 
and treatment” (Schwean & Rodger, 2013, p.154; see also Kutcher & Wei, 2013; Weare & Nind, 
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2011). More specifically, researchers implicate pedagogy with the claim that “teachers represent 
the most vital resource in whatever strategies are endorsed within the school system” (Leschied, 
Flett & Saklofske, 2013, p. 9; see also Vesely, Saklofske, & Leschied, 2013; Whitley, Smith, & 
Vaillancourt, 2013). Yet while Whitley, Smith, and Vaillancourt (2013) stress the importance of 
mental health literacy among teachers, they also acknowledge uncertainty: “although teachers 
may gain knowledge and understanding of mental health issues as a result of their participation 
in a particular program, how this affects their future actions within the classroom has yet to be 
determined” (p. 65). Sustaining a belief in “evidence-based” interventions (see also Manion, 
Short & Ferguson, 2013), these researchers nonetheless recognize that knowledge is not a 
guarantee of meaningful outcomes.  
Still, rather than theorize the qualities of psychical conflict, the search for solutions 
continues and the dissemination of expert knowledge is constructed as ideal. Vicki Schwean and 
Susan Rodger (2013), for example, describe their efforts to “bridge the gap between theory, 
research, and practice” and point to “a menu of promising systems, policy, procedural, and 
intervention practices to support children’s mental health” (p. 157). Their predominant concern is 
that “many educational, health, and social services professionals and paraprofessionals lack the 
training to implement specific practices”; instead, they are guided by individual “judgment” 
rather than by “research” (p. 157). A prevailing idea constructed through these interventions is 
that mental health and illness is a problem in need of experts beyond, that is, the individual 
judgment of teachers. One consequence of such a framing is, however, the deferral of thinking to 
expert others. Put another way, education is emptied of thinkers or “thinking group[s]” 
(Britzman, 2010, p. 101) and filled instead with the false promise of the expert’s cure. This 
arguably fuels rather than alleviates anxiety and discourages creative thinking across academics 
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and mental well-being in touch with the limits of mastery. That is, the language of experts 
reproduces a split between mental well-being and teaching and learning, between those who 
“know” about emotional life and those who “know” about academics. Lost in this split is a 
creative space for thinking and representing emotional conflict as constitutive of teaching and 
learning. 
Yet another symptom of this anxious discourse is the evacuation of history. Indeed, the 
debates about the conditions needed for optimal learning and well-being are not new but rather 
form an interminable knot foundational to the very idea of schooling. As noted above, early 
iterations of such discourse have been taken up from the vantage of “developmentalism” and 
“developmental psychology” in early twentieth century scientific research (Walkerdine, 1984); 
in critiques of traditional education and the rise of theories of progressive education (Dewey, 
1938/1997); critiques of progressive education (Arendt, 1958/2006); in the interventions of 
critical pedagogy (Freire, 1970/2000); and in the ethical turn to “happiness” as an aim of 
education (Noddings, 2004). These debates call attention to the status of emotional life as 
foundational to teaching and learning, and not their opposite or obstacle.  
And yet, the discourse of mental health and illness in education remains largely split off 
from the passionate labour of creativity, as Kristeva means it. The assertion of creativity does 
exist but in a form that is suspicious of passion and un-attached to history. Instead, creativity is 
constructed as yet another “new” competence to measure and to market. As a leading Canadian 
organization for the study of education asserts on its website, “Creativity is an essential aspect of 
schooling and one of the key competencies that young people need for success in the modern 
world of ever-increasing change” (People for Education, 2015). Ken Robinson’s (2006, June) 
TED Talk, “How Schools Kill Creativity,” suggests something of the concept’s weight in the 
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cultural imaginary. At over thirty two million views, it is the most watched TED Talk of all time. 
For Robinson, creativity is a competence that the factory model of education cannot cultivate. 
But ironically, creativity, as he imagines it, is still an economic matter involving 
entrepreneurship. Seduced by the spectacle that Arendt (1958/2006) called the “pathos of the 
new” (p. 173), important questions remain unexplored: Is there a difference between creativity 
that works towards an efficient end and the indefinite working through of the passionate mind? 
What about the passions of creativity make emotional life feel difficult? To what extent are 
concerns over the aim to cultivate student creativity a displacement of the field’s own difficulties 
in re-creating education? Creativity, it would seem, matters to people but only insofar as it is 
safely disconnected from its passionate underside. 
Despite the furor for mental health and the nature of success in education, I argue that the 
conflicts of education cannot be cured with the right information, training programs, or strategic 
approaches. Indeed, the mind as an enigma born of passion and madness confounds the field of 
education despite new generations of researchers, policy makers, pedagogues, and health care 
professionals seeking to resolve the problem of mental health. Yet passion disillusions the 
educational wish to cure the conflicts of mental life. Thus while discussions of mental health and 
illness in education have largely been dominated by the idea that knowledge is the royal road to 
change, there is still a question of how to think of education as interminably working through 
passion and not its cure. What is lost in idealized efforts to cure passion through education is the 
very idea of teaching and learning as enlivened by passionate forces that complicate what it 
means to know and to live.  
Across mental health discourse, noted above, there is a risk of turning mental well-being 
in education into a spectacle, where meaningful engagement exists in name only. “The spectacle 
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is life as a dream—we all want this,” writes Kristeva (1995, p. 8). Caught by the spectacle, 
Kristeva’s wonders about its compliant underside: “Do this ‘you’ and this ‘we’ exist? Your 
expression is standardized, your discourse becomes normalized. For that matter, do you really 
have a discourse of your own?” (p. 8). The spectacle loses touch with representing the intimacies 
of psychic life, its passions as well as its breakdowns. Disconnected from our critical and 
creative capacities, we instead manifest a normative phantasy of education. There is the mad 
pursuit of “best practice.” There is the splitting of pedagogy into, on the one hand, academics 
and, on the other, “social and emotional skills.” There is the refusal of history in idealizations of 
success that repeat the masterful logic of teaching the “right” actions and moral exactitude. In 
place of meaningful elaboration of the conflicts and limits that passion poses to education, 
research and policy risk fuelling the spectacle, or “education as a dream.” Add to this, as well, 
the spectacular breakdowns that populate news media and loom large over educational 
interventions. Positioned repeatedly as a shock to the field, these breakdowns embody the very 
dynamics of anxiety and vulnerability to which the field has struggled to respond. Making 
pedagogical significance from breakdown must wait while teachers and students suffer from the 
failure to live up to impossible ideals, fearful of the unknown, which, despite their best efforts, 
cannot be controlled. 
 
Interpreting Passion in Education: Methodology and Chapters 
While passion pulsates in repressed form in education, we see its return in both loud 
scenes of breakdown and in the quiet symptoms of compliance that Kristeva (2010a) describes as 
null passion. We can readily find examples of breakdowns in education and mental health in 
news media: rioting students, school shootings, student suicide, bullying, crazy teachers, and sex 
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scandals, to name just a few examples. Such stories compel this project, but in themselves, they 
remain at the level of spectacle that requires theorizing. In the chapters to come, my aim is to 
illustrate the emotional labour of narrating spectacle in order to interpret the conflict between 
passionate life and going mad. I work with the discourse of psychoanalysis, in which I find in a 
language for reckoning with the question of how research might repair or renew a capacity for 
representing emotional and relational life.  
This research thus attempts to bring significance to the passions of education by 
interpreting untold phantasies brought to and brought out in pedagogy. To the discourse of 
mental health and education, I bring a view of education as itself a passionate emotional situation 
and a theory of learning as a crisis that cannot be cured but can be narrated. As Britzman’s body 
of research argues: “What we make of knowledge and what we make knowledge from is a 
problem that never goes away” (2006a, p. 121). This interminable conflict is not the barrier to 
teaching and learning, but is the very ground of education. Reading scenes of teaching and 
learning through Britzman’s psychoanalytic formulation of education allows me to interpret 
phantasies that ward against difficulty: phantasies of mastery, compliance, success, and cure, for 
example. Accordingly, in this research I work to “make knowledge from” the phantasies 
surrounding scenes of breakdown in order to represent conflicts of passion. The work of 
representation, I suggest, brings to light phantasies that otherwise threaten to undermine 
aliveness in teaching and learning in the production of a “mad education.”  
Moreover, I bring to the study of mental health in education Kristeva’s (1995) suggestion 
that we suffer from rather than are cured by the absence of passion. Relatedly, I argue that when 
“maladies of the soul” are left un-interpreted we may “end up destroying psychic life” altogether 
(Kristeva, 1995, p. 10). Working from Kristeva’s theory of passion and maladies, therefore, 
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allows me to read mental health as an interminable problem of renewing and representing 
psychical life. Across this research, I trace and interpret breakdowns in symbolization in order to 
re-find the passionate imaginary in the work of making the mind in education and research. The 
intervention is to bring to the field’s concerns about emotional well-being a theory of passion as 
the lifeblood of the mind and a theory of madness as something to represent. Schools and 
universities, then, might be places where meaning breakdown is explored and engaged for its 
untold significance, significance that spectacular discourses of prevention and cure cannot yet 
engage.  
 In the chapters to come, I trace the uneven movement of passion in erogenous zones that 
range from the body to narrative and examine why this study should matter to education. To be 
clear, by education, I am not referring solely to practices and activities underway within the 
school’s walls. Rather, I mean to signal phantasies that affect the meaning of education in its 
broadest sense that refers to growth, transformation, and relationships. Here, I am thinking with 
Anna Freud (1935/1979) who offers this expansive view of education when she argues that “the 
education of a child begins with his first day of life” (p. 39, emphasis in original). By the time the 
child enters the school, A. Freud observes, education has been well under way, grounded as it is 
in the phantasies that comprise the relation between the adult and the child. Education begins 
neither with schooling nor consciousness, but rather structuring phantasy formations that 
facilitate and obstruct meaning.4  
                                                
4 In this dissertation, I treat education as an elusive concept that comprises a myriad of meanings and calls for 
interpretation. At times, education refers to a relation (often intergenerational), while at other times it represents the 
encounter with social expectations of a given society. It is also read as an effect of phantasy that carries unconscious 
wishes and desires. Above all, I read education as an experience that each of us makes significant in narrative. I am 
especially interested in stressing an idea of education that exceeds the school, though can also include it. For 
instance, if the group psychology of schooling is marked by a passion for compliance or mastery, I argue that this 
has social and psychical significance for people’s efforts to find ways to live in relation to their passion. As much as 
we make education in the ways we occupy the idea of education, I also argue that education acts on subjects. For 
example, in chapter two I posit education as comprised of a dynamic tension between the invitation to create and the 
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Working from psychoanalytic theories of symbolization, I read passionate phantasies that 
precede the conscious time of the school and of understanding and I examine the status of 
narrative in representing passion in education.5 I also analyze various forms of madness that 
emerge from symbolic collapse (Segal, 1957). The work of interpreting the collapse of narrative 
touches also on methodological concerns. My interest is in developing a reading practice that can 
represent passion in education while resisting the certainty that characterizes madness. This work 
also theorizes an education that can bear and recreate itself with a different relationship to human 
passion. The reading practice I enact thus takes as axiomatic that research is a work of 
questioning that does not end with answers or the certainty of knowledge. Key to my reading 
practice is representing the emotional significance of passion and its relation to madness, without 
either idealizing this condition or pathologizing it as something to fix through the right 
education.  
Chapter one reads the aims of education from the vantage of emotional life. Specifically, 
I read idealizations of enlightenment and mastery for the madness that such ideality cannot yet 
represent. Through three figures that disrupt the enlightenment ideal—the question child, the 
normal student, and the mad student—I discuss the valence of “negative capability” (Keats as 
cited in Britzman, 2009, p. 118) as the interminable ground of working through of the passions 
                                                                                                                                                       
psychic labor of working through the desire to copy and be copied, a tension first encountered in the bond with the 
mother. In chapter three, education concerns the capacity to heed the maternal law of seriality that would allow for 
more than one mind to exist. Beginning in the maternal relation, then, education is defined in this dissertation as a 
psychical problem that faces us with the dilemma of how to make a self in relationship to both inside and outside 
pressures, both implicitly and explicitly rendered.  
5 By narrative, I mean the symbolization of (unconscious) phantasy in words and in signs. I argue that narrative 
makes from passionate ties a meaningful construction that conveys emotional significance. In this research, I 
construct a narrative of education using the aesthetic form of film, which I suggest is a particularly useful medium 
for conveying unconscious phantasies that fall outside of linguistic representation. For instance, Black Swan’s 
graphic visual representation of the dream, its grotesque representation of bodily insides, the depiction of symptoms, 
and the unspoken manifestations of the tie to the (m)other give expression to the excesses of conscious thought. The 
visual and auditory quality of film exposes what the written word cannot fully grasp or master yet can nonetheless 
engage. In this study, therefore, I turn largely to film because of its capacity to represent the passionate unconscious. 
Narrative, in this context, is a belated construction that gives symbols to unconscious conflict. 
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of emotional life. The following chapters are then organized by three positions: the student 
(chapter two), the group (chapter three), and the teacher (chapter four). In chapter two, I examine 
the student’s paranoid phantasies of mastery and compliance that are transferred to the teacher 
from the first passionate bond with the mother. Chapter three works with D.W. Winnicott and 
Juliet Mitchell to interpret phantasies of singularity and annihilation in the making of a group. 
Chapter four examines the breakdowns of the teacher. Here, I distinguish between the cultural 
myth of the heroic teacher and the teacher’s capacity to mind the gap between rescuing the 
students and reparation in contexts of loss and breakdown.  
The core chapters of the work (two, three, and four) work with fictional representations in 
order to think about the difficult work of representing the passionate mind. Against the spectacle 
of mental health in educational discourse, I argue that fictional narratives make it possible to play 
with the convergence and divergence of passion and madness without the urgency to cure. The 
fictional narratives I work with are also filmic. In my interpretations, the intent is not to offer a 
formative analysis, but to use this visual medium as a screen for thinking about the dynamic 
tension between passion and madness as it manifests in teaching and learning.  
The films I select represent a diversity of the genre: horror, dystopic science fiction, and 
drama. Yet these films don’t necessarily fit into any one genre. For instance, Black Swan 
(Medavoy, Messer, Oliver, Franklin, & Aronofsky, 2011) may best belong in a genre “between 
melodrama and horror” (Brauerhoch, 1995). The filmic rendering of The Hunger Games 
(Jacobson, Kilik, & Ross, 2012) also “defies easy genre classification” (Henthorne, 2012, p. 30). 
According to Tom Henthorne (2012), 
…it is young adult fiction that addresses themes usually reserved for adults; a science 
fiction novel that is largely unconcerned with science and technology; a dystopian fiction 
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that ends hopefully, at least on a societal level; a survivor story in which the survivor 
never fully recovers; and a Bildungsroman in which the protagonist regresses as much as 
she progresses. (p. 30) 
Similarly, Monsieur Lazhar (Déry, McCraw, & Falardeau, 2011) is a drama that begins more 
like a horror movie. Its opening scene features a dead teacher hanging from the rafters of the 
classroom’s ceiling.  
There are also larger thematic genres into which these films can be placed. In addition to 
being a horror/melodrama about motherly passion and mad jealousy, Black Swan follows in the 
tradition of films about troubled artists, inclusive of the The Red Shoes (Powell & Pressburger, 
1948) and the recently released Whiplash (Blum, Estabrook, Litvak, Lancaster, & Chazelle, 
2014). In chapter three, I pose a thematic relationship between The Hunger Games and William 
Golding’s (1954) Lord of the Flies, specifically on the theme of group breakdown against an 
absent or malevolent authority. Monsieur Lazhar, meanwhile, assumes its position in a long line 
of teacher films, what Mary Dalton (1995, 2006) describes as a “Hollywood curriculum” of 
“good teachers” (Dalton, 1995, p. 23). In this heroic context, my emphasis is on the possibilities 
of communication opened up because of the teacher’s capacity to work through the phantasy of 
rescue to face the pain of loss. Across their diversity, each film occupies the borderland that 
concerns my dissertation: between representing and collapsing under the passionate weight of the 
emotional world.  
Each film also brings into play the body and narrative as sites for holding and/or working 
through mad passion. The films I work with in chapter two and three—Black Swan and The 
Hunger Games, respectively—are particularly poignant for comprising what Linda Williams 
(1991) terms “body genres” (p. 3; see also Clover, 1987). Williams uses this term to describe 
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films marked by excess: “there is the spectacle of a body caught in the grip of intense sensation 
or emotion” (p. 4). Such films—she works specifically with horror, melodrama, and 
pornography—focus the body as a site of ecstasy. Significant for the present study of passion and 
madness is the connection of ecstasy to the Greek word for insanity, as well as sexual excitement 
and “rapture” (Williams, 1991, p. 4). Horror films, melodramas, and pornography, Williams 
argues, portray bodies in the grip of ecstatic sex, violence, and emotion, and become objects that 
also move audiences to “mimic” the affects represented (p. 4). While this may be ground for 
dismissing these films or assigning them low cultural status, Williams argues that they rather 
emphasize “a cultural form of problem solving” (p. 9). Her argument is that such films stage and 
re-cast interminable problems of identity and difference in relationship to forgotten phantasies 
pertaining to an irrecoverable “event” that is, as Jean Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis describe, “the 
origin of the subject” (as cited in Williams, 1991, p. 10). “Body genres” enliven original 
phantasies (i.e. of Oedipal triumph, castration, seduction, mergence with the mother) and thus 
serve a psychic function as well as a cultural function by “recast[ing] the nature of these 
problems” of bodies, difference, passion, and madness in the containing space of the screen 
(Williams, 1991, p. 12).  
Following Williams, I view Black Swan and The Hunger Games as modern-day examples 
of body genres for the ways they symbolize the body—both the individual body and the body of 
the group—as a site of ecstasy, and in turn, alert viewers to their own bodies. In these films, I 
construct a venue for symbolizing phantasies that are part of the passionate labour of embodying 
subjectivity in relation to others. Relatedly, chapter four’s examination of Monsieur Lazhar 
navigates the tensions of making an education from a context that seeks emotional well-being 
through the denial of the body and its passions (Kristeva’s “null” passion). But the characters in 
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this film must also fight to re-make a symbolic world in touch with the body and its passions in a 
context that is driven by a passion for death and destruction in the form of a teacher’s suicide, 
student bullying, and political terrorism. Read in relation to the body genre films that come in the 
chapters preceding it, Monsieur Lazhar may be a hopeful narrative of what it takes to re-find a 
connection to the body through the narration of moving stories, of which Black Swan and The 
Hunger Games are exemplars. Finally, I close the dissertation by returning to the research’s key 
question over how to interpret mental health and education from a position that recognizes 
passion as our human susceptibility to breakdown. 
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Chapter One 
A Method for Reading Madness in Education 
When passion is repressed in education, it returns in symptoms ranging from compliance 
to disaffection to inexplicable outbursts. This idea raises a difficult question that guides the 
present inquiry: How may teachers and students work with passion in a way that works against 
repression and enlivens the capacity for symbolization? I describe this question as difficult, in 
part, because passion challenges foundational ideas about education. One such idea concerns the 
field’s relationship to and use of knowledge. Where “best practices” and “evidence-based 
decision-making” seem to be “a mantra for policy-makers, politicians and influential media” 
(People for Education, 2013, p. 6), education writ large is guided by the enlightenment ideal of 
knowledge as the avenue to progressive change. In such a view, issues of mental health are 
overcome through appeals to reason. Here, knowledge takes shape as the application of skills 
that can facilitate well-being, ultimately with the view to help students learn more efficiently. 
Knowledge is a measure of success that promises mastery over the uncertainties of emotional 
life.  
But knowledge can also be “difficult,” as I will show through Britzman’s (1998) work 
with the concept. And knowledge can be a defence against emotional significance, a kind of 
pseudo-knowing that manifests as compliance. But also, one can have a passion for knowledge, a 
desire to find out, or get to the bottom of things, only to find oneself on shaky footing. Such 
passionate inquires can signal what Jacques Lacan (1998) terms a “passion for ignorance” (p. 
121)—the desire not to know. Knowledge, then, may idealize certainty in the search for a cure 
and it might also threaten that idealization. Knowledge can be empirical, belonging to the 
external world of experience. Knowledge can also be subjective, the product of external facts 
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mingling with internally held concerns, wishes, and desires. Across all these variations, 
knowledge is complex, elusive, itself difficult to know. In this sense, knowledge is not simply a 
cure for the unknown, but a site to examine the passion and madness that can make knowledge 
feel so contradictory, at times idealized, and if all goes well, an invitation to the uncertain labour 
of thinking.  
This chapter offers a psychoanalytic reading of knowledge that analyzes the 
enlightenment dream of education through a study of its unspoken conflicts and breakdowns. My 
ultimate aim is to theorize education as a project of narrating—rather than curing—passionate 
forms of knowledge. In what follows, I outline the framework of this inquiry through a 
discussion of three figures that disrupt the enlightenment ideal of knowledge in education: the 
question child, the normal student, and the mad student. My reading of these figures exposes the 
passionate core of education, where the adult’s reasons can neither resolve the child’s conflicts 
nor those of education. As such, this chapter posits a reading practice that highlights both passion 
and madness in education as something to symbolize rather than control or cure with “right” 
skills or application of knowledge. The chapter closes with a discussion of how aesthetic objects, 
such as in film and literature, offer a particularly rich site for a study of the passions of meaning-
making at the limits of mastery. 
 
Enlightenment Between Psychoanalysis and Education: The Question Child  
Psychoanalytic theories of psychic life offer a capacious understanding of the mind as 
made from the body, experience, and emotional life. As such, psychoanalysis as a theory of 
human development converges with theories of education. Still, the relationship between 
psychoanalysis and education is fraught. Such tension can be evidenced in the field of child 
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psychoanalysis as developed in the clinics of Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. Their differing 
views on how best to approach the child roused lively discussion. Both analysts held a view of 
interference as the grounds of a person’s development. But they were divided on what this meant 
for the child and the necessarily interfering adult (Phillips, 1988; Britzman, 2003). A. Freud 
argued for a preliminary phase to analysis to support the child to gradually accept the 
interference of reality. In contrast, Klein argued for the analytic value of staying close to the 
child’s phantasy rather than the external demands of reality-testing. While they argued over the 
handling of interference from external forces, both analysts held the view of interference as a 
phenomenon.  
The conflict between these two analysts is not unlike educational debates on how best to 
teach the child. We might think of A. Freud’s approach as guided by the principle of 
developmentally appropriate practice, which presumes to wait for the child’s readiness for 
certain knowledge. Klein might have argued that we are never really ready and so better to start 
working through now than later. Despite these differences, these arguing analysts disrupt a major 
paradigm of knowledge in education that promises mastery over the mind and body. The conflict 
between A. Freud and Klein offers another paradigm of knowledge made from the passionate 
work of making meaning from the interference of education, one that is other to the promise of 
mastery through reason. In what follows, I describe this paradigm shift using the figure of the 
“question child,” a figure who concerned both A. Freud and Klein, albeit to construct different 
analytic approaches to children. 
Delivered to teachers in Vienna, A. Freud’s (1935/1979) Psychoanalysis for Teachers 
and Parents: Introductory Lectures reminds her audience that education wants something from 
the child: “Step by step education aims at the exact opposite of the child’s instinctive desires” (p. 
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58). She worried about too much interference and framed education as a “never-ending battle” 
between the student and teacher, between instinctual life and the demands of the social world (as 
cited in Britzman, 2003, p. 76). Her ideas aligned with those of her father, S. Freud (1937), who 
described the work of psychoanalysis to involve the “taming” of instincts (p. 225). For S. Freud, 
instinctual life presented an interminable problem of existence to which psychoanalysis, 
education, and politics must answer. But this also meant, for S. Freud, that these are “impossible 
professions” insofar as “one can be sure beforehand of achieving unsatisfying results” (p. 248). 
A. Freud’s lectures foreshadow S. Freud’s idea of the impossible professions with a trace of 
optimism. Reminding teachers of the impositions of education on the potential of children, she 
suggests that teachers offer a gentle hand. A. Freud was concerned about adult interference given 
that the child experiences her own forms of interference from within. She urged educators to go 
easy with the child and do less harm, or risk the adult and child ending up in that “never-ending 
battle” further impeding the child’s desire for insight or understanding. For A. Freud, while 
education could lead to enlightenment, it required a gentle navigator.  
Implied in A. Freud’s idea of interference towards the instincts of the learner is its 
converse: Instinctual life also interferes with education. The drives that comprise the 
unconscious undo “the very thought of education” as a panacea of enlightenment (Britzman, 
2009). Britzman (2003, 2006a) interprets this other scene of interference in her study of the 
Kleinian archive and the “paper war” (Britzman, 2006a, p. 121) enacted between Klein and A. 
Freud. Originally, somewhat like A. Freud, Klein set out to offer a prophylactic, psychoanalytic 
education to her son Eric, or Fritz as he is known in Klein’s (1921/1975) paper. In this effort, 
Klein began with the hope that education could allay the child’s future emotional conflicts by 
meeting the child’s questions with stark reality, particularly questions concerning sexual 
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reproduction. This enlightenment education paralleled S. Freud’s (1909/2002) work with Little 
Hans, as well as A. Freud’s advice to teachers. All were based on the idea that the child needs to 
know the fact of his position in the family and then he can accept what he can and cannot have. 
From this view, child psychoanalysis was an educational endeavour aimed at bringing the child 
closer to social reality.  
What happens next in this psychoanalytic education is where things get interesting for 
Klein: Fritz wasn’t interested in accepting the knowledge Klein offered. Instead, he used Klein’s 
answers to confirm his incredible theories about where babies come from. Something, Klein 
observed, was passionately driving the child away from reason and sexual enlightenment. In this 
pedagogical encounter, Klein confronted the very impossibility of education, as S. Freud also 
warned. And in the face of the child’s resistance to enlightenment, Klein faced “her own 
resistance to what else the child asks” (Britzman, 2006a, p. 125). In the second part of her paper, 
written two years later, Klein’s “question child” (Pontalis, 1981, p. 95) is born. This child figure 
helps her rethink child analysis as something other than a means of bringing the child closer to 
reality. The child’s resistance leads Klein to theorize a different kind of knowledge—that of 
phantasy—communicated in the child’s discourse, and eventually, the child’s play. The question 
child becomes a metaphor for a world of phantasy made from passionate object relations 
constructed between self and other, inside and outside.6 Britzman (2006b) describes Klein’s 
construction of phantasy as referencing “not just what the child imagined about the world” (p. 
66). “Rather,” Britzman continues, “phantasy preexist[s] knowledge of the actual world and 
                                                
6 Throughout the dissertation, I use the construction “object relating” and “object relations” to reference the 
unconscious impressions we make from our ties to the external world, as well as how these impressions affect new 
ties. This mode of thinking about the unconscious derives largely from the Object-Relations school of 
psychoanalysis, inclusive of Klein and Winnicott among others. Key to this orientation is its emphasis on a lively 
internal world populated by internalized objects. In Margot Waddell’s (2002) words, “The mind [is] a kind of 
internal theatre, a theatre for generating the meaning of external experiences, one in which [is] enacted the stuff of 
fairy tales” (p. 2). 
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represent[s] one’s feelings. Phantasy is the carnival of children’s feelings about their inner 
worlds and their object relations” (p. 66). Touched by phantasy, Klein shifts gears: “The 
interpretation of the child’s phantasies and anxieties now takes precedence over any educational 
attempt” (Britzman, 2006a, p. 122). Because for Klein education could only be thought of as a 
project of enlightenment, she breaks ties with education in order to cultivate the analytic side of 
interpreting phantasy.  
Britzman (2006a, 2006b), for her part, interprets what Klein could only suggest: 
Education, too, is touched by the child’s resistance to enlightenment and can be rethought 
through the notion of phantasy. For Britzman, education is not made through or because of 
knowledge, per se. Rather, it is made from thinking through failures in knowledge, when the aim 
of enlightenment breaks down and a question over meaning emerges: 
Klein’s difficult contribution was to wonder if there is a place where education cannot go, 
but where, nonetheless, knowledge can become.…Where does anyone’s curiosity come 
from and what stops it short? Klein, allowing for the inexplicable reach of phantasy, 
opened our educational archive to its own otherness, reminding us that there is no 
thinking without phantasy. (Britzman, 2006a, pp. 120-121) 
In bringing Klein to education, Britzman thus articulates at least two questions: What meanings 
can be made from the breakdowns in our pedagogical ideals? Where the question child interferes 
with education, what can we make of education? 
 Britzman notices how the question child instantiates for the adult an uncanny return to 
questions of existence. She suggests that in the meeting between the child’s questions and the 
adult’s knowledge, two more burning questions arise: “What can I make because I was made” 
(Britzman, 2006a, p. 130) and what has already happened “without my noticing” (Britzman, n.d., 
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par. 24)? While each of us will ask these questions of ourselves, the difficulty lies in our 
incapacity to find answers for them by ourselves: We depend on others to offer us clues from 
which we can author a history of existence, a puzzle of the self with missing pieces. This 
paradox of dependency and autonomy is precisely what Klein discovers in her analysis of Fritz 
and, arguably, it is the defining feature of education’s “impossibility” (S. Freud, 1937, p. 248). 
Confounding the paradox is the fact that most adults do not consciously remember what it was 
like to become a question child. Nor do they necessarily understand the significance of how their 
own existential questions were met by the adults—parents, teachers—in whose position they 
now stand. Still, the force of these experiences returns in the encounter with the child’s efforts to 
make questions that refuse and challenge the adult’s knowledge. Indeed, something other than 
knowledge drives the dynamic between adult and child. 
Psychoanalysts term this dynamic the transference: the animation of the adult’s forgotten 
past with the present child. Transference also references a transfer of conflict, as, for example, 
when the adult’s uncertainty is displaced onto the child whose lack then stands in for the adult’s 
own. If the adult is able to symbolize the transference, a renewed paradigm of knowledge may 
emerge. In this paradigm, the dynamics of transference structuring relations between the adult 
and the child becomes the subject of education. Here, the battle signalled by A. Freud can be 
thought of as oscillating transferentially between the education of the child that the adult once 
was and the education of the child who is there. When Britzman reads pedagogy through the 
transference, she asks what else education might become if it were to interpret the interminable 
significance of phantasy, that is, without “settling the research of either the child or the adult” 
(2006b, p. 81). Adam Phillips (1995) argues similarly when he writes that “answers are not a 
cure” (p. 3), but rather the very ground of still more questions from which to spin meaning. 
 38 
Education, in this view, is “elusive” (Britzman, 2006a, p. 124). Transference is not merely an 
obstacle to enlightenment but a resource for interpreting (unconscious) phantasy as the grounds 
of trying to know the self, other, and world. Transference is knowledge that invites associations 
about the emotional significance of existence that we can never finally answer. 
Where Klein discovered phantasy in the child’s question, Britzman finds phantasy in the 
“childhood of education” (2009, p. 28) cast in the adult’s dreams of enlightenment. Specifically, 
Britzman (2006b) interprets a “phantasy of knowledge,” described as a belief “that knowledge 
can, in and of itself, transform the self and its superfluous infantile theories” (p. 80). As we will 
see in the chapters of this dissertation, this phantasy of knowledge can fuel a sense of mastery 
over the self and bodily affects, where knowledge is imagined to be the guarantor of 
development, a cure for sexuality, and the answer to un-reason. Britzman offers a way to 
interpret such ideality in the dreams of education: The adult might insist on rationality as cure for 
passion in order to save herself from facing the limits of her own mastery and, too, the 
difficulties of dependency. Under such conditions, passion circulates in the idealization of 
enlightenment as education’s royal road to change. Sometimes, as I illustrate in the next section, 
the child learns to embody the adult’s phantasies all too well. Surviving the disillusionment of 
enlightenment is both the adult’s and the child’s best chance to symbolize the emotional 
significance of meaningful existence. 
 
Disillusioning Enlightenment Education: The Normal Student 
In the educational archive of the twentieth century, the psychoanalytic phantasy of 
knowledge as cure for conflict circulates in debates that split education into traditional and 
progressive theories and practices. These debates are passionately fought, with pedagogical 
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practice swinging from one view to the other (see Thomkins, 2008). Ironically, these shifts 
remind those working in the field that the conflicts of education cannot be cured, even if this is 
the driving force for such conflicts in the first place. Such debates may comprise the educational 
equivalent to the arguments between Klein and A. Freud, where un-thought passion makes for 
stark divisions and leaves little room for making significance across differences (Britzman, 
2003). In the 1980s, however, a new figure—the “normal student”—began to disillusion 
progressives of their dream of freedom through non-interference. At the same time, clinical 
psychoanalysis confronted the consequences of the child adhering to normative ideals. Taken 
together, the normal student poses yet another challenge to the ideals of education.  
Influenced by Michel Foucault’s reconceptualization of power, new criticisms of 
progressivism aligned its endgame and methods with traditional education’s project of 
compliance. Valerie Walkerdine (1984, 1986), for instance, brings a Foucauldian analysis of 
power/knowledge to a study of child-centered, progressive education, dismantling the dominant 
notion that education operates outside the confines of power and politics. Specifically, she argues 
that scientific and pedagogical discourses and practices pertaining to the “nature” of the 
“developing child” produce the very normative ideas from which earlier iterations of 
progressivism sought to liberate the child (1984, p. 190). Seemingly free to play, to 
“experience,” to create her own meaning, the child is controlled by technologies of normalization 
designed to ensure development moving towards a rational, self-governing subject. In the myth 
of the progressive, “happy classroom,” Walkerdine (1986) writes, “passion is transformed into 
the safety of reason” (p. 58). Passion, here, becomes reason, a passion for no passion, and 
freedom merely an illusion of autonomy.  
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This critical moment in the history of educational theory unsettles the ideal of 
enlightenment. Where once the problem of education appeared solved by the ideals of 
progressivism, Walkerdine’s criticisms expose its similarities to traditionalism in its pursuit of an 
enlightened subject/child free from passion and certainly its madness. In this moment in the 
educational archive, the question child of progressivism is revealed as subject to a disciplinary 
gaze, destined for normalization. The normal student is exposed as the idealized endpoint for the 
stubborn persistence of the question child. Walkerdine’s critique points to the risks of this 
normative narrative in its simultaneous production of the opposite: the pathological “other” who 
fails to be normal. Her criticism points to the relationship between mechanisms of power and the 
pathologization of social differences and of classed, raced, differently abled, and gendered 
subjectivities that do not display the requisite qualities of normalized developmental frames. 
Walkerdine suggests that implied in the image of the normal student is a white, middle-class, 
able-bodied boy-child, while “others” are equated with their personal failure to fit this 
suffocating mould of the educated subject.  
At the same time as these inquiries into the production of normality and the 
marginalization of difference were taking place in education, a curious new patient appeared in 
the psychoanalytic clinic. This patient calls into question enlightenment theories of education, 
but from a different angle than the one noted by Walkerdine and her contemporaries. This child 
also stands in stark contrast to the question child who passionately resists enlightenment. Joyce 
McDougall (1980/1992) described this figure as “supernormal” and as an “anti-analysand.” To 
characterize this figure, Christopher Bollas (1987) coined the term “normotic” and offered the 
case of Tom, an adolescent who was hospitalized after a suicide attempt. After encountering 
Tom, Bollas describes his surprise. Rather than meeting the depressed person he imagined he 
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would meet in suicidal Tom, he finds Tom to be very sociable and astute. He reports that by all 
standards, Tom is normal. Bollas notes that Tom’s family “appeared ideal…[and was] regarded 
by their friends as steady people with their feet firmly planted on the ground” (p. 150). Upon 
meeting Tom, Bollas felt that Tom knew the rules of the game and “he meant to be up to any 
skill on my part” (p. 149). He recounts that “Tom behaved as if nothing was at all unusual in his 
immediate history” (p. 149), and he recalls feeling “confronted with a mentality that admitted of 
no inquiry or reflection” (p. 150). Unlike the question child of Klein’s archive, Tom is a child 
who has seemingly stopped asking questions of the world. In this child, passion—as manifest in 
burning questions that tie the body to language and the world—is sacrificed for empty clichés, or 
slogans. Bollas offers a few examples, which Tom hears from his father: “It will all turn out for 
the best” and “If you want to get ahead in life, you have to get on with life” (p. 149). Tom’s 
internalization of these taglines symbolizes an anti-question child, or what Bollas describes as an 
“object with no subject” (p. 156).7  
                                                
7 This personality bears resemblance to the “as if” personality, described by Helen Deutsch (see Roazen, 1985) in 
the 1930s and the “false self” described by Winnicott (1986). Bollas (1987), however, distinguishes between the 
normotic personality and these other two. The difference seems to rest on the relative presence of a counterpoint to 
the false self: the true self. In reference to the schizoid personality, the extreme example of Winnicott’s false/true 
self split, Bollas notes that “there is a private inner self that goes on living a secret life, hidden and protected by a 
false self. Schizoid persons do have complex, possibly even rich, inner fantasy lives” (p. 152). But, he continues, 
“[t]he normotic person is almost exactly the opposite…he would have very little inner psychic life” (p. 152). 
Moreover, for Bollas the normotic embodies the “drive not to be (human) but to master being,” akin to Freud’s 
(1920) death instinct, theorized as the drive to “rid the psyche of the tensions of being” (Bollas, 1987, p. 143). So 
whereas the “as if” personality or the subject wrestling with the false/true self split embodies to varying degrees the 
conflicts and tensions associated with a social self and a private self, or a compliant self and a creative self, the 
normotic seemingly has no struggle. For the normotic, the true self has become the false self, and the gap between is 
foreclosed. In place of struggle there is breakdown or revolt against living such collapse, as Bollas finds in Tom’s 
suicide: “It is my view that Tom’s breakdown constitutes a mute refusal to live within normotic culture, even though 
at the point of his suicide attempt he had not discovered other avenues for the expression of his feelings” (p. 151). 
Despite Bollas’ demarcation, we can notice here how the “as if” or “false self” is a likely theoretical precursor to the 
normotic. Deutsch described the “as if” personality as giving an impression of “complete normality,” while making 
productions “totally devoid of originality...without the slightest personal trace” (as cited in Roazen, 1985, p. 320). 
Such people—and Deutsch specifically emphasized this phenomenon as primarily associated with women—were 
masters at living lives of fiction, though unconsciously so. As she described of one patient, “She never had cause to 
complain about lack of affect because she was never conscious of it” (as cited in Roazen, 1985, p. 321). Perhaps key 
here is the idea that a person, as well as a group or culture, may be more or less conscious of the play of emotional 
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The case of Tom symbolizes the passion of compliance, perhaps best articulated by 
McDougall (1980/1992) in the form of a question: While “each child...must take his place in the 
order of things,” she asks, “does it have to be at the price of the loss of that magical time when 
all thoughts, fantasies, and feelings were at least thinkable, representable?” (p. 483). She 
elaborates further:  
Obviously the child, who does not yet know the ‘norms’ life imposes, must submit, little 
by little, to the normalizing effect of his environment and family structure, with their 
ideals and interdictions, if he hopes to take his place one day as an adult among adults. 
But to be caught in the grip of an overly powerful social ego, over-reasonable and 
overadapted, is no more desirable than the dominance of unleashed instinctual forces. 
The point at which the ‘norm’ becomes the straitjacket of the soul and the cemetery of 
imagination is a delicate one to define. (p. 484) 
McDougall’s discussion, mirrored in the case of Tom, offers a new take on the risks of 
education’s demand for adaptation to reality: Adaptation can be too successful. Failure is 
necessary for imagination. When passion becomes a passion for the other’s passion, and when 
this passion is mistaken for successful learning, the “feverish forces of life” become compliant, 
rather than “filtered” through the symbolic (p. 485). Moreover, normotic compliance loses the 
subject, leaving one vulnerable to breakdown when overwhelmed by forces that exceed the 
child’s understanding. Indeed, because of the passionate excesses of the body, none of us is 
entirely normal. But this is also good news because being good at being normal can leave one 
open to the madness of compliance. 
                                                                                                                                                       
life and the subjectivity that passion calls forth. A collapse between true and false self, or in Bollas terms, the object 
and the subject, may be so extreme that the conflict appears as an absence of conflict.  
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Both educational and psychoanalytic archives evidence the disillusionment of an 
enlightenment narrative that frames development as progression from an unruly self to a rational 
subject in control of itself and knowledge. Both fields highlight the relationship between 
knowledge and power and, through this nexus, ask how the self becomes disciplined and to what 
effect(s). And both fields point to the dangers of the child who does not ask questions. For 
Walkerdine, this danger was the formation of docile bodies whose passions could only be 
pathologized and subject to disciplinary regimes, no matter how gentle and subtle. For analysts 
such as Bollas and McDougall, compliance meant the loss of subjectivity and the risk of 
breakdown exchanged for the promise of conflict avoidance. Closing the door on the internal 
world opens another “dangerous door to the explosion of the imaginary in the soma itself” 
(McDougall, 1980/1992, p. 484). Thus while educational theorists pointed to the ways that 
progressive narratives construct particular subjects as abnormal or pathological, analysts asked 
what is dangerous and damaging about being so good. From these two vantages, no one escapes 
the pitfalls of an education in which knowledge is to be mastered and a body simply controlled. 
The problem of passion as a question of existence persists as one that enlightenment cannot, and 
ought not try to, cure.  
 
The Mad Student 
In our own time we have not yet settled the question of what will be made of passion in 
education. Nor have we adequately learned from the disillusionment that met progressives in the 
1980s. Indeed, a third figure has arrived in the contemporary moment that renews the question of 
passion as a problem of education. This emergent figure also shares some of the disturbing 
qualities of those found in the question child and the normal student. I am calling this figure the 
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“mad student,” a figure who stands as a reminder that education has not solved the problems of 
passionate existence and poses, yet again, a challenge to the thought of education as a site of 
mastery and enlightenment.  
By “mad” I do not necessarily mean a person diagnosed with a mental illness; in fact, the 
mad student may excel at normality in the ways that Tom did. Rather, by mad student I am 
referring to a figure that manifests the collapse of the gap between affect and its symbolic 
transformation in language. In the discourse of Kleinian psychoanalysis, this phenomenon is 
called symbolic collapse and refers to the lost capacity to acknowledge and take pleasure in the 
space between internal phantasy and external reality (Segal, 1957). Symbolic collapse registers 
the submission of internal passion entirely to the demands of outside reality or, the mistaken 
belief in internal life as the only reality, without holding a space between them. The mad student 
is burdened by a state of mind where the symbol is felt to be the object, rather than a 
representative of it. Hanna Segal (1957) terms this kind of symbol formation “symbolic 
equation” (p. 393). Kristeva (2009) terms this certainty of belief a “malady of ideality” (p. 18) a 
defence against the loss of one’s ideals that are also necessary for making a relation to the 
outside world. This malady is made from the defense against thinking of passionately held ideas 
as beliefs, and instead taking them to be facts. The mad student refuses the interminability of 
making meaning from emotional experience in the certainty of finding a cure for the questions 
that constitute learning, and life. The mad student suffers this collapse in a range of symptoms 
that can include paranoia, language inhibition, and acting out against the self and the other—such 
as when Nathan Kotylak’s gave himself over to the destructive actions of fandom that June 
evening in 2011.  
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The mad student is the figure of concern at the centre of discourses of mental health and 
illness in education. In response to this figure, I argue that education has turned, once again, to 
the phantasy of expert knowledge to cure what ails the system, and children. The dream of 
enlightenment returns in training manuals and programs aimed at educating teachers and 
administrators on how to read warning signs of mental illness and make suitable adjustments to 
their teaching practices in order to allay the threat of (student) breakdown. These prescriptives 
may be useful to practitioners. But formulaic solutions also evade a more crucial question called 
forth by this decade’s version of the (anti-) question child: What is education good for if 
knowledge alone cannot save us from the passionate experience of living? In confrontations with 
the mad student, begging for interpretation is the passion-filled transference one also finds in 
encounters with the question child. In the response to the mad student, however, we find yet 
more madness in the field’s manic pursuit of a cure through expert knowledge.  
The mad student compels my investigation of education as the study of passionate object 
relating. I ask three questions: First, if education wants something from the child, what else can 
education want if not—or not only—enlightenment? Second, what would it mean for education 
to risk letting go of phantasies of mastery secured in aims for rational knowledge? And third, in 
Kotylak’s words, what kinds of “education and support” do students and teachers need to engage 
the indefinite working through of passion that Kristeva identifies as foundational to language and 
to life itself? To study these questions, I turn to a theory of narrating emotional life and passion 
that operates on a different register that mastery over passion and the body. Kristeva’s (2010a) 
theory of symbolization offers such a theory, to which I turn next.  
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From the Body to Narrative: Education as Symbolization 
The main claim of my dissertation is that narrative is education’s best chance to respond 
well to the complexity of passion. My interest in narrative derives from its capacity to hold and 
transform passion that may first appear in symptoms acted out in the body and the mind. Based 
on Kristeva’s (2010a) discussion of language as the carrier wave of the drives, this idea of 
narrative defines language not as a discrete entity made up of letters and words that code for 
singular meanings, but as a relationship to internal life that gives life to passion—“work[ing] 
through its imaginary substance indefinitely” (p. 94). Another way to think of narrative is 
through the notion of symbolization. Symbolization comprises a “stylistic labor” through which 
language labours to communicate meaning and, in this way, renews “curiosity and creativity in a 
plurality of connections” (Kristeva, 2010a, p. 169). Bringing symbolization to a study of 
education opens the possibility for a relational response to mental health and its breakdowns. 
When education is framed as a project of symbolizing passionate object relations, the study of 
education can become a study of the meaning held in breakdowns, before their correction or 
cure. Symbolization, I argue, is the missing term in theories of education and mental health that 
repeat enlightenment or normative ideals of development. 
Kristeva’s thinking about symbolization follows the Freudian tradition of the “talking 
cure,” wherein significance is thought to be made belatedly via the work of representing what 
might otherwise play out symptomatically (and, indeed, already has). For Kristeva and others, 
symbolization is a relational experience tied to the presence and the loss of the (m)other. If our 
bodily needs drive us into the arms of the (m)other, the failure of the (m)other to meet our every 
need also drives us into the social world of language. Words carry the tacit admission that 
meaning emerges in the space between self and other. Narrative thus emerges in the gap between 
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experience and understanding, which never fully closes, thereby making way for new narratives. 
In this equation, passion’s prerogative is to perverse language, Kristeva (2010b) argues, using 
psychical detours to re-create the self in a “third dimension” of story (p. 684). In Kristeva’s 
words, passion “transforms even psychic accidents into the pleasure [jouissance] of searching for 
oneself by means of a third dimension” (p. 684). The third dimension refers to the position of a 
“speaking being” (p. 684), through which meaning is ever re-made through speech. Meaning 
“carried by sublimation” (p. 684) is therefore a creative act, a revolt as she calls it elsewhere 
(Kristeva, 2000). Language transforms the maternal relation into cultural experience even while 
it refuses to comply to pre-set meanings of social and historical discourse.  
The breakdown of sublimation leaves one without a way to work through the raw 
experiences of instinctual life. Rather, instinctual life and unconscious affect erupt in scenes of 
crisis or manifest in quiet forms of madness, “maladies of the soul” in Kristeva’s (1995, p. 9) 
lexicon. For Kristeva, the making and re-making of this symbolic capacity is the work of 
psychoanalysis. She writes: 
It is the delicacy of the speaking being that the analyst examines today…The 
Freudian voyage into the night of desire gives way to taking care of the capacity 
to think: never one without the other. The result? Modern psychoanalysis, as I 
understand it, seems to be an elucidation of the vulnerability resulting from the 
biology/language crossroad, as well as a perpetual rebirth of the subject, if and 
only if this vulnerability is recognized. Situated in this untenable place, 
psychoanalysts, by going beyond the frequent disasters and increasingly visible 
psychosomatic terrain, have the privilege…of accompanying new emerging 
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capacities to think–represent–think; capacities which are as much new bodies as 
new lives. (Kristeva, 2006, p. 222, emphasis in original) 
Rather than a project of enlightenment, wherein the patient or the analyst comes to master 
unconscious life and bodily affects through reason, Kristeva stays close to Klein’s interest in 
symbolizing phantasy in order to elucidate passion in symbols. Here, psychoanalysis involves the 
use of symbols through which to play with passion and to (passionately) defend against this 
labour. For Kristeva, psychoanalysis involves constructing narratives that are able to symbolize 
the significance of emotional life as well as breakdowns in meaning instantiated by passionate 
object relating. These narratives represent madness, “this untenable place” between the 
psychosomatic and the psychoanalytic, between the body as given and “new lives” made in 
language. 
Education too is infused with passionate object relating and defenses against making 
significance from our human ties. A critical group of educational theorists draw from 
psychoanalytic theory to craft narratives of education that give “new life” to the meaning of 
learning, curriculum, pedagogy, and research (in addition to Britzman’s body of work cited in 
my introduction see Appel, 1999; Bibby, 2011; Bracher, 1999; Britzman & Pitt, 2004; Farley, 
2011, 2012, 2013; Felman, 1992; Georgis & Kennedy, 2009; Gilbert, 2014; Min Shim, 2014; 
Mishra Tarc, 2011, 2013, 2015a, 2015b; Pitt, 2003; Pitt & Britzman, 2003; Salvio, 2007; 
Sandlos, 2009; Simon, Rosenberg, & Eppert, 2000; Todd, 2003). These studies offer narratives 
of emotional life as a means to work through the symptoms and conflicts which languish un-
symbolized in stalled scenes of teaching and learning. Education becomes in this research a site 
of uncertain becoming, fraught with love, hate, aggression, reparation, and hanging its hope in 
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the possibility for the belated work of making from these affective encounters new questions and 
inspired constructions.  
Borrowing from poet John Keats, Britzman (2009) refers to uncertain becoming as 
“negative capability,” which opens the possibility for knowledge to be something other than 
mastered and performed. “With negative capability,” Britzman writes, “we may begin to 
understand that living in the world requires our response to the world and our responsibility in 
the world is affected by our having to symbolize the world” (p. 119). Drawing from Britzman, 
we can think of symbolization as not only a psychical labour of thinking. It is also a 
responsibility and an ethic of care. To respond to the world through symbolization is to take 
responsibility for the ways that our symbolic efforts construct the world. Implied in Britzman’s 
discussion of negative capability is the poignant question of the question child: What can I make 
from how I was made? Returning to Kristeva’s emphasis on symbolization, I offer a revision: 
What kind of world can narrative make? And yet, negative capability also carries crisis and can 
lead to what Keats calls “irritable reaching after fact and reason” (as cited in Britzman, 2009, p. 
118). The incapacity to tolerate frustration can also lead to breakdown. Here is where a return to 
mastery and to enlightenment ideals in education may flourish. Here also is where symbolic 
collapse may embody efforts to protect the self and the group from too much uncertainty. These 
symptoms of breakdown in negative capability thus invite researchers to repair education by re-
finding the symbolic impulse. 
Thinking with Kotylak’s statement that his riotous actions had “nothing to do with the 
education and support [he] received,” a theory of symbolization invites an experiment in thinking 
the relation that he cannot yet make. This is a subject who struggles to narrate and learn from 
passion. But what if Kotylak’s actions do have something to do with the education he did not 
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receive, namely an education capable of containing and transforming the passions of life 
(including the ordinary frustration of losing a hockey game) that makes us susceptible to 
breakdown? These manifestations of madness are what education risks, and all the more when it 
cannot tolerate the idea of narrating the risky business of passion. Education itself is subject to its 
own madness in its phantasies of mastery and enlightenment, what, returning to Kristeva, we can 
put under the heading of education’s syndrome of ideality. In the chapters to follow, then, I 
symbolize the ideality implied in phantasies of mad students, mad groups, and mad teachers and 
consider what meanings might emerge when education can stay close to the breakdown implied 
in each.  
 
To the Movies: Aesthetics and Symbolization 
To construct narratives of madness in education, I work from aesthetic texts that operate 
like Klein’s question child. As with the child who poses hard questions, the aesthetic objects I 
engage enliven transference by returning us to enigmatic questions of existence and influence 
that refuse any singular origin or cause. These objects also challenge normative ideas about 
passion in education by reminding viewers of passion’s ties to aggression and hatred. And these 
films challenge the pervasive idea that mastery over knowledge makes education by representing 
the madness of mastery in the collapse of negative capability. These objects, then, are resources 
for thought, provided we can engage them not as documentaries of “real” education, but as 
representations of the phantasies that animate scenes of teaching and learning. 
My discussion of aesthetic objects draws from the field of trauma studies. Trauma studies 
of the 1990s used aesthetic objects to theorize trauma as un-representable and to make 
interventions into straightforward assumptions about the transmissibility of history (see for 
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example Caruth, 1995, 1996). More recently, E. Ann Kaplan and Ban Wang (2004) argue against 
this insistence on un-representability as potentially melancholic. While recognizing the 
inadequacy of representation to capture and wholly repair moments of mass violence and cultural 
and historical rupture, they see representation as a crucial means by which a culture engages 
breakdown. As Kaplan and Wang claim: “History has shown that intensely traumatic periods 
spawned more narratives and images, rather than less” (p. 12). Moreover, with Dominick 
LaCapra (1994; see also LaCapra, 2001), they view an emphasis on trauma’s un-representability 
as risking both “psychic paralysis” (p. 5) and “push[ing] trauma into the mystified circle of the 
occult, something untouchable and unreachable” (p. 8). Their views on representation mirror 
Kristeva’s emphasis on symbolization: We make representations that give shape to bodily, 
relational experiences that are necessarily imperfect. 
Lisa Farley (2014) argues similarly, but makes the point particular to pedagogy. Like 
Kaplan and Wang, she acknowledges that catastrophic losses may make for melancholic states of 
mind that can lead to important insights about social and political life (see for example Ahmed, 
2010; Cvetkovich, 2012). But when considered through intergenerational relations of teaching 
and learning, this orientation to loss may work against the teacher’s ability to make a “lively 
education” in which loss and its affects can be encountered and narrated (p. 132). For Farley, 
“lively education” depends on a teacher able to “let go of idealized knowledge, including the 
idealized knowledge of loss” (p. 133) that structures melancholic attachments to history. At issue 
here is not simply the content of curriculum, but the teacher’s pedagogical capacity to invite 
students to narrate and interpret passionate encounters with representations of loss, and to 
consider how the world is affected by this ragged symbolic effort.  
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I suggest that aesthetic texts make for a lively education when they are read as enigmatic 
objects that animate existential questions about what it means to teach, learn, and be human. To 
return to Kaplan and Wang (2004), aesthetic texts are resources for thought in their efforts to 
symbolize the breakdown of thought: 
The visual media do not just mirror those experiences [of trauma]; in their courting and 
staging of violence they are themselves the breeding ground of trauma, as well as a 
matrix of understanding and experiencing of a world out of joint. The visual media have 
become a cultural institution in which the traumatic experience of modernity can be 
recognized, negotiated, and reconfigured. (p. 17, emphasis added) 
Through aesthetic objects there lies the opportunity for researchers to approach histories of 
trauma as both material and ever re-made. History can become, in Farley’s (2011) words, “a 
layered artifact born of social relationships, concrete events, desires and dream...[one] that 
cultivates imagination...without doing away with reality” (p. 32).  
Jim Garrett and Sara Matthews (2014) and Karyn Sandlos (2009, 2010) further 
demonstrate the pedagogical possibilities of learning from aesthetics objects. Film, for Sandlos 
(2010), can invite viewers to explore the “hidden investments and evasive measures” that 
structure harmful framings of sexuality, for example (p. 299). Film may also instantiate and 
represent “encounters with insignificance,” allowing educators to use film not to understand 
traumatic events (in this case, the 1999 school shooting at Columbine High School), “but [to 
explore] how one is affected by a story of horror” (2009, p. 56). Garrett and Matthews analyze 
the significance of the aesthetic of photography in the classroom. In particular, they speculate 
about how photographs may contain students’ emotional responses to the “pedagogical 
complexity” of learning from narratives of violence and learning to teach difficult histories (p. 
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334). Through unique perspectives, Garrett and Matthews each narrate how their pedagogies 
invite students to struggle with meaning made through encounters with the visual realm. They 
view the aesthetic of photography as a site of transference where anxiety in learning may be 
enlivened, visualized, and narrated. Across these examples, we can also see how a turn to the 
aesthetic in education may work to repair education. If, as Aparna Mishra Tarc (2011) puts it, 
“education in dehumanizing and hyper-instrumental social practices, and devastating regimes of 
thought and being interfere with our every chance to reach infinite human possibility” (p. 368), 
the aesthetic pedagogies that Sandlos, Matthews, and Garrett describe may return education to its 
emotional condition. 
Britzman’s work extends the significance of the aesthetic as a site of working through 
“difficult knowledge” (Britzman, 1998, p. 117). She argues that histories of violent disregard are 
“difficult knowledge” not only because of the traumas they represent. They are also difficult 
because they instantiate pedagogical dilemmas of narrating and representing significance 
(Britzman, 1998, see also Pitt & Britzman, 2003). Her more recent work examines the use of 
aesthetics to support the labour of narrating “an unclaimed history of learning projected into 
present arrangements and affected by the group psychology of education” (Britzman, 2013, p. 
101). For Britzman, there is something about learning itself that is difficult to know because it 
happens before the time of conscious understanding. To return to the question child, the work of 
learning is to make meaning from what has already happened without our noticing. Here, the 
aesthetic opens the scene of teaching and learning to its otherness by representing phantasies that 
have already happened and are difficult to narrate:  
Expelled by education, phantasy artfully returns to invite second thoughts through the 
reconstruction of events in education. We can read these literary expressions as 
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symptoms, as a compromise between the wish and the need, as a return of the repressed, 
and as a placeholder for what has been missed. Then we might also interpret the fictions 
of education as trying to say something difficult about determining what belongs to the 
inside of education and what belongs to its outside, what is conviction and what is 
imposition, and what belongs to the immediacy of education and what comes after 
education. We need the tropes of fiction to lend a quota of our affect to symbolizing the 
forces and expressions of education, because when we are trying to say something about 
education, this education and that phantasy are difficult to pry apart. And that makes us 
nervous. (Britzman, 2003, pp. 6-7) 
Britzman suggests that aesthetic objects can help us make a study of the delicate line between 
phantasy and reality by reminding us that there is a line to study. These objects interfere with our 
conscious assumptions and stories about education, stories that would solve the dilemmas of 
teaching and learning rather than open them to representation and interpretation.  
Aesthetic objects are thus a resource for negative capability: They are outside objects that 
return us to the inside life of education and that might offer a difference to pre-ordained scripts. 
Aesthetic objects invite us to play in the mysteries of meaning—to tease out knots of experience 
that are represented in the object and that emerge in our transference to the object. In this way, 
thinking with aesthetic objects is also a resource for health in the sense described by Winnicott 
(1945): 
Through artistic expression we can hope to keep in touch with our primitive selves 
whence the most intense feelings and even fearfully acute sensations derive, and we are 
poor indeed if we are only sane. (p. 140) 
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Encounters with aesthetic objects connect us to the forgotten content of passionate emotional life 
that comprises the grounds for symbolization. The aesthetic object, like the question child, 
reminds us that there is a world to symbolize and that symbolization, in turn, makes the world 
meaningful. To learn from aesthetic objects means, then, learning the interminable lesson that 
existence is not a matter of mastering ready-made answers, as enlightenment theories of 
education purport. Rather, the enigmatic aims of education might align themselves with that 
most aesthetic of questions and the most negative of our capabilities: What narrative can I make 
from what is difficult to symbolize about the emotional life of education?  
The following three chapters take this question into three sites to study what education 
becomes when its aim is not enlightenment. My analyses interpret the labour of becoming a 
student, group, and teacher as a project of putting passion into time. My interest is in noticing 
and theorizing times when we flee from narrative and passion emerges in symptoms. The work 
of these chapters, therefore, is to construct narratives of passion in contact with the breakdown of 
symbolization where negative capability is lost. Throughout, I construct a theory of education 
from aesthetic texts that remind us of a needed middle ground for passion, one committed to 
making passionate minds. 
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Chapter Two 
 The Suppressed Madness of Sane Students 
In 1987, at the request of the British Psychoanalytic Society, Marion Milner gathered her 
papers into one volume for publication and chose as a title, The Suppressed Madness of Sane 
Men. The title is borrowed from an essay published in 1921 by the philosopher George 
Santayana. In this short paper, Santayana, according to Milner, “seems to be concerned...with 
people or states of mind in which one is cut off from what he calls ‘instincts’—which must 
surely mean, cut off from the body” (p. 240). Writing in the collection’s “Afterthoughts,” Milner 
traces the question of madness back to an observation of patients she describes as “‘sane’ in their 
professional work but not in the emotional satisfactions of their private lives” (p. 234). Milner 
perceives a rift between first appearances and deeper conflicts, much like Bollas (1987) did in his 
work with Tom, the “normotic” adolescent discussed in the previous chapter. Thinking with 
Santayana and also Winnicott, Milner asks: What is madness and how might it live (or hide) 
beneath a veneer of sanity? 
This question may have found an early life when, 50 years earlier, Milner conducted a 
study on behalf of the Girls’ Public Day School Trust in England. A five-year study, the research 
was published as The Human Problem in Schools in 1938. It examined dominant educational 
methods and students’ responses to them. The research ended with the threat of war and the 
evacuation of schoolchildren to the countryside. After the tenure of her study, Milner found 
herself suddenly “free to investigate certain private misgivings” that had arisen during her time 
in the schools (Milner, 1950/2010, p. xvii). She had a “feeling” these misgivings had something 
to do with “the problem of psychic creativity, whatever that might mean” (Milner, 1950/2010, p. 
xvii). Milner described her subsequent book, On Not Being Able to Paint (Milner, 1950/2010), as 
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a sequel to this school research. Though difficult to recognize at first glance, this second 
publication is an iteration of the first study that also symbolizes the difficulties she felt but could 
not yet represent in the context of the school (Farley, in press). Extending the findings of that 
school study, Milner’s (1950/2010) inquiry in On Not Being Able to Paint offers a theory of 
creativity that she describes as “something being left out of account in the general school 
system” (p. xix). Not far from the schoolroom, On Not Being Able to Paint was published for 
teachers as part of the Heinemann Education Series. But rather than focus on the conditions of 
young girls’ learning at the Trust Schools, this second study details Milner’s own attempts to 
learn to draw and paint. In particular, she emphasises the obstacles to her efforts, the very same 
themes that framed her analysis of the girls’ narratives of learning in 1938 (Farley, in press). 
In this chapter, I draw from Milner’s work to investigate the problem of madness 
suppressed in sane students. Like Milner, I am interested in the obstacles to creativity, what she 
frames as a problem of “letting in madness” and of loosening the boundaries that give coherence 
to the self and the world (Milner, 1950/2010, p. 19). I offer a reading of the mad student through 
this framework to examine the labour of symbolization and its breakdown in phantasies of 
compliance and mastery. Taking my analysis through psychoanalytic theories of maternal time 
and Darren Aronofsky’s film Black Swan (Medavoy, Messer, Oliver, Franklin, & Aronofsky, 
2011), this chapter narrates un-thought conflicts that emerge in creative time. 
 
The Human Problem of Creativity: On (not) Letting go 
 Milner’s (1950/2010) self-study on painting provides insight into the relationship  
between learning and failure. Milner had been interested in painting since early childhood. Yet 
while she had developed “some technical facility,” she describes her efforts as fraught, “always 
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tend[ing] to peter out in a maze of uncertainties about what a painter is really trying to do” (p. 
xvii). The “general educational problem” (p. xvii) was of not being sure of how to approach 
painting differently, beyond reproducing appearances. To her surprise, discovering what else 
painting might involve came to her by way of a detour, an unexpected “letting go” (p. 19) of all 
that she had been taught. For Milner, letting go meant “letting hand and eye do exactly what 
pleased them without any conscious working to a preconceived intention” (p. xviii). Here, she 
recounts being able to apprehend creative life as a loss, or breakdown, of boundaries. Neither 
fully inside nor outside of the self, the aesthetic of her artwork emerged as a place of fusion, 
illusion, and imagination between these two realms. She learns that creativity is a risky, 
disorienting experience of getting lost. 
It was around this time that Milner came across Santayana’s essay, “The Suppressed 
Madness of Sane Men.” Years later, she describes reading Santayana as “like coming from a 
stuffy room into the fresh air” (as cited in Glover, 2009, p. 172). His essay symbolizes a central 
quality of perception that Milner draws upon in On Not Being Able to Paint. According to 
Santayana: 
Perception is no primary phase of consciousness: it is an ulterior function acquired by a 
dream which has become symbolic of its own external conditions, and therefore relevant 
to its own destiny. Such relevance and symbolism are indirect and slowly acquired: their 
status cannot be understood unless we regard them as forms of imagination happily 
grown significant. In imagination, not in perception, lies the substance of experience, 
while science and reason are but its chastened and ultimate form. (as cited in Milner, 
1950/2010 pp. 32-33)  
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Milner interprets Santayana’s theorization of perception as meaning that “the substance of 
experience is what we bring to what we see, without our own contribution we see nothing” (p. 
33). With psychoanalysis, she extends Santayana’s conception to suggest imagination itself has a 
history: “Inner dream and outer perception both spring from a common source or primary phase 
of experience in which the two are not distinguished, a primary ‘madness’ which all of us have 
lived through and to which at times we can return” (p. 33). Objective perception is belated, 
coming after the time of imaginative, passionate apprehension. Taking these ideas to her study of 
painting, Milner examines subjective experience as a necessary condition of objective seeing and 
discovers that subjective looking is itself fraught with resistance.  
Milner’s (1950/2010) account reminds us that imagination is both subjective and 
objective experience and involves risk. Significantly, “letting go” of the traditions she already 
knew about the craft brings her to these insights (p. 19). Returning to this scene, she 
characterizes the experience as: 
…so disconcerting that I had tried to forget all about it; for it seemed to threaten, not only 
familiar beliefs about will-power and conscious effort, but also, as I suppose all irruptions 
from the unconscious mind do, it threatened one’s sense of oneself as a more or less 
known entity. (p. xviii) 
At stake in creativity is the loss of the self and the “common sense appearances” (p. 19) that 
offer ego stability. In Milner’s terms, “letting in imagination meant letting in madness” (p. 19, 
emphasis added). The “letting go” of tradition also means “letting in” the uncertainty made at the 
blurred boundaries between external and internal reality, consciousness and unconsciousness, 
and, as she found in Santayana’s text, the mingling among body, instincts, and the mind. 
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Creative life confronts a “fear of being mad” (p. 19). The hope is that such fear does not 
overwhelm the creative capacity it also implies. 
In her connection between the creative life of imagination and madness, Milner narrates a 
set of conflicts at the heart of learning. On the one hand, adhering to the standard principles of a 
craft (for her, painting) produces “only tolerably good imitations of something else” or, 
“counterfeits” (Milner, 1950/2010, p. 3). Yet the alternative is to risk total chaos and madness. 
Yet Milner also suggests that to not live imaginatively (to not paint, or to paint only as others 
taught) may itself constitute a form of madness. This “false certainty” (p. 89) seeks refuge in the 
external, objective, factual world in a way that can feel rather empty—to “see nothing” as it 
were. “True sanity” emerges from the imaginative, passionate, subjective realm (p. 172). Again 
quoting Santayana, creativity is “madness put to good uses” (as cited in Milner, 1950/2010, p. 
33).  
In Milner’s view, therefore, learning is a paradox: We are dependent on what is inside 
and outside even as we seek to understand and transform what is already there through the work 
of representation (see also Pitt & Phelan, 2008). To enliven this paradox, Milner turned to 
aesthetics. In the case of her 1938 school study, she invited students to freely associate to visual 
images. In the case of her own self-study, she freely drew what she saw as filtered through the 
unconscious, without trying to reproduce outside reality. In both places, she opened a field for 
creative representation that could put madness to use in symbolic constructions. But if the arts 
offer transitional spaces for creative play, Milner’s research also shows that there is still the 
problem of inhibition that resists this playful labour. Confronting a compulsion to repeat, to 
imitate or copy in compliance, she asks: What holds the student back? Why should creativity, 
“whatever that might mean” (Milner, 1950/2010, p. xvii), be such a problem for the student and 
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the field of education? In the following section, I take these questions through the earliest time of 
infancy, what Milner (1950/2010) terms a “primary phase of experience” (p. 33) from where 
creativity is given, found, and made.  
 
Creativity from Maternal Madness to a “Plurality of Connections” 
André Green’s (1986/2005) On Private Madness begins with a narrative of education that 
describes his development as a psychoanalyst. As with Milner’s study of schooling and painting, 
Green’s education involves following associative meanings. Specifically, he describes noticing 
something overlooked in the psychoanalytic discourse of his time, particularly in France and in 
the work of Jacques Lacan. Indebted to the British school of object relations, notably to 
Winnicott and Wilfred Bion, Green returns to Freud’s writings with an interest in elaborating a 
psychoanalytic study of passion and madness. His study involves a return to instincts and affect, 
which he argues is lost in post-Freudian theorizing. Beginning his chapter, “Passions and their 
Vicissitudes,” Green re-finds passion “where it has always been” (p. 241): at “the heart of man” 
(p. 243). He locates passion in language and representation, much like Milner who observes that 
the Human Problem in Schools is tied to creativity. Through this return to passion, Green 
constructs a framework for reading the patient’s symptoms as a question of binding and 
unbinding instinctual excitation. Where binding takes place, “the pole of madness attached to the 
instinct is contained within the limits of fantasy and the vicissitudes of Eros” (p. 244). Binding 
ties instinct to representation. Where this binding of affect does not occur, there emerges instead 
a mobilization of destructive instincts, and a risk that internal chaos will be engaged through “the 
chaos of destruction” (p. 247). Here, the question of passion appears as a fight between Eros and 
destruction, between representing and expelling internal states and experiences. Green arrives at 
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a crucial question: What tips the scales in favour of binding? How does passionate attachment 
rather than meaninglessness win the day? 
Answering these questions leads Green back to the beginning: to the mother’s passion. 
He summarizes the maternal situation thusly: “after fostering the birth of instinctual life, the only 
aim of maternal love is to make it tolerable for the infant” (Green, 1986/2005, p. 246). Kristeva 
(2010a) also arrives at the question of the mother, most notably in an essay titled, “The Passion 
According to Motherhood.” For Kristeva, as for Green, the “maternal place” (p. 152) is a site of 
passion for the mother as much as it is a physical connection between her and her growing child. 
Moreover, Kristeva sees maternal passion as a prototype for all passion as it comes to exist in 
sublimation and symbolization. To reinsert passion back into the heart of psychoanalysis, both 
analysts suggest taking a closer look at the maternal conditions from which each of us was born. 
So too might looking into the time of infancy allow for a renewed study of passion in later scenes 
of learning. If “letting go” and “letting in madness” (Milner, 1950/2010, p. 19) are the grounds 
for creativity, my question is: How did each of us learn (or not learn) to represent a relationship 
to these internal states? How can the condition of infancy help us think about the student’s 
creative efforts?   
According to Kristeva (2010a), even before there is a baby, and certainly before the baby 
is born, maternal passion gains momentum. The soon-to-be mother creates a story, a phantasy, 
and an image about the mother she will become, about her body, and about the “unknown third 
party” that will be the baby: “an embryo, a fetus, then a baby, a child, though for the moment an 
indiscernible double” (p. 86, emphasis added). She calls this impassioning: the “possession” of 
imagination which gives symbolic life to instinctual energy and occurs in the meeting place 
between self and other, inside and outside, mother and child (p. 140). Green (1986/2005) calls 
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this “normal maternal madness” (p. 244). In this description, Green echoes Winnicott’s 
description of maternal madness as “primary maternal pre-occupation” (as cited in Abram, 2007, 
p. 223). For Kristeva, maternal madness is out of time. For each scholar, such madness is normal 
and necessary in that it supports the mother’s role as the infant’s caregiver: She is mad about her 
infant at the very time he needs her to be.8 The baby is, after all, fully dependent upon her and 
excessively demanding in his dependency.9 
Maternal passion enables the mother’s responsiveness to her baby as she calls him into 
being. But maternal passion also pays the price of what, with Milner, we could call sanity. For 
Milner, sanity involves the capacity to narrate a gap between self and other, inside phantasy and 
outside reality. In the possession of the mother’s passionate imagination, the baby is not yet an 
other in the sense of a thinking, feeling subject separate and different from her. Rather, both 
physically and emotionally the baby’s emotional life lives inside mother, in the “maternal place” 
(Kristeva, 2010a, p. 152). Both Green (1986/2005) and Kristeva (2010a) describe this 
relationship’s passivizing effect on the baby. Subject to and fully dependent on the mother, the 
mother is experienced, with the “life forces,” as a kind of “torturer” (Kristeva, 2010a, p. 91). The 
mother’s position vis-à-vis her child is thus paradoxical. She is charged with animating and 
making the passions of emotional life bearable for her child. But she is also a source of 
emotional/physical anguish and torment: Her care is at times too close and too far away when 
                                                
8 My use of the male pronoun here is to facilitate clarity, particularly given my use of the female pronoun in 
reference to the mother. My intention here and throughout the dissertation is not to reproduce hierarchical gender 
structures. Rather, my theorizing emphasizes the psychical position and the emotional work of the three positions of 
the baby, mother, and father, as well as the positions of student and teacher. While discourses of sex and gender are 
certainly a factor in how each of us lives these positions, my intention is to open a space where sex/gender does not 
determine meaning or the positions we occupy. For instance, an infant’s father may occupy the maternal position in 
his care, as may the mother occupy the paternal position. With this intention in mind, I use the male pronoun here 
for the sake of clarity, while later in the chapter and in subsequent chapters I rely on female pronouns.  
9 Winnicott’s (1949) discussion of maternal hatred is particularly good at painting a picture of this dependency. 
Maternal hatred may also be the grounds for detachment or disimpassioning, what Kristeva describes as a crucial 
aspect of maternal care and which I elaborate below. 
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she fails to meet the baby’s every need. Moreover, being the passive object of the mother, the 
baby is not yet a separate subject, but a double in the nursing couple (Winnicott, 1971/2005). 
And while radical dependency and non-differentiation is a necessary condition for infancy, it is 
unsustainable and cannot hold if either subject is to be free to have, speak, and pursue his/her 
own passionate desires. Separation therefore allows the growing child to find distance from 
mother and become a distinct subject with his own capacity for both subjective and objective 
perception, or creativity as Milner theorizes it. But what does the mother do for and/or teach to 
her child that makes it possible for him to tolerate and make something from this separation, this 
time and space between? If, as Phillips (1999) puts it, “Mother is the one who gives the infant’s 
passion a chance” (p. 171), then what makes such a chance possible? How does the infant begin 
the work of transforming emotional experience himself? 
Green’s (1986/2005) response to this question is “the myth of an intelligible genesis” (p. 
247), a construction that is at least two-pronged. On the one hand, mother “teaches” her child the 
art of representing emotional life, a transformative act that binds affect to something beyond the 
immediate experience of it. This means, for example, that when she meets her baby’s physical 
needs, she is also meeting an emotional one. She gives back to her child his emotional 
experience in tolerable form, such as in a song or a word, which transforms his need. In so doing, 
the mother “enable[s] him to recognize his own instincts in her, to feel that she can be used as a 
receptacle for them, so they can be returned to him in a more acceptable form” (Green, 
1986/2005, p. 245). Where this binding does not take place, Green suggests that the infant learns 
that the “polarity of madness” cannot be contained (p. 248). In the face of overwhelming affect, 
Green contends that unbinding may step in to solve the problems emotional and instinctual life 
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present.10 This self-defence is also destructive: the baby makes from his passivity activity that 
rails against the world. Unbinding mobilizes the destructive instincts and embodies “the supreme 
recourse to activity, against passivization by an object in whom it is impossible to put one’s 
trust” (p. 248). At its most extreme, this is psychosis, which works to destroy the torturous bond 
to the drive/other burdening the subject with the enactment of madness from which there seems 
no possible escape. Different from binding, which creates an “aesthetic distance” through which 
to transform unbearable affect (Britzman, 2009, p. 104), unbinding provides no such 
transformation. Rather, distance comes way by destruction. 
For the mother to play this crucial role of transforming her baby’s emotional situation, 
she must “accept and contain her own instincts at the same time” (Green, 1986/2005, p. 245, 
emphasis added). Important here is the role of a third, the father, for being what Green 
(1986/2005) calls a “mediatory element” (p. 247) that comes between mother and child and 
supports the mother’s efforts to contain the infant. Despite the gender stereotypes here signified, 
we can think of this figure as symbolic and as serving a function, rather than being tied to a 
particular person (Kristeva, 2009). This third introduces a triangulation that provides symbols 
where there is otherwise raw affect and distance where there may be the unmediated phantasy of 
union. The symbolic father, or what Kristeva (2009) calls the “Father of individual prehistory” 
(p. 11), offers an avenue to traverse the limits of maternal madness. The mother’s identification 
with this father introduces a third term that serves as reminder that the baby is not the sole 
creation of the mother—a third other was needed for this nursing couple of others to exist 
                                                
10 Winnicott’s (1971/2005) work is, again, influential here. His description of the “good enough” mother (p. 13) 
indicates a mother who is able to gauge the optimal time of waiting that the infant can bear before his wants dissolve 
into catastrophe. When there is no time of waiting, the baby is not afforded the time/space for experiencing his 
desire; however, the baby must not have to wait too long lest he fall into a state of dis-integration. With reference to 
this tricky balance, Green (2005) writes of Winnicott’s mother, “The good enough mother is also the bad enough 
mother” (p. 15). 
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beyond mirror images. The father also functions to contain the mother’s anxieties, in order that 
the baby does not take them on (or take them on excessively). Thus, even though the baby’s 
experience, what I would like to call his primary education, is crucially tied to the mother, from 
the beginning this education includes the mediation of a third.  
According to Kristeva (2010a), the crux of maternal passion hinges on the mother’s 
capacity to separate from her child with the support of a third term. Separation opens a space 
between self and other where new meanings of both can emerge. The physical separation 
experienced at birth and sutured by placing infant and mother skin-to-skin, must now take place 
in the mother’s mind. Words and images emerge in this new gap and are the means to make the 
gap bearable. For this separation to take place, the mother must disimpassion herself of her 
(phantasy) child-double and invest in his development beyond her. Under “good enough” 
conditions (Winnicott, 1971/2005, p. 13), this occurs gradually and according to the infant’s 
growing capacity to tolerate the “feverish forces of life” (McDougall, 1980/1992, p. 485) that 
comprise the human condition. The mother’s ability to detach herself thus enables the baby to 
increasingly take on the work of animating and transforming emotional life vis-à-vis transitional 
objects (i.e. words and symbols). For Kristeva, the feat of motherhood, its real “miracle,” occurs 
when “mother arrives at the impossible” feat of letting the baby go to be with others in the world 
and everyone survives (p. 92). Creativity emerges for both mother and baby when the baby 
“ceases to be her double” and becomes a subject in a world of symbolic objects (p. 86, emphasis 
added). The movement from maternal madness to “a plurality of connections” (p. 94) thus 
depends on the mother’s capacity for detachment—for making and holding a space between 
herself and her child. In this space, Kristeva suggests, new meaning can thrive: “A mother loves 
nothing and no one if not ‘flowering’” (pp. 91-92). 
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Key to both Green’s (1986/2005) and Kristeva’s (2010a) formulations of infancy is the 
idea that we come into being through the mad love of an other, provided that we tolerate its 
impossibility. Such mad love is only the beginning. Separation must take place so that each one 
of us can grow alongside this initial attachment, or “flower,” as Kristeva describes development. 
Separation makes possible a space for enlivening and transforming emotional, bodily experience. 
Disimpassioning creates distance from what feels like an explosive process of impassioning.11 It 
arises from the mother’s capacity to recognize and invest in her child’s difference from her. In 
maternal (dis)passion, therefore, we might consider an idea of a primary, maternal education, 
wherein each of us learns to transform bodily experience through the labour of symbolization 
(see also Pitt, 2003).12 Here, “private madness” (Green, 1986/2005) is worked out through 
transitional sites that that both connect and go beyond the primary tie to the mother. In an 
“optimal experience of motherhood” (Kristeva, 2010a, p. 87, emphasis in original), passion can 
be put into time, and therefore into a sequence of experience that can be understood and 
represented as history.  
In contrast to putting passion into time, Kristeva (2010a) describes its double, or 
“hysterical time” (p. 129). Hysterical time denotes a splitting between instinctual life and the 
mind, where the former is caught within the earlier time of maternal passion. Kristeva elaborates 
her thesis through four cases, one of which involves Odette. Odette’s affect comes to the fore in 
                                                
11 I thank Aparna Mishra Tarc for the addition of this vivid imagery to Kristeva’s maternal metaphor. 
12 Christopher Bollas (1987) calls this transformative work the mother’s “instruction” (p. 60) and offers the image of 
“the shadow of the object” to describe what remains from this time before thought and memory. Because this 
education comes before the time of thought, before, that is, a time when it can be represented, it exists as a kind of 
shadow over the subject’s mode of engaging with himself and the world, a memorial to a time before memory. Thus, 
akin to Green, his intervention into psychoanalytic theory in the 1980s was to lift from Freud’s page and from his 
own and others’ clinical work a notion of the “unthought known” (p. 9). This concept explored how an analysis may 
facilitate not only the patient’s understanding of emotional conflicts, but more to the point, will be able to partake in 
the creative work of representing them. The psychoanalytic clinic, Bollas suggests, is a site for apprehending this 
shadow and representing and repairing what might have gone array in a person’s early life. In the intimacy of the 
clinic, the mother’s instruction can become a site of inquiry, and analysis may enable what Kristeva (2006) describes 
as a “rebirth” (p. 222). Thus, while the mother may “give the infant’s passion a chance” (Phillips, 1999, p. 171), 
these analysts suggest that a second chance may be found in the relationship between analyst and analysand. 
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“scenes” recounted on the couch as a “puddle ris[ing] up, a hurricane, a tornado, and a voice that 
tore through my throat” (p. 147). Odette feels trapped within an exacting tie to her mother: “With 
my mother, it was always like we were communicating vessels: I feel exactly what she feels, 
though I’m not sure of the opposite” (p. 146). This is a repeated scene not yet worked through in 
subsequent relationships. Kristeva draws on this case to describe passion’s mad manifestations: 
scenes of torrential affect, hysterical symptoms, obsessive compulsions, phobias, even the 
absolutism that fuels war (see also Kristeva, 2009). She reads these symptoms as a sign of 
breakdown in symbolization and sublimation.  
Green (1986/2005) suggests that “madness is a sort of antidote to insanity” (p. 230), 
which involves unbinding from pain that leaves chaos in its wake. In Green’s framework, there is 
either passion in the form of sublimation and its madness, or psychosis in the destruction of the 
binding implied in the former. But like Kristeva, Green argues that passion also works through 
the madness of symptoms—hysteria, obsessions, phobias—that preserve passion, even while 
holding the subject hostage. As Green puts it, “One can say the hysteric is ‘mad about her body’. 
The obsessional becomes mad about his mind….The hysteric converts [libidinal energy] 
somatically, the obsessional into thought, and between the two the phobic is anxious. Libido is 
everywhere” (p. 227). These symptoms register “symbolic collapse” (Segal, 1957): the collapse 
of a transitional space within which libido might forge object relations. Putting passion into time 
in symbolic constructions affords distance from bodily drives and the (m)other. Yet while 
registering a collapse of this space between, these symptoms nonetheless allow a site for passion 
to exist in the tie to the body/(m)other. When primary madness can find neither symbols nor 
symptoms that release the subject from its grip, “a second front is created to combat the object” 
(Green, 1986/2005, p. 244). In place of mechanisms that bind instinctual forces to representation, 
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the (m)other becomes a combative second front, or an “enemy agent” against which destructive 
forces are unleashed to break the bond. Green describes this second front in the following way: 
In this last instance, the ego loses its head, so to speak; at times it is no longer capable of 
distinguishing between what it perceives of its own instincts and those coming from the 
object; it panics in confusion and finds no other expedient than to react destructively. It is 
of little importance to the ego that it has to scuttle itself, as long as it can conjure the 
object by destroying it. (p. 244) 
I understand Green to mean that the subject suffers from the absence of a mediating force, or a 
third term, that would make it possible to contain and make something from excitation. The 
primary question Green raises, and that Kristeva echoes, is: What are the conditions under which 
emotional experience can be bound by the symbolic and under what conditions might destructive 
forces take over?  
Hysterical time is not an absence of understanding the (m)other and her passion, but 
signifies a phantasy of understanding too much or too well. This is a kind of pseudo-knowing 
that is compliant, even if it is also destructive. Odette’s “communicating vessels,” after all, 
conjures an image of magically telegraphing emotional experience that is somehow without the 
need of an interpretive, representative realm. This latter realm exists when an uncertain space 
between self and other, emotion and symbol, experience and meaning can be acknowledged, 
tolerated, and invested in. We are, after all, not communicating vessels, but rather speaking 
subjects. By inviting her analyst into her emotional life and speaking the phantasies to which she 
feels bound, Odette eventually allows for the possibility of a space of indeterminacy to emerge 
and for true sanity to flower as she gives voice to affect. Where once there was only “scenes” of 
torrential affect, now there are scenes created and re-created in language to be respond to by a 
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listening other. As with Milner’s study of painting, Odette’s eventual use of speech in the 
analytic space signals a capacity to engage differently with emotional and relational life. New 
objects in the form of words and images can come to signify experience that would otherwise be 
thrown out in torrents of rage. And here too, the analyst’s capacity to recognize and hold open 
this space becomes crucial. We are back to the “passion according to motherhood” (Kristeva, 
2010a p. 94), this time repeated and re-invented in the analytic encounter, where passion can be 
enlivened in words.  
The passionate labour of putting affect into symbols involves a compromise that comes 
by way of an interminable, human problem: We make words from the failure of the maternal 
even while we hold onto a phantasy of perfect maternal unison that works against language. 
Phillips (1999) articulates this problem as a paradox: “representation is never good enough, and 
by the same token it is the only thing that is good enough” (p. 172). For Mishra Tarc (2015a), 
this paradox can be thought of as a productive tension of the maternal relation. The mother 
“imbues the child with words” and thereby welcomes the growing child into language, which, in 
turn, the child uses to narrate his own existence as separate from the mother (p. 125). These 
theorists stress the function of representation as a means by which we give life to, while also 
giving ourselves some distance from, the life forces that can feel quite torturous if left 
unmodified. Taken through Milner’s opening of the category of the student, we can observe the 
power of maternal time to both create and collapse efforts in the symbolic realm. Through 
collapse, we can also observe why learning to become a separate person is difficult. Put as a 
question, I ask: What does it mean to represent the mad experience of being the (m)other’s 
double? And second, how does the work of separation mirror the work of learning?  
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These questions come to life in Aronofsky’s film Black Swan, a film that represents one 
student’s crisis in symbolizing passion and her subsequent breakdown. As with Milner’s 
(1950/2010) positing of creativity in terms of letting go, the film presents creativity as a 
confrontation with a fear of “letting in madness” and paints a picture what might emerge at the 
site of efforts to “let ourselves go” (p.19). My engagement with the film highlights the emotional 
labour of becoming a student able to give life to affect without losing oneself altogether to its 
passivizing force. 
 
Odette, Again: On Not Being Able to Dance 
As in the prologue of its double Swan Lake, Black Swan (Medavoy, Messer, Oliver, 
Franklin, & Aronofsky, 2011) opens with a dream that sets the stage for the drama that unfolds.13 
A young woman comes under the spell and is transformed into the object of another’s desire, 
from which there seems little or no escape. In the film’s next scene we meet the dreamer, Nina, 
who narrates with some pleasure her “craziest dream” as her mother, Erica, silently prepares 
Nina’s breakfast in the background.14 Later in the film there is another dream, this time an erotic 
encounter between Nina and her friend and dancing rival, Lily. Unlike the first dream, the second 
is mistaken as reality, fuelling Nina’s (and the viewer’s) confusion about what is real and what is 
                                                
13 In this film and my reading of it, doubles abound. Swan Lake, the ballet staged in Aronofsky’s film, dramatizes 
the theme of the double in the conflict between the Odette, the white swan, and her double, Odile, the black swan. In 
his filmic version of this plot, Aronofsky makes use of the ballet to stage a modern day story of doubling inspired by 
yet another uncanny echo: Fyodor Dostoevsky’s (1846/2004) novella, The Double (Macaulay, 2010). As with Black 
Swan, Dostoevsky’s novella is a tale of paranoia and double identity. It tells of a man whose life is suddenly 
intruded upon by a man who looks just like him and who threatens to usurp his social and profession place in 
Russian society. Here, then, Aronofsky doubles the narrative, transplanting it to modern day New York and the 
scene of professional ballet, with notable reference to the harsh world of the Russian Bolshoi ballet company. In 
Nina’s opening dream the choreography of the ballet is “like the Bolshoi’s,” in her words, a ballet company known 
for both excellence and ruthlessness. Add to this theme of doubling the Odette of Swan Lake and Kristeva’s case 
study featuring Odette. While Kristeva likely chose the name Odette in reference to Marcel Proust’s In Search of 
Lost Time (uncannily also featuring a Swann; see Kristeva, 2005), I draw links between Kristeva’s discussion and 
Aronofsky’s protagonist Nina. 
14 All quotations of dialogue are from Medavoy, Messer, Oliver, Franklin, and Aronofsky (2011). 
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happening in the mind. As the film continues, these distinctions between phantasy and reality 
become increasingly unclear and the viewer is transported into a whirlwind of emotional 
experience. Boundaries break down, inside and outside reality blur, and meaning, as the making 
of distinctions, lies in wait. In this, the film plays with the viewer’s capacity to let go of the need 
for certainty and tolerate ambiguity, while watching the character Nina attempt to do the same. 
The difficulty for Nina is allowing herself to passionately dance with some abandon, without 
going mad. I read this challenge as also the challenge of the student in the broadest sense: to 
passionately represent madness, to engage the world with some liberty and abandon, without 
losing one’s mind. 
Nina is much like the student painter in Milner, for whom letting go is the challenge and 
the risk. The film represents what Milner (1950/2010) might be talking about when she says that 
“letting in imagination meant letting in madness” (p. 19). Indeed, Aronofsky seems to delight in 
this idea, playing off old tropes and tricks of horror films. The aesthetic of the film uses mirrors 
to create eerie doubles, dark lighting, creepy sounds, and bloody insides. The effect is both 
absurd and familiar as viewers watch Nina attempt to dance the role of her dreams: Princess 
Odette, the Swan Queen of Swan Lake. We watch as her manic pursuit of mastery comes face to 
face with a different logic of creative self-making, one that can transform instinctual urges into 
the language of dance and that uses the choreography to communicate something from within. 
Along the way, viewers witness Nina experience dancing as a demand that taunts and torments. 
Her torment is mirrored in the disturbing effects of the film’s use of the trope of the double that 
de-stabilizes meaning. She enters into an increasingly paranoid state of mind as she struggles to 
represent the passions of her subjective experience. 
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Nina’s mother emerges as a monstrous obstacle in Aronofsky’s creative production. Erica 
is like the evil sorcerer of Swan Lake, casting her spell on a daughter who is both like and 
frustratingly unlike her. This is the mother who won’t let go. Kristeva’s maternal place of 
collapse materializes at every turn as the uncanny return of a repressed bond that, for the mother 
and her adult daughter, is out of time. We catch a glimpse of this untimely bond in the apartment 
they share together, but also in the mother’s intrusive care that seems to aggressively refuse the 
reality of their difference. In the opening scenes, for instance, we watch Erica feed and dress her 
young-adult child. She even puts Nina to bed, sitting by watchfully until, like a mother by her 
newborn’s side, she finally submits herself to sleep. Erica worries that Nina is being worked “too 
hard,” closely monitors the status of a re-occurring rash on Nina’s back, and generally acts as 
though Nina’s body is also her own. This collapsed boundary can be found in seemingly simple 
turns of phrase, such as when Erica uses the first person plural to speak to Nina: “We leaving it 
alone?” or, “It’s our favourite!” In one of the film’s most horrifying scenes, Nina, on the cusp of 
masturbatory climax, catches sight of her mother fast asleep on the chair beside her. Recoiling 
from her self-pleasure, the scene conveys what can be lost in the passionate collapse of 
distinctions of the maternal place. Nina is caught in a claustrophobic maternal relationship, a 
relationship that she depends on and suffers from. Without friends, Nina turns to Erica as her 
sole source of support. She appears also to lack interest in a world beyond the maternal, save for 
ballet, which seems merely to be an extension. Nina is unable to let go of the mother whose 
primary preoccupation is holding on to her daughter. In Kristeva’s and Green’s formulation, a 
third is needed to come between mother and daughter. 
Watching Nina and her mother, the viewer experiences an oddly familiar encounter with 
maternal madness that is out of time. And this may be why the film feels creepy. The film returns 
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to viewers a time before memory, when each of us was fully dependent on the mother and 
passivized, terrorized, and comforted by her care. As with Freud’s (1919/2003) description of the 
uncanny, Aronofsky’s film takes us into an eerie collapse of boundaries that reasonably keep 
apart present and past, the familiar and strange. The uncanny is an effect of the loss of this 
boundary that exposes the radical otherness of our beginnings: where we experience helplessness 
and dependency in the face of pressing affect, where care is both desired and hated, and where 
the fear is both that the (m)other will and will not let go. This time before boundaries, before 
language, returns on the screen through the swirling out of control figure of Nina. Here, 
Aronofsky delivers the phantasy of a mother failing in her most important, “impossible” 
capacity: to separate from her child in order that he “ceases to be her double” and develops a 
mind of his own (Kristeva, 2010, p. 86). In this phantasy, the earliest maternal education is on 
the line, made from the mother’s labour of detachment, which opens a transitional space of 
passionate symbolization. 
It is easy to see how horribly wrong this earliest education has gone for Nina and how she 
suffers from it. Maternal passion that will not let go has paved the way for hysterical, obsessive, 
and phobic symptoms that plague Nina. These symptoms leave their trace largely on Nina’s body 
and in her relationship to it: skin rashes, anorexia and bulimia, a relentless pursuit of perfection, 
inhibitions and isolation. Like Kristeva’s (2010a) Odette, Nina suffers from an inability to 
symbolize passion. Her symptoms register the “hysterical time” of the “crazy link to the crazy 
mother” that cannot yet enter into history (p. 151). At every turn, she is threatened with the 
collapse between self and other. One has the sense that the only way Nina knows how to reveal 
her internal experience of the pain of attachment is by scratching away at the surface of her skin, 
perhaps also to experience a barrier and boundary that feels non-existent in her relationship with 
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her mother. The logic of collapse repeats in the space of the dance studio where Nina madly 
aspires to achieve the idealized and exemplary figure of the ballerina.15 Nina goes to 
unbelievable ends to achieve the status of Odette. She obsessively limits what goes inside her 
body, as if distrusting her own digestive capacity to make a nourished self and life. Her 
symptoms and inhibitions express an orientation to instinctual life that defends against insanity 
by madly performing sanity. Nina is “mad about her body” (Green, 1986/2005, p. 227) and mad 
about being perfect as a way to keep manageable an impossible emotional situation. But in this 
very effort, she shuts the doors to creative existence.  
Following Kristeva, we can read the film as a representation of passion caught in another 
time and place. Nina manifests a passion for compliance and for perfection that is both sign and 
symptom of the collapse between self and other, one that repeats the phantasy borne in the 
maternal relationship. Nina remains bound to the mother’s passion and positions herself within 
this structuring infantile phantasy. As long as she cannot find a symbolic outlet with which to 
represent this relation, she can only be caught by it. And this stranglehold leaks into her 
performance on the stage: She is a dancer without subjectivity, a body without a narrative. 
Plainly put, she is caught in the mirror image of the mother’s double. Unable to use the language 
of dance and the space of the stage to play, imagine, and forge a representation of self, Nina’s 
aim becomes one of mastering her body and its desires through punishing technique. 
Consequently, she can only dance the role of passive Odette, but not the ruthless and destructive 
passion of her double, Odile. Nina is a version of McDougall’s (1980/1992) “supernormal,” 
overly adapted to an external ideal at the expense of giving expression to her own “feverish life 
                                                
15 The documentary First Position (Caiola, Higgins, Kargman, Merten, & Kargman, 2011) represents the ballet 
world through six young dancers preparing to compete in an annual competition held in New York City that awards 
both scholarships and employment contracts to aspiring ballet dancers. While, according to one critic, the film lends 
the competition an “aspirational, almost boosterish vibe” (Dargis, 2012, May 3), it does portray the extreme lengths 
one must be willing to go to in order to come close to succeeding as a professional ballerina. 
 76 
forces” (p. 485). She is also melancholic, projecting herself into an unachievable ideal and 
punishing her failures to live up to it. In this secondary education of the ballet studio, Nina 
repeats rather than represents the experience of doubling from which she cannot break free. 
Passion for Nina has become a passion for no passion and for compliance to unattainable ideals. 
This is Freud’s death drive and a manifestation of hysterical time, with the added conflict that 
she cannot put her madness to “good uses,” as Santayana (and Milner) urge. 
The dynamic of doubling and Nina’s madness for mastery comes under threat with the 
possibility of embodying the Swan Queen role in a way that can represent a relationship to her 
instinctual urges that include both desire and aggression. The role offers Nina an opportunity to 
inhabit a third term that might facilitate separation from the mother that, until this time, eludes 
her. The role represents a chance for Nina to become something other than a double of the 
mother’s phantasy. In this maternal phantasy, Nina is meant to replace Erica’s lost dreams and at 
the same time repeat Erica’s fate of remaining a dancer in the background. In contrast, the role 
invites Nina to take center stage and to be in touch with split off parts, namely desire and 
aggression, without which creativity languishes. Here, the film represents the relationship 
between appetite and creativity, which includes the ruthless desire to devour. Aronofsky’s point 
seems clear: Hopeless madness engulfs the self who fails to give aggression symbolic form. 
Whether in the madness of mastery, where aggression turns inward against the body, or in 
persecuting phantasies of others out to get her, Nina’s flight from aggression lands her squarely 
in its clutches. 
It is only upon Nina’s shocking act of aggression in a scene where she bites her 
choreographer’s lip that convinces them both that she is up to the challenge of the role. An 
interrupting third, Thomas both calls forth and survives her aggression, acknowledging it in a 
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way that opens a transitional space that requires Nina to interpret the role. And yet, while the 
stage is set, Nina struggles still to dance upon it. Neither Thomas nor the role resolves the 
problem of symbolizing emotional life, including its ruthlessness. For Nina, remaining a problem 
is the phantasy of the mother who cannot bear Nina’s difference and the aggression with which 
she asserts it. Indeed, when Nina wins the starring role, and with it the chance to step out from 
the shadow of the mother and into the role of her own life, she is again faced with the phantasy 
of her mother. This is a phantasy of maternal passion that desires to keep hold of “my Nina” and 
maintain her as her “sweet girl,” the mother’s child-double. Here we could say that Nina’s fear 
and rage about separation emerge in the figure of the mother who won’t let go, a phantasy that 
functions to secure the ideality promised in this relation. In this phantasy, Nina can be the ideal 
object of love without the pain of separation, however hated and hard this fused position may be. 
At the very moment of creative, passionate possibility, then, Nina comes face to face with the 
pain of separation that the phantasy of perfect unison wards against.  
Evidence of this conflict can be found in a scene that begins with Erica checking up on 
Nina’s relationship with her choreographer, Thomas. Suspiciously, Erica wants to know if 
Thomas has “tried anything” with Nina given his “reputation.” Nina responds that he hasn’t, 
appearing to resent this performance of intrusive concern. “Good,” replies Erica, “I don’t want 
you making the same mistake I did.” This utterance painfully conveys both the mother’s wish for 
sameness and hostility for a daughter she regards as a “mistake.” Nina responds by suggesting 
Erica’s career might have been less lucrative than Erica has made it out to be, and worse, less 
successful in comparison to her own: “What career?…You were 28…And only…” Having her 
intrusion met with accusation and the daughter’s assertion of difference, Erica switches the topic, 
demanding to see how Nina’s skin rash is doing and reasserting control over her daughter’s 
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body. In Nina’s furious attempt to get away from her mother she leaves the apartment with her 
friend Lily, yet another double who is also her rival. With Erica watching the clock, Nina arrives 
home hours later intoxicated and out of time. 
What follows is familiar enough—an adolescent revolt met by a worried mother 
demanding to know “What else have you been doing?” But Nina is not a child and the mother’s 
concern is by this point suspicious. Nina’s response indicates a daughter much more capable of 
aggression and sexual activity than she had hitherto expressed: 
Nina: [laughing] Oh you wouldn’t know their names. 
Erica: You need to sleep this off. 
Nina: There were two, there was Tom, there was Jerry... 
Erica: Be quiet Nina. 
Nina: And I fucked them both. 
Erica: Shut your mouth. 
[A slapping sound and Erica seen aggressively closing her hand over Nina’s mouth.] 
Nina acts out against the mother’s suffocating gaze over her body and her desire. It is an acting 
out that makes a distinction the mother seems unwilling to admit or recognize as a site of 
potential or possibility. Rather, in the face of Nina’s actions, she exclaims: “You’re not my Nina 
right now.” Read with irony, the statement returns a difficult truth that cannot yet be thought: the 
fact of their separateness. But Erica’s outrage communicates the grip of her passion. It also 
communicates her reluctance to disimpassion or detach herself from her Nina. Caught in an 
untimely tie to the crazy mother, Nina’s revolt does not yet signal the “flowering” (Kristeva, 
2010a, p. 92) that separation makes possible. Cut off from her own speech, literally, by Erica’s 
hand, Nina faces the conflict that the mother does not want and will not stand for her libidinally 
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charged efforts to symbolize her difference. In this scene, then, we see the phantasy of the double 
emerge at the point of separation and its failure. If the mother won’t let go, the daughter’s 
creative efforts to symbolize the self may dead-end in silence. 
Complicating Nina’s suffering is her phantasy of perfect love, embodied in the intensity 
of her revolt against it. Indeed, Nina cannot seem to get her mother out of her head, even in a 
sexual scene of pleasure that represents the ultimate form of letting go. In this view, we can read 
the film not only as a representation of the mother’s incapacity to disimpassion, but, equally, as 
the daughter’s construction of the mother in face of this separation. For instance, Nina 
phantasizes an erotic sex scene between herself and Lily following the confrontation with Erica. 
But when Nina opens her eyes after climaxing, she sees not Lily, but her mother-double who 
whispers “sweet girl” and smothers her with a pillow. Clearly the problem of disimpassioning 
and separating from the mother belongs also to the daughter. Nina struggles to admit a third into 
the fold, as that involves mourning the loss of a maternal ideal. Here, Milner’s notion of letting 
go takes on new significance, for Nina must learn to let go of is her fused relationship to the 
mother that is both idealized and hated. If she is to take on the work of transforming emotional 
life by way of new object relations, Nina must let go of the phantasy mother who won’t let go. 
And she must do so by becoming her own person capable of representing her experience—in 
dance, in love, and in life. 
Nina, however, seems destined to repeat this phantasy of doubling. The experience/ 
phantasy of not being able to escape the mother-double ultimately manifests in yet another 
repetition of the double in Lily, who is “trying to replace [her].” While Nina finds some degree 
of distance from the mother in the figure of Lily, her paranoia suggests that she is ill equipped to 
bear the anxiety of separation. Instead, she can only create and be terrorized by more doubles: in 
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the figure of Lily, in Odette, and in Odile. She cannot seem to dance the conflict she is so 
gripped by, for instance, to dance both the white and black swan. Unable to bear the intensity of 
her emotional experience, Nina is incapable of deciphering what comes from within and what 
comes from outside. As the pressure intensifies, destructive aggression urgently takes over as her 
only recourse to finding relief. In Green’s (1986/2005) words, Nina “panics in confusion and 
finds no other expedient than to react destructively” (p. 244). Her “ego loses its head” and her 
only recourse is to “void the struggle” and break the bond (p. 244)—destroy the mother, destroy 
Lily, destroy the self the mother fashions, destroy her white swan, and literalize the black swan. 
In the film’s closing scenes, Aronofsky constructs a representation of the stakes of letting go and 
the loneliness that it risks. Nina spirals into madness as her passion becomes destructive. 
Destruction acted out against the self/other functions to break a painful bond to the (m)other 
from which there seems no other relief. As a negative case of creativity, the film thus shows the 
spiralling into breakdown that Nina’s madness for mastery had been protecting her from.  
  
The Suppressed Madness of Sane Students and the Question of Pedagogy 
My reading of Black Swan highlights the phantasy extremes of both a maternal education 
that demands doubling, as well as the daughter’s (or student’s) phantasy of a (m)other who 
won’t let go. In representing these extremes, Aronofsky succeeds where his protagonist cannot: 
“madness [is] put to good uses” (Santayana as cited in Milner, 1950/2010, p. 33). Aronofsky 
constructs a representation of madness that may itself ward against going mad. Where the literal 
mother and breakdown would be, there emerges a phantasy and a film symbolizing both. Where 
instinctual life feels overwhelming and all encompassing, representation offers some distance 
and a chance to think. Where the student cannot dance, there can be a narrative about her 
 81 
inhibition, just as Milner crafted a narrative of not being able to paint. Symbolizing madness, 
then, seems key to our efforts to work through it. Aronofsky thus tells a story of what it might 
feel like to allow for and make use of the madness that emerges between self and (m)other. He 
represents the mad mother and the grip of maternal passion and, in turn, the mad daughter bound 
by that relation. As such, he puts into symbolic form the emotional situation behind Nina’s 
suffering, her mad compliance and extreme drive for mastery. He represents plots of sexuality 
and aggression that, in symptomatic form, can wreak havoc on the body and the mind and one’s 
chance to learn and create. By extension, watching Nina’s crisis of passion unfold on the screen 
provides a site for viewers to let go into Nina’s madness without having to go mad themselves.  
The viewer, like the dancer on the screen, re-finds the loss of distinctions and, perhaps 
too, burning questions that are the grounds for sanity and thought: What comes from within and 
what comes from outside? What is the difference between phantasy and reality? Is the mother 
crazy, or is the crazy mother in the daughter’s mind? Is Lily out to get her or is she a good 
friend? Is Thomas a creep or does desire sometimes feel creepy? The film positions the viewer 
not only as an observer of Nina’s breakdown, but also as asker and interpreter of such questions, 
for which the film does not offer clear answers. Viewers enter into the constellations of 
emotional life and breakdown via the detour of the film. As they do, the film becomes a possible 
site for symbolizing the viewer’s own anxiety of separation and the pangs of dependency and 
helplessness. Indeed, the film’s surprising mainstream success may reflect its capacity to offer 
viewers a welcoming and containing experience of their own uncontained madness.16 
                                                
16 Despite being an independently produced film with a small budget, the film was, as one commentator described 
Black Swan, the “surprise breakout of the movie awards season, sneaking up on the Hollywood establishment” and 
baffling even its director in appealing to a broad spectrum of viewers (Zeitchik & Fritz, 2011, January 16). The film 
garnered five Academy Award nominations, including ones for best picture, director, and actress, the latter of which 
was won by Natalie Portman. Ironically, the film also met with controversy on the issue of Portman’s “dancing 
double,” Sarah Lane, who claims Portman’s dancing in the film was over-represented in promotion of the film 
(Markovitz, 2011, March 25). The controversy supports Katherine Fusco’s (2013) claim that the film’s success 
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As a transitional space, the film brings the experience of mad beginnings and maternal 
(dis)passion to life as a problem of creative self-making. Viewing Nina’s attempt to learn how to 
let go of the phantasy of doubling, we re-enter the conflicted and confusing space of 
representation as bound to the (m)other. Here, the film posits emotional conflicts made from 
dependency, helplessness, and passivization as part of what must be symbolized in our creative 
efforts, lest we go mad in desperate revolt against them and creativity itself. Specifically, a 
phantasy of compliance and mastery may emerge precisely at the site of letting go. The invitation 
to creativity can invite resistance and will require a space for narration.  
For the student to manifest a version of sanity that isn’t split from madness, she needs 
both time and space necessary for symbolizing passion. The work of pedagogy, in this view, is to 
hold open a dynamic frame in which creative work might be imagined and enacted. Sites of 
learning animate and make use of the “passion according to motherhood,” which is Kristeva’s 
(2010a) prototype for all passion. In learning, the student will lose and re-find the distinctions 
between self and other, inside and outside, phantasy and reality. Being a student in a “deeper 
sense” (Lear, 2003, p. 58) involves losing the self in something and something in the self. To 
recall Milner’s (1950/2010) interpretation of Santayana, “the substance of experience is what we 
bring to what we see, without our own contribution we see nothing” (p. 33). Thus the student 
needs both “things” but also the time/space to get lost in them. As Kristeva (1995) reminds us, 
                                                                                                                                                       
trades on a cultural and cruelly destructive fascination with celebrity, namely, “our desire to watch celebrities play 
the roles we believe them to inhabit in their real lives” (p. 30). Writing about Black Swan’s Natalie Portman, Fusco 
argues that the film collapses distinctions between the actress and the character she portrays and, in turn, exposes the 
viewer’s own cruel desire for sameness. In such a film, Fusco argues, “we understand stars…not just to be playing a 
type but to be playing themselves” (p. 29). But also, we understand our own superiority over stars we also idealize: 
“The only change we want to see in celebrities is their failure” which “confirms” and “conforms” to the world we 
want for ourselves (p. 29). That is, Fusco seems to be concerned that viewers won’t be able to let go of the 
celebrities they have in mind and allow them, like Aronofsky’s Nina, to represent something different, something 
not already known. While I share Fusco’s concerns, my reading of the film suggests that the film might also work 
against mindless circulation of demands for sameness that defend against conflicts that cannot be symbolized. By 
offering a representation of uncontained madness and by representing the conflict of separating from idealized 
objects, there lies the chance for viewers to symbolize their own difficulties with letting go.  
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without the time and space for symbolizing psychic life, we risk entrenching “maladies of the 
soul” (p. 9). Such maladies manifest a psychic deadness and undermine what is alive in human 
experience and in education.  
Thinking about the scene of teaching and learning through a theory of maternal 
(dis)passion opens a space for examining how pedagogy may be affected by un-symbolized 
desire for doubles. We can see the repetition of a phantasy of doubling, for example, when 
teachers ask for and even demand the student’s compliance. When education is imagined and 
practiced as a method of mastering, copying, or performing the other’s knowledge, a creative 
space between self and other is lost. Here, the crazy mother returns in a monstrous pedagogy 
structured through the demand for sameness. Education may itself be mad when the teacher 
cannot let go of her own idealized knowledge (Britzman, 2006b). The temptation may be to 
proceed as if teaching and learning are taking place when in reality compliance, paranoia, 
hysteria, and other maladies structure the pedagogical imaginary. These are the conditions in 
which “good students” become split from “bad students” and “success” as mastery over 
knowledge and the body reigns over learning from failure, being surprised, and the unknown—
or, “negative capability” (Keats as cited in Britzman, 2010, p. 118). These are also the conditions 
for false sanity wherein teachers and students might become “‘sane’ in their professional work 
but not in the emotional satisfactions of their private lives” (Milner, 1987, p. 234). If the 
student’s work is to become something other than a reflection of the teacher’s desire, then what 
is needed are representations that can bring into symbolization the teacher’s desire for doubles, 
lest the teacher forget her difference. Devoid of such representations, the student may be asked 
and even required to play in reality the double in the teacher’s phantasy. So too might the teacher 
become monstrous in the student’s (phantasied) efforts to make her so. The implication is that 
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sane pedagogy is made from the teacher’s capacity to let go and let in madness. But also, sanity 
will depend on disimpassioning, in Kristeva (2010a) term, in order for a space of indeterminacy 
to exist. 
Black Swan is instructive for teachers and theorists of pedagogy as it allows viewers to 
re-find the madness involved in teaching the other as if double to the self. In the film, this 
breakdown in teaching is represented through the maternal relation, perhaps a necessary 
displacement of just how crazy education can be. Yet education might also become a place for 
holding and reworking one’s internalized maternal madness. The key idea is that teaching, as 
well as learning, is subject to phantastic paranoia that can collapse the space needed for new 
meaning. Indeed, there is so much that cannot be controlled when we admit that education is a 
place where we affect one another before we understand the nature and effect of these affects. 
Though we are not “communicating vessels” (Kristeva, 2010a, p. 146), the film invites us to sit 
with the tendency to lose the self in this very phantasy. Symbolizing this phantasy is significant 
to an education that supports the learner’s capacity to think creatively and to work through the 
maladies ailing her capacity to learn and be. 
Milner’s timeline of research into education and painting also indicates something about 
the madness manifest in schooling and the belated work of symbolization. As noted earlier, 
Milner began drawing immediately upon leaving the schools (Farley, in press). In this second 
self-study, she archives her efforts to paint something that was not simply a copy of something 
else. She finds that drawing and painting copies operated as a defence against “letting in 
madness” (Milner, 1950/2010, p. 19). It was only when Milner (1950/2010) could admit that her 
work was reproducing appearances and at the same time failing to reproduce their “loveliness” 
(p. 4), that she could tolerate painting differently. That is, the cure for compliance to outside 
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appearances was no cure at all, but rather a description of the frustrating pull of compliance and 
an opening into discovering what else might exist in its place. She writes, “I was forced to the 
conclusion that copies of appearances were not what my eye liked, even though what it did like 
was not at all clear” (p. 4). The imposition of the phantasy of doubling on her productive efforts 
preceded conscious awareness of it. Where in Britzman’s (2003) words, “we learn before we 
understand” (p. 83), here we can also say, we copy before we create (see also Farley, 2015).  
With Milner, Aronofsky, Green, and Kristeva, we can conclude that making sane students 
involves a leap of faith on the part of both teacher and student that we might be able to put into 
symbols what the eye likes, as well as what is dislikes. This leap of faith involves a belief that 
pedagogy is a space of contestation in interpretation. Because each of us brings something 
different to experiencing the world, education can be a place for communicating our differences 
and thinking subjective experience alongside the experiences of others. Teaching and learning 
may then involve symbolizing experiences of our conflicts with learning, including the desire to 
learn nothing at all. Provided these conflicts can be narrated, education may invite students and 
teachers to risk something different together rather than repeat the deadening phantasy to be the 
same.
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Chapter Three 
Group Psychology and Education: On Making Room for Others 
“I’ve always been puzzled,” recalls Lord of the Flies author William Golding in a BBC 
documentary, “between the imaginative world and the real world” (Rosenbaum & Low, 2012). 
His statement comes as he describes the origins of his most famous novel. He recounts how the 
idea for the novel emerged out of an abundance of island stories—“islands incorporated”—that 
he and his wife had been reading to their two young children. After one “pretty exhausting” 
evening of nightly reading, he recalls saying to his wife: “Wouldn’t it be a good idea to write a 
book about what actually would happen to children if they found themselves alone on an island?” 
From this conversation sprung Lord of the Flies (Golding, 1954), a novel about a group of boys 
stranded on an island following an unnamed catastrophe. The original title, Strangers from 
Within, opens one of the key themes discussed in this chapter: Strangeness pulsates within the 
boundaries that we create in the name of group coherence, sameness, or belonging.  
Golding’s manuscript was turned away multiple times by publishers and described by its 
first reviewer at Faber and Faber as “rubbish and dull” (Carey, 2009, p. 152). Editor Charles 
Monteith rescued the manuscript from the rejection pile, a move that landed him a position as 
Golding’s lifelong editor. Monteith found in Golding’s imaginative construction of what 
“actually would happen” to a group of young people who found themselves alone on an island, a 
harrowing tale of group psychology unlike those more often told, particularly about children 
(Hannabuss, 2000).17 The novel invites readers into the dynamics of a group made in the face of 
                                                
17 Stuart Hannabuss (1983) describes the island stories of the late eighteenth century as particularly influenced by 
Rousseau. The Rousseauian ideal of merging education with nature led to stories in which, he argues, “The island 
has become a metaphor for the classroom...a travelling classroom, a nature study class on the march” (p. 73). 
Hannabuss (2000) also notes Rousseau’s use of the “individual alone on an island” in Rousseau’s (1962/1979) great 
phantasy of education, Emile (p. 9). Golding’s intervention into these stories can thus be read as an intervention into 
these views of the child and education as a solitary pursuit. His contrasting story of the group symbolizes the 
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disaster. The group ostensibly goes mad as the boys’ destructive impulses are acted out to 
murderous results. By the time they are rescued, the island is afire, three boys are dead, and a 
manhunt is underway for Ralph, the “chief” of the group whose passion for order proves a weak 
match for his nemesis Jack’s savage desires. Golding’s novel narrates something missing from 
children’s literature, its island narratives in particular. He introduces the difficult idea that the 
goodness of the innocent child—and particularly the child-group—must battle with children’s 
susceptibility to destruction and ruthless desire. In Golding’s novel there is also a “puzzling” 
relationship between phantasy and reality. By representing the breakdown of the group, Golding 
turns the tradition of romancing childhood innocence on its head.  
Golding describes his novel as distinctly twentieth century. The romanticism of the 
previous century no longer held in the aftermath of two world wars (Golding fought in World 
War Two), the horrors of the European genocide, and the atomic bomb. As with psychoanalysts 
working in the same period, Golding’s tale unseated the “lovely knowledge” (Pitt & Britzman, 
2003, p. 766) of the romantic period that posited man is by nature good, a goodness born of the 
innocent child. Also lurking in the story’s background is Golding’s admission that, were he 
living in Germany in the 1930s, he could very well have followed blindly and willingly the 
cruelty at the heart of Hitler’s program of genocide (Carey, 2009). Golding’s ability to see a 
capacity for evil in himself makes him a kind of “stranger from within.” Golding also aligns 
closely with Freud’s (1930/1961) view that humans are “creatures among whose instinctual 
endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness” (p. 68). Golding’s portrait of 
the child-group dramatizes a Freudian view that does not shy away from representing the darker 
sides of the human.  
                                                                                                                                                       
unnamed anxiety of influence of peers—what Hannah Arendt (1958/2006) calls the “tyranny” of the child-group (p. 
178)—beyond the adult’s direct control or grasp. 
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Written in the aftermath of World War One, Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents 
anticipates the crisis of civilization that Golding witnessed in the Second World War and that 
became the basis of Lord of the Flies. For Freud (1930/1961), a “fateful question of the human 
species” concerns how humanity’s “cultural processes” will contain the “derangements of 
communal life caused by the human instinct of aggression and self-destruction” (p. 111). 
Golding exposes these “derangements” in his fiction. As with Freud’s writings, Golding’s novel 
narrates destructive passions hitherto displaced from much of the previous century’s discourse of 
childhood. Indeed, the evaluation of Golding’s book as “a book about children…rather than for 
them” indicates the disruptive force of his literary representation (Hannabuss, 2000, p. 11, 
emphasis added). Against a backdrop of war and the threat of still others, Golding’s novel, 
regularly taught in high schools, invites readers who can contemplate the thought of death and 
destruction in the stranger within the child. 
In the decades since the publication of Lord of the Flies, the uneasy relation of the adult 
world to the child-group persists, particularly in the context of the school (Blackman & 
Walkerdine, 2001). The passions of group life undergird incidents of school shootings, bullying, 
and harassment (particularly gendered and/or homophobic harassment) that have tragic 
connections to suicide. Feelings of isolation are deeply connected to group psychology and its 
externalizing function to cast out anyone not believed to belong within its confines. For this 
reason, the passions of group life remain a stubborn and threatening problem in contexts of 
education. Moreover, with the emergence of social media and mobile technologies, we find 
ourselves in a virtual “castle rock,” the name given to the place on the island where the boys’ 
monster resides. Technology pushes the group into unchartered territory. In the online world, 
neither the teacher nor student is immune from exposure and attack. The passions and 
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implications of group life are mobile, meeting the desire to be seen with public moments of 
shame and exploitation.18  
Discourses and practices of control emerge as the most dominant response to the threat of 
group breakdown. More or less overt manifestations of this control have emerged in sites of 
education. One lies in zero-tolerance policies.19 Another exists in the move to institute formal 
legislation that criminalizes bullying and harassment, such as the Government of Ontario’s Bill 
13, Accepting Schools Act, passed into law in 2012. More “positive” approaches to bullying and 
social violence call for promoting: “social-emotional competencies” such as empathy (Frey, 
Hirschstein, & Guzzo, 2000, p. 110; Greenberg et al., 2003; Schonert-Reichl, Smith, Zaidman-
Zait, & Hertzman, 2012); peace-building (Bickmore, 2014); proactive discipline (Sharkey & 
Fenning, 2012); and an emphasis on group work as a method of cooperative learning to 
strengthen group bonds (Johnson & Johnson, 2009). All of these responses imagine the child-
group as in need of something that education can provide: a limit, a punishment, discipline, 
competencies, cooperative others. But a tension arises between what the child-group allegedly 
needs and what the adult (and adult-group) might need from the child-group. To return to 
Britzman (2006a) on the question child, the adult re-finds her own history of education in the 
child and so too may find her history of group psychology in the child-group. Put in terms of 
                                                
18 In Canada, a startling example of how new technologies have led to troubling forms of harassment is the 2013 
suicide of 17-year-old Rehtaeh Parsons. Parsons was subject to severe shaming and harassment when a photograph 
of her allegedly being sexually assaulted circulated among her peers (according to the boys involved, the sexual act 
was consensual). This case, among others, raises crucial questions regarding the law’s ability to respond to new 
technologies and the forms of harassment they make possible. So too does it raise pedagogical concerns over how to 
address and intervene in online harassment, before the time of crisis. 
19 Farley (2012) notes the turn to zero tolerance policies, particularly since the 1980s. She suggests that this policy is 
a manifestation of “literal readings” of student behaviour (p. 175). In such a reading of behaviour, the difference 
between phantasy and reality cannot be thought such that phantasy (in Farley’s case, the phantasy of beating/being 
beaten) comes to shape the very policies that perpetuate this collapse, namely zero tolerance policies. Farley makes 
the case for considering phantasy formations at work in responses to student “misbehaviour” in order to respond 
without retaliation to both real and imagined forms of violence. This chapter similarly orients towards the problem 
of aggression as something that exists in the passionate mind and asks how it becomes manifest in phantasies of the 
group. 
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Golding’s puzzle: What does the child-group need in reality and what does it need in our 
imagination of it? Narratives of group breakdown, such as Golding’s, may therefore support 
adult thinking about the puzzle of reality and phantasy as it pertains to the child-group, a use of 
fiction Golding himself implies in suggesting that, “Perhaps in the twentieth century, the sort of 
fables we must construct are not for children on any level” (as cited in Singh, 1997, p. 205). In 
this regard, narratives of the group gone mad allow us to enter into a space for symbolizing the 
mad passion animated in groups and the challenges it poses to the adult’s world authority, issues 
as important in the twenty-first century as they were in Golding’s time. 
In the educational aim to respond to the group through mechanisms of control, lost is 
Golding’s argument that the group can also go mad in the name of establishing order and control. 
The discourse of controlling the group loses touch with the idea that the group is itself a site of 
controlling its members. Groups are made from ties that shift, as its individual members also do. 
Intentionally or not, human ties can hurt, cause others pain, feel good, frustrate, and give 
pleasure. Never are the bonds between self and other self-evident, static, or the same, except in 
our phantasies of them. Group life thus presents a paradox that works against the educational 
phantasy of control precisely because groups animate and depend on the uneasy mingling of 
inside and outside. “Group psychology is,” in the words of Britzman (2010), “as much an 
internal affair as it is an external organization” (p. 113). Britzman reminds us that we bring an 
internalized group of past figures to the external group of present ones, and this animates what 
we understand to be happening there. Her idea echoes Freud (1921): “In the individual’s mental 
life someone else is invariably involved, as a model, as an object, as a helper, as an 
opponent…individual psychology…is at the same time social psychology” (p. 69). Within any 
group, there are countless internal group formations at work. As an “internal affair,” the group is 
 91 
made from the passion of its members—the phantasy groups we each bring to object relations 
and that serve as unconscious responses to the collective. Such phantasies enliven group life, 
while also threatening its dissolution in defensive compliance or chaotic breakdown. Thus, I read 
group life as a site of passion and madness with a view to notice how these dynamics emerge 
both symptomatically and narratively. How may pedagogy create the conditions in which 
individuals within groups narrate and make significance from the ties that bind them, a notion of 
symbolization? 
In what follows, I examine representations of group breakdown to rethink the group as a 
place of mad passion. In the next section, I draw from Winnicott’s (1984/2012) suggestion that 
the group depends upon the health of its individual members. I bring this idea to Golding’s 
literary representation to examine the group’s need for adequate “cover” that would make 
bearing their vulnerable situation possible. 
  
Group Psychology 
Golding’s novel uses the symbol of a monster to express an inner strangeness of the 
group. At first a subject of nightmares, the monster takes shape at the peak of a cluster of rocks 
named Castle Rock. As the boys become progressively more convinced about the reality of the 
monster, they decide they must hunt and destroy it. As they do, the boys themselves become 
increasingly monstrous and mad. Golding was a schoolteacher at the time of the novel’s 
publication. This telling biographical note suggests his fiction makes strong link between the 
group psychology and education. Britzman also makes this link to theorize education as an 
experiment in group psychology, one that may strive towards the construction of a “thinking 
group” (2010, p. 101, emphasis in original). But as Golding’s tale represents so well, the group 
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is also susceptible to symbolic collapse, which can further lead to madness and destruction, 
symbolized in the boys’ construction of the island monster. 
The “stranger within” Lord of the Flies might here represent the child in the sense that 
Hannah Arendt (1958/2006) describes in “Crisis in Education.” In Arendt’s view of natality, a 
new generation bursts into a world with a quality of newness that also threatens to topple the 
world as it exists. Arendt worried about how education could meet the child’s natality and she 
criticized education’s progressive turn for its simultaneous emphasis on the child-group and 
neglect of authority. Leaving young people to their own devices meant giving free reign to the 
child’s destructive instincts un-tempered by adult authority. Thus Arendt’s is a plea for adult 
intervention capable of containing the irreverence of the child-group, lest it become one of 
tyranny. Echoing Arendt, Golding describes the young people in his story as being “innocent of 
their own natures” (as cited in Wall, 2010, p. 44), such that when they arrive on the shores of the 
island they fail to understand the monsters within themselves that they later come up against. 
Both Golding and Arendt raise the question of how the newness of the child-group carries an 
unacknowledged monstrosity that needs to be taken into account. 
Reading the novel through Freud (1921), Golding’s “nature” might refer to the human 
tendency to sacrifice individuality and thinking for the love of a leader. “A primary group of this 
kind,” Freud writes, “is a number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object 
for their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego” (p. 
116). Indeed, the field of education makes use of this desire for love of a leader (Freud, 1914). 
But the aim of education is also to support children to direct passion away from being loved to 
the love of the world: “from learning for love to love of learning” (Ekstein & Motto, 1969; see 
also Britzman, 1998). 
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 From Winnicott’s (1984/2012) point of view, the boys’ “nature” is an effect of being 
born in a state that is merged with and totally dependent on the mother. The group in Golding’s 
narrative may have initially formed because it offered “cover” (Winnicott, 1984/2012, p. 166) 
that protects members from their isolated situation of having to grow up and out of the bond with 
the mother. For Winnicott, protection arrives via maternal covering and, later, becomes self-
covering: a mind capable of meeting frightening and paranoid states with a layer of imagination 
that invites curiosity, concern, and insight. Cover facilitates representing distinctions between 
self and other or phantasy and reality, and allows for a kind of sanity. As differentiation comes 
into existence, there emerges something that exists outside the self. But this is also a threatening 
prospect in which “protection is needed, else the repudiated external world comes back at the 
new phenomenon and attacks from all quarters and in every conceivable way” (Winnicott, 
1984/2012, p. 165). 
Winnicott (1984/2012) identifies two kinds of groups, depending on the status of 
integration of its individual members. If members are sufficiently integrated, they are also 
capable of self-covering, which produces a group formation in which each individual contributes. 
In this scenario, the group as a whole allows for and benefits from each member’s difference. In 
contrast, when individuals have not achieved sufficient integration (and Winnicott suggests this 
is the case for children and adolescents), the group may form on the basis that the group as a 
whole provides cover. In some cases, individual members may “exploit the group’s cover” and 
regress into states of dependency and un-integration from which integration may then be 
achieved (p. 166). For others, the cover of the group will be enough to take on the integrating 
work themselves. Still, for some an external agency is required for the group to survive the 
antisocial aspects of the child in need of a cover. To this discussion can be added Winnicott’s 
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idea of dis-integration, a defense against a state of primary madness that is vital to self-making, 
and for which the (maternal) environment’s holding is absolutely crucial. Dis-integration 
responds to unbearable anxieties that cannot (and/or did not) find adequate cover. In all cases, 
Winnicott argues that we bring a more or less integrated self to a group and that we also, to 
varying degrees, depend upon the group for making integration possible, as was the case in our 
infancy vis-à-vis the mother. This means that forming a group is an emotional achievement 
dependent upon the emotional capacities of its members to allow for but not be overcome by 
passionate states of un-integration. 
Winnicott’s (1984/2012) dynamics of group formation are fictionalized in Golding’s 
(1954) Lord of the Flies. At first, the boys find comfort in the cover that the group provides and 
in the ordering of the reality they set out to achieve. They decide, democratically, on a leader 
who divides tasks and assigns the group members various roles, from keeping the fire alight to 
hunting to watching over the young children to building shelter. But this democratically 
organized arrangement is fragile and no match for the vulnerabilities of their emotional and 
physical situation. Un-integrated aggression and fear take over as unmediated paranoia. The 
group members’ individual and collective capacities to cover the anxiety of taking care of their 
own and each other’s needs break down as they work desperately to sustain the hope of rescue. 
In Winnicott’s sense, the boys require a cover beyond their own phantasy of this condition 
because they have not achieved integration. “Adolescent groups may achieve a kind of 
democracy under supervision” (p. 167), Winnicott argues. However, “it is a mistake...to expect 
democracy to ripen among adolescents, even when each individual is mature” (p. 167). Unable to 
integrate the fear of their situation, the group and its members defend against anxiety by 
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mobilizing a passion for control, which as quickly careens into its underside: aggression and 
destruction.  
The island fire in the novel is a metaphor representing the two sides of this tension. 
Where the boys’ routine of keeping the fire alive acts as a cover holding the hope of rescue, 
when they fail to mind the fire their worries over not being rescued very quickly rage to a point 
of destruction. Here, the group passion for control, in the form of minding the fire, wards off 
uncertainty. Yet control turns to aggressive action to get rid of the dangers of exposure felt by the 
group. With the fire snuffed out, the boys spot the “monster” that had until this point been a 
figure of nightmares and speculation. This monster becomes a placeholder for their monstrous 
feelings and fears. Attacking the monster becomes a way to attack the vulnerability for which 
they have no cover but the group, which is also dissolving into mass psychology. The question of 
who will mind the fire turns on each member of the group and the group itself.   
Winnicott (1984/2012) considers how a group may be used to ward against the pains of 
separation. He also speculates on how the group may offer a second chance for integration by 
allowing and providing cover for states of un-integration. For Winnicott, integrated selves can 
come together to learn from each other with the awareness of their differences. When individual 
members are not yet able to bear the separation needed to create such groups, and when the 
group’s cover is not good enough, members may create a leader—a lord of the flies. This leader 
fulfills the phantasy of omnipotence that individual group members may simultaneously wish for 
the self and find lacking. Read through Winnicott, then, Golding’s fictional rendering of “what 
actually would happen” posits a collection of individuals unable to bear the mad passion that 
emerges from their situation of dependency and uncertainty. The group promise of control that at 
first provides cover eventually dissolves as symbolic collapse takes over. In Golding’s tale, there 
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is neither learning nor education nor what we might call, after Winnicott’s “true self” (p. 165), a 
“true group” that would signal a collection of integrated selves working and learning together. 
Instead there is a mass of people acting out annihilating phantasies. 
Rather than be used by its members as place for learning and representing passionate 
states of mind, the group dis-integrates. What breaks down is a group whose members can risk 
integration that would allow for difference and for narrative. For the boys, phantasy becomes 
reality, rather than a thing to symbolize. The only one who is finally able to symbolize a 
distinction between reality and phantasy, a boy named Simon, is mistaken for the mysterious 
beast and killed before he can offer his interpretation to the masses. Quite literally, this child 
representative of the thinking mind is destroyed by the group’s collapse into mindlessness as 
paranoia takes over. Simon’s ability to grasp the difference between imagination and reality 
stands in for the integration that the rest of the boys fail to achieve.  
The nature Golding refers to could be the boys’ susceptibility to not notice the distinction 
between reality and imagination in their desperate bid for a cover from the gap between the two. 
Golding’s idea of nature is here the tendency of the group to lose the capacity to mind the fires 
that burn within and between members. Thus his narrative helps us think about the madness that 
may unfold when one cannot find narratives through which to contain the passions brought out in 
the group, as Freud also warned. Here, too, Golding might have had in mind a theory of 
education as needing to help young people notice and narrate the confusion between internal and 
external groups. If so, we can read the group going mad as a representation of pedagogical 
challenges and failures to support the transformation of passion through its symbolization, an 
effect of a group psychology dominated by a “hatred of development” (Britzman, 2003, p. 109). 
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What are needed, in response, are narratives of groups and breakdown that invite teachers and 
students to symbolize underlying phantasies of group life that threaten to dissolve the group.  
 
Siblings 
Mitchell’s (2003) Siblings turns on a question significant for my interest in the child-
group: What is the status of lateral human relationships in the effort to belong and contribute to 
group life? Mitchell observes that while much psychoanalytic attention is given over to vertical 
relationships, that is, between parents and children (also, teachers and students), the specter of 
the sibling haunts the group and its breakdown. Mitchell finds the sibling specter in the very 
language we use to describe the group—“liberty, equality, fraternity” and “sisterhood” in the 
case of feminism (p. xv). But she also notices an absence of a “social place” for acknowledging 
the significance of actual siblings (p. xv). Mitchell detects a problem to the extent that 
manifestations of social siblinghood displace considerations about literal sibling bonds. This 
negation, she writes, “ensures the dominance of social brotherhood as an ideal while natural 
brotherhood can go on the rampage unnoticed…because it is given no social place” (p. xv). The 
“rampage” manifests, too, in the outbreak of war, which re-stages an old battle of the first-born 
and the second and animates a lethal battle for the lost territory of the mother. Mitchell asks: “If 
we fail to overcome our desire for sibling incest or for sibling murder, will versions of these be 
more insistently played out with later lateral relationships, with peers and so-called equals — in 
love and in war” (p. 2)? The Oedipal passion to possess the mother and destroy all rivals catches 
the sibling in the crossfire. Without containment, this old dynamic, now manifest laterally, risks 
being acted out in the group going mad. How things unfold with the mother affects sibling 
bonds, which in turn, affect peer bonds that come later.  
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Mitchell’s (2003) theory of siblings tells a tale of narcissistic love, traumatic self-
annihilation, and murderous hatred. If well mediated this emotional complex transforms into 
healthy play and object love. She writes: “The ‘original’ moment, replicated endlessly if not 
resolved, is when the sibling or imagined sibling replaces one – when there is another in one’s 
place” (p. xvi). For Mitchell, the sibling is a double, albeit of a different kind than the mother-
double. Unlike the former, the sibling-double comes after the time of maternal passion. In the 
sibling-double, the position of the child is doubled. The sibling intrudes on the phantasy of being 
the one and only creation in the eyes of the parents, an intrusion that amounts to a “‘universal’ 
trauma of displacement/replacement” (p. xvi). The sibling re-animates Oedipal conflict with the 
additional feature that Mitchell names a phantasy of annihilation directed laterally: If another 
exists in my place vis-à-vis the parents, how can I remove it? But also, if another stands in the 
same position as me, this other must be me, or be killed. Here, Mitchell posits a passionate 
relationship with the sibling that is necessarily conflicted. The sibling is adored with “all the 
urgency of the child’s narcissism,” even while it is also “loathed as its replacement” (p. 10). In 
Mitchell’s words: “The sibling is par excellence someone who threatens the subject’s 
uniqueness. The ecstasy of loving one who is like oneself is experienced at the same time as the 
trauma of being annihilated by one who stands in one’s place” (p. 10).  
Mitchell’s (2003) sibling story is also a developmental narrative that moves from the 
phantasy that “there is only room for me” to a belief that “there is room for you as well as me” 
(p. 44). Like many psychological achievements, there is also uneven movement between these 
two positions insofar as we are susceptible to regression. It is this tension between singularity 
and multiplicity that marks both the pleasure and risk of later group formations. Between the two 
positions, Mitchell finds yet another intrusion: a prohibition she names the “law of the mother” 
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(p. 43). This maternal law comes by way of a “later mother” (p. 50) and exists alongside the law 
of the father, which symbolizes prohibition against parent-child incest.20 This mother issues a 
vertical law regarding who can and who cannot have babies, but she also introduces lateral 
difference among a sea of sibling sameness. As Mitchell writes: 
By differentiating between her children, the mother and her law allow for the concept of 
seriality to be internalized — John has to know he has lost the possibility of being Jane. 
One is a child in the same positions as one’s siblings in regard to one’s parent or parents, 
as one’s peers in relation to one’s teacher or boss, but one is also different: there is room 
for two, three, four or more. Of this the hysteric in all of us is unaware. (pp. 52-3) 
In her later role, the mother’s recognition of each sibling introduces a prohibition on the child’s 
murderous desires that would secure uniqueness, as well as the child’s narcissism that would see 
no difference. The mother’s law is the law of seriality. Her prohibition initiates a sense that the 
child shares a lateral position with different others. According to Mitchell, such a realization is 
traumatic, and its effect amounts to a phantasy of self-annihilation: If the sibling is at first double 
to the self, there arises the possibility that there could be no self. This doubling thus introduces 
an idea of death handled through an aggressive impulse to destroy the other who “stands exactly 
                                                
20 Mitchell (2003) traces the negation of this later mother in psychoanalytic theory to the fact that, in the analytic 
relationship, the analyst assumes this role thus making it difficult to notice. Writing in relation to the emergence of a 
pre-Oedipal mother as introduced through Klein, Mitchell elaborates:  
The Object-Relations ‘mother’ analyst is enacting the mother-as-lawgiver and thus is not able to think about 
the role. If the clinical treatment enacts a maternal law then what will be perceived in the material of the 
patient’s transference will not be this mother but instead the other mother, the necessarily mad (Winnicott), 
fused and loving (Baling) or retributive (Klein) pre-Oedipal mother. (p. 51) 
Mitchell’s feminist intervention is to elaborate a mother who is not always subsumed to being “primitive and 
earlier” as she is so frequently defined by the patriarchy (p. 51). She argues for seeing the mother’s law beside the 
law of the father: “a different law on the same level” (p. 51). To think about this in relation to the theorizing 
discussed in the previous chapter, this “later mother” might reflect and/or instantiate the kind of disimpassioning that 
Kristeva (2010a) argues brings about the separation and difference that maternal passion or doubling had sutured. 
The mother in possession of the maternal law, that is to say, must recognize her different position in relation to her 
children as she also must recognize plurality among her children/her children’s peers. 
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in the same place as oneself” (p. 43). This construction is the child’s knee-jerk reaction against 
the threat of sameness:  
It is the one who can now be imagined to be utterly different who can thenceforth be 
loathed or loved. The displaced has initially no place to go to....The new baby must be 
got rid of; when it does not vanish, then it must be relegated to another place - the place 
of the ‘other’. ‘I’ must be king of the castle, the new baby the dirty rascal. (p. 48) 
In the sibling dynamic, then, a passion to kill the sibling is ironically a hopeful moment in 
making a relation to something outside the self: “Hate for the sibling enables the first move to be 
made: I hate you, you are not me, is the precondition of seriality” (p. 53). The mother’s law 
intervenes to contain the threat and divert the ruthless impulse to destroy into “aggressive play 
and healthy rivalry” (p. 28). As Mitchell describes, “children’s games—musical chairs, oranges 
and lemons, pig in the middle and all the spontaneous play—are about seriality” (p. 53). These 
games constitute a “social place” for negotiating sibling relations (p. xv). Moreover, Mitchell 
notes a relation between seriality and mourning the idea of the self as the only one, evidenced 
when patients contemplate just how ordinary they are. “[A]t heart we are just like anyone else, as 
anyone else is like us,” she writes, acknowledging how ordinariness is both a narcissistic blow 
and a “huge relief” (p. 29). Importantly, the function of seriality is to distinguish between the 
phantasy of sameness (which sets into motion annihilation) and the reality that there is more than 
one ordinary place to stand.  
Mitchell’s (2003) law of the mother, like Jacques Lacan’s law of the father, is not 
guaranteed or bound by the actual mother. Rather, her work posits the law of the mother as a 
structuring principle of groups that may emerge from different sources. As a quality of relating, 
seriality may be generated from within the sibling/peer group itself. The law can thus be 
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imagined as a frame of authority passed down by adult decrees but also enacted by the peer 
group in ways that are separate from these generational roots. In this suggestion, Mitchell offers 
an alternative to ethnocentric framings that depend on paternalistic notions of power and 
authority. She notes, for instance, that it often “comes as a shock to the Western imagination” to 
learn how central sibling relationships are in certain places in the world (sub-Saharan Africa and 
southern India are two cases in point) (p. 3). The importance of the sibling is closely related to 
social context. She explains, “Where there is less individual attention to the child [from the adult 
world] the social demands of peer behaviour may be more internalized” (p. 21).  
For Mitchell (2003), group psychology must contend with a phantasy of annihilation that 
group life also manifests. In contexts of group psychology, she finds the problem of madness in 
unmediated transference of the passions of our early sibling bonds, dominated by the wish to be 
the only one. Where Winnicott underscores the role of the group to defend against the threat of 
being a separate subject, Mitchell highlights the opposite wish to be the only one and the group’s 
unraveling precisely to defend this wish. Mitchell’s formulation offers a frame through which to 
think about the games children play as sites of both repeating and working through the conflicts 
of annihilation and adoration animated in sibling/peer relations.21 In the section to follow, I 
examine the Hunger Games children play as one site in which to speculate about the dynamics of 
singularity and collectivity as also belonging to the generational ties that comprise education. 
 
                                                
21 Mitchell’s theory of the sibling phantasy invites a new interpretation of the relationship between Erica and Nina 
discussed in the previous chapter. There, I read their relationship through a vertical lens of maternal phantasy. With 
Mitchell, we can consider their dynamic as returning a sibling phantasy of annihilation, a phantasy also found in the 
Swan Lake ballet. For instance, the mother’s aggression may stem from murderous phantasies against a phantasy 
sibling who usurps her own position in the world: The ballerina Erica was, is now the (better) ballerina Nina. 
Positioned to play a game of sibling sameness/rivalry, which requires the suppression of her own subjectivity, Nina 
re-finds the persecuting, murderous sibling in the black swan and then in Lily who Nina believes is “trying to 
replace me.” While a more substantive reading of the film is necessary to do justice to this interpretation, I signal 
this possibility to emphasize the diversity of interpretations that aesthetic and theoretical texts invite. Such diversity 
also exemplifies the maternal law of seriality: There is room for more than one interpretation. 
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The Group Gone Mad: May the Odds be Ever in Your Favour 
Since its publication in 2008, North American readers have been captivated by a novel 
and now a film with a very dark premise. The Hunger Games (Collins, 2008) is named for a 
battle to the death that takes place among twenty-four “tributes”: young people aged twelve to 
eighteen picked randomly from each of the twelve districts in the imagined nation of Panem. The 
ruling district, the Capitol, stages this Battle Royale each year as a reminder of the districts’ 
uprising 74 years earlier. The reminder is also a phantasy of sameness that binds the districts in 
their submission to the paternalizing force of a Capitol power. According to the head 
“gamekeeper,” the games are a key binding force, “something that knits us all together” 
(Jacobson, Kilik, & Ross, 2012).22 The book trilogy, and now four-part movie franchise, follows 
the main character, Katniss Everdeen, as she volunteers for the games in place of her younger 
sister. Thinking with Mitchell, this move represents straightaway the symbolic role of the sibling 
double in the form of rescuer. In this capacity, Katniss wins the games while outsmarting the 
gamekeepers’ rule, itself a phantasy of sibling annihilation: there can be only one winner. But 
Katniss usurps this rule so that she and her competitor from the same district, Peeta, survive the 
games together by playing as star-crossed lovers. Inspired by their victory, the districts again rise 
up against the Capitol. They fight to bring down the monolithic structure of power and to 
                                                
22 Ironically, the problem of doubling arose as a controversy surrounding Collins’s The Hunger Games. Published in 
2008, the novel bears an uncanny resemblance to Koushun Takami’s Battle Royale, published in English in 2003 
and in Japanese in 1999. Battle Royale is about middle school students who, under the guise of a study trip, are 
taken to a location where they must battle one another until only one remains. Though Collins denies knowing about 
Takami’s novel at the time of writing The Hunger Games, let alone having read it, outraged readers took to the 
Internet and Collins’s novel was “savaged on the blogosphere as a baldfaced ripoff” (Dominus, 2011, April 8). 
Though the comparisons between the two novels reveal striking similarities, there is also an interesting study to be 
made from their differences (most notably the Japanese novel’s staging of the battle in closer proximity to the world 
of schooling). But there is also something at stake in the furor to defend or “savage” one author over the other. Here, 
the demand for a sole survivor that is insisted upon in both novels repeats in the controversy about them. Can there 
be room for more than one novel? How close is too close? The move to note and insist upon differences between the 
stories may thus offer a necessary intervention into the anxiety (and rage) that their similarity invites. 
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institute the law of seriality that makes room for many to live together. But this aim, too, is 
complicated. 
The narrative begins from the vantage of mad group psychology. The nation is dominated 
by phantasies of singularity held by the ruling Capitol. Under its law of domination, “others” are 
cast out, relocated to the districts, and then pitched onto the screen in the yearly Hunger Games’ 
spectacle of killing. Like the tyrant on the playground, the games perform a “manic grandiosity” 
that restores, however insufficiently, the “traumatic eradication of…being” (Mitchell, 2003, p. 
xvi). The Capitol’s grandiose expression of power, reflected in lavish, garish lifestyles, knits 
them together in a “shared eradication of selves…until all become as one” (Mitchell, 2003, p. 
xvi). The nation of Panem here represents a Coral Island for the twenty-first century, the name 
given to the bed of rocks on which the monster reigns in Golding’s novel. But whereas Golding 
represented the return of aggressive, destructive children that had been expelled from the 
previous century’s island stories, Collins represents a world organized around the spectacle of 
annihilation staged, uncannily, in the format of a reality show. Her narrative offers a new twist 
on Golding’s tyranny: Whereas his boys must navigate the temptations of a life with no rules and 
no figure of authority, the rules of the Hunger Games are made by adults and are clear: Kill or be 
killed, only one will survive. The Hunger Games thus offers a rich site for the study of group 
dynamics as a problem of interpretation and its collapse. It explicitly plays with monstrous 
impulses and fears of annihilation that circulate among siblings and offers a representation of 
how these may be contained. While protecting her own sister, Katniss enters a scene dominated 
by a repetition of the phantasy of sibling annihilation, where each tribute represents a brother or 
sister from one’s own or a neighbouring district. But if the official goal of the games is to be the 
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last one standing, Katniss emerges as the hero who champions a different kind of group 
formation: a law of seriality.  
Asked how the idea for the story came to her, Collins describes a dreamy origin story 
reminiscent of Golding’s thought experiment about “what actually would happen”: 
I was channel surfing between reality TV programming and actual war coverage when 
Katniss’s story came to me. One night I’m sitting there flipping around and on one 
channel there’s a group of young people competing for, I don’t know, money maybe? 
And on the next, there’s a group of young people fighting an actual war. And I was tired, 
and the lines began to blur in this very unsettling way, and I thought of this story. 
(Scholastic Inc., n.d.)  
The idea for the novel emerged in this moment of sleepy confusion, a state between phantasy and 
reality. In turn, the novel blurs lines between these realms: The terrors of war can feel terribly 
surreal, just as the games we play can turn viciously real. The Hunger Games’ fictional death-
match conveys phantasies that underpin both the annihilating genre of reality television and the 
phantasied terms of belonging that found the nation. From our engagement with group dynamics 
in the novel, we have a sense of how the dissolution of the serial law can fuel the phantasy that 
“there is only me” that is also, for both Winnicott (1984/2012) and Mitchell (2003), the grounds 
of war.   
The Hunger Games presents scenes of children in combat. Through its reality show 
format, Collins weaves a fictional plot where young people are forced to play a deadly game for 
all the world to see. An adult phantasy of a world without children, the narrative might also 
symbolize a phantasy of a world without siblings, a world of “just me.” As the inhabitants of the 
Capitol re-find their annihilating phantasies on the screen, so too do readers and viewers of The 
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Hunger Games. In text and image, readers enter into and delight in a mad world of symbolic 
collapse, where phantasies of destruction are horrifically acted out and achieved.  
Collins conceives of the games children play as an example of group psychology. But the 
games are also a generational problem, a question of the conditions made possible by adults. In 
the film, children are puppets on the adult’s playground of violence. In this view, a breakdown 
between generations animates the mad world of The Hunger Games, where young people are 
made to play a game that purportedly “knits” together the nation on the bodies of children who 
act out annihilation phantasies. Read through Mitchell’s (2003) theory of laterality, this group 
psychology can be thought of as a representation of the breakdown of one generation’s ability to 
work through—or symbolize—the annihilating experience of the sibling such that it repeats its 
terrifying logic of “there is only room for me”: kill or be killed. What has happened to the serial 
law that decrees there is room enough for all? Paradoxically, Collins’s fictional narrative 
represents the failure of fiction, and of playing, such that the young people are literally poised as 
intruders the adults create in phantasy. The monolith of the Capitol may be read in phantasy like 
the only child enacting revenge against the sibling whose emergence on the scene disrupts an 
omnipotent phantasy of singularity. To keep the threat of the other at bay, and so to keep the 
phantasy of singularity in tact, the Capitol actively exploits maternal law in the service of its own 
power, and not the seriality of the group. Each district must serve the Capitol by providing basic 
resources for its existence. The resources are both material (coal, agriculture, grain) and 
emotional (the sacrifice of two tributes to play in the yearly death-match). Mirroring the image of 
the child who pays the bully in exchange for peace, each of the districts feeds the Capitol until 
the annual Hunger Games when the abiding phantasy, kill or be killed, is staged, once again, on 
the screen.   
 106 
The narrative of sacrifice also implies a phantasy of being “the chosen one” that fuels the 
group psychology between districts. Here, the Capitol stands in a parental position, albeit one 
who fails to insist upon seriality. At stake for the districts is the phantasy of being the one and 
only love object. This phantasy is particularly strong in the districts for which being a tribute is a 
noble aspiration for which one trains a lifetime. In these districts, “career tributes” gladly 
sacrifice themselves to the dream of being chosen. They enjoy bringing pride to their districts, 
reminiscent of nation-building stories that boast the loyalty of military troops who sacrifice their 
lives to defend the borders of the state. The position of career tributes also plays with ideas of 
global sporting competition, such as the Olympic Games. But whereas the Olympics may 
provide an arena for “aggressive play and healthy rivalry” (Mitchell, 2003, p. 28), the Hunger 
Games operates in an arena of war that enacts the sibling phantasy of annihilation in its most 
ruthless form: Only killing will suffice. 
Under the authority of a malevolent parent, then, the question the narrative asks is how 
siblings might relate differently than through the terms set out by the parents. Returning to 
Winnicott (1984/2012), this question concerns each individual’s capacity to find adequate cover 
for the vulnerability of being a dependent self separate from others. Such cover is initially the 
provision of the parental bond. Taken through Mitchell (2003), one also needs cover for the 
terrifying experience of sibling intrusion, where an idea of the self as separate and unique 
collapses with the arrival of another who stands in my position. In The Hunger Games, the adult 
world exploits rather than covers the vulnerability of the child’s conflict, stoking rather than 
abating sibling phantasies of annihilation. The Capitol turns the child’s conflict into a game that 
feeds the omnipotent phantasy of singularity yet never allows for digestion and working through. 
Indeed, the Capitol’s disavowal of the need for working through is represented through the 
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metaphor of feasting in a scene in book/film two, Catching Fire (Collins, 2009; Jacobson, Kilik, 
& Lawrence, 2013). In this scene, Katniss and Peeta attend a party in the Capitol at the opulent 
home of President Snow. They are offered an elixir designed to make them sick, “for when 
you’re full” and want to “go on eating,” because “how else could you taste everything?” 
(Jacobson, Kilik, & Lawrence, 2013). The phantasy feeds insatiable desires for delicious food 
and ruthless destruction. A potion that promises endless satisfaction or a murderous game that 
acts out annihilating phantasies of the “repudiated external world” (Winnicott, 1984/2012, p. 
165) are the converse of cover. Rather, enacted here is symbolic collapse and a manifestation of 
the death drive.  
Katniss introduces another view and a different game based on the principle of the law of 
seriality. A chosen one of a different sort, she intervenes in the mad logic of the Capitol. She 
reminds people that a thinking self capable of making distinctions may emerge between the 
phantasy of singularity and annihilating the threatening sibling/other in reality. Katniss is an 
individual who “cares, or minds, and both feels and accepts responsibility” (Winnicott, 
1984/2012, p. 86, emphasis in original). Responsibility, here, is enacted as an ability to respond 
differently to the “internal affair” (Britzman, 2010, p. 113) of group life. Even more, she changes 
the Games’ terms of luck (that the “odds be ever in your favour”) to her own terms of choice. 
First of all, Katniss volunteers herself to the Games in a bid to replace her younger sister, whose 
name was originally drawn and called into the role. While in the arena, Katniss struggles with the 
demand to kill in various ways. At times she responds with a murderous impulse, at other times 
by retreating and hiding, and, finally, by changing the rules of the game. Rather than abide the 
singular logic of the gamekeepers, her final act of the Games operates as a fight for a future of 
the group on new terms. Her strategy appeals to a new kind of group, while also acknowledging 
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the Capitol’s need for a winner. In Katniss’s imagination, more than one can survive the games; 
if not, both will die in a pact of double suicide. Her wager is that two winners are better than no 
winner at all: two siblings are better than none. Hers is a move towards the containing function 
of maternal law. For Katniss, the group need not be undone by the annihilation of all but one. 
Among those watching from the sidelines of the districts, her actions incite a revolution against 
the oppressive, authoritative Capitol. Katniss reminds the group of a forgotten lateral law: more 
than one can survive. She achieves this by playing on the Capitol’s need for magical certainties. 
She and Peeta deliver the performance of a mad love affair, the only logic that the Capitol can 
accept. But while Katniss and Peeta perform their victory lap of love in an effort to keep the 
Capitol masses happy, in the background, district “rebels” prepare for revolt. 
Significant about Katniss’s efforts is how she changes the rules so that the group might 
operate according to a new logic. This new logic depends upon Katniss’s ongoing labour of 
making fine distinctions between self and other, phantasy and reality. In The Hunger Games 
trilogy, she finds another way to organize the emotional ties of the group, which drives the 
narrative to its final, climactic scene in book three, Mockingjay (Collins, 2010). In this scene, 
Katniss kills the new leader of the district Panem, President Coin, who had assumed authority 
when the revolutionaries overtook the Capitol. The scene is elaborately staged: Katniss, known 
for her excellent ability to wield a bow, readies herself to deliver the executing arrow into the 
dethroned President Snow. While the crowd looks on, anticipating the taste of final victory and 
revenge, Katniss catches a final glance from her would-be victim and is reminded of his pledge 
that he would be and has always been truthful with her. This is significant because earlier 
Katniss accused him of murdering her sister, Prim, the same sister whose rescue opened the 
series. As part of a team of medical officers, Prim was attending to a group of injured children 
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when a second round of bombs exploded, killing everyone but securing victory for the rebellion. 
To Katniss’s surprise, Snow tells her that it was not Capitol forces that delivered the fatal blow. 
Rather, the revolutionaries staged the assault to make it look as though the Capitol was to blame. 
Distorting reality, the adult world once again repeats the logic of winning at all costs, played out 
specifically on the bodies of children in the name of revolution against oppression. All of this 
knowledge returns to Katniss as she catches Snow’s eye.  
Also on Katniss’s mind in an unsettling turn of events: The leaders of the revolution have 
voted to reverse the murderous Hunger Games. Their plan is to force the children of the 
overthrown leaders of the Capitol to play the deadly game. With her bow at the ready, Katniss 
must wage a battle between her own desire to seek revenge on the overthrown leader, on the 
understanding that killing him will lead to more children being killed. Katniss faces the question 
of how to choose maternal law in a world of regressed sibling adults. In literalizing the sibling 
phantasy that only one can survive, Coin represents the failure of the parent or adult to cover the 
terrors and vulnerabilities of being one among many. Turning her bow away from Snow to kill 
Coin at the last second, Katniss’s act acknowledges the failure of maternal law in both the 
Capitol and revolutionaries. Revolting against this annihilating logic, she positions herself on 
neither side but in a third term—as an interpreter of group psychology and its breakdown. 
Ultimately, Katniss is exonerated for killing Coin when she is diagnosed as herself mad: a 
“hopeless, shell-shocked lunatic” (Collins, 2010, p. 378). In this diagnosis, the new leaders and 
inhabitants of Panem seem to find a representative of insanity under which they had all been 
living.  
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Katniss’s story concludes with a plea for finding new rules of play that do not repeat the 
deadly parental ones given to the siblings. For Katniss, the capacity to imagine this alternative 
future is an imperative for the survival of the next generation: 
One day I’ll have to explain about my nightmares. Why they came. Why they won’t ever 
really go away. I’ll tell them how I survive it. I’ll tell them that on bad mornings, it feels 
impossible to take pleasure in anything because I’m afraid it could be taken away. That’s 
when I make a list in my head of every act of goodness I’ve seen someone do. It’s like a 
game. Repetitive. Even a little tedious after more than twenty years. 
But there are much worse games to play. (Collins, 2010, p. 390) 
Rather than repeat the inherited logic of annihilation, or have her children repeat it on her behalf, 
Katniss instead plays a “repetitive” game of seriality “in [her] head.” This game allows her to re-
find the capacity to “take pleasure” and remember a group made from “act[s] of goodness.” 
Here, the trauma of her early life finds its way to an internal scene of nightmares, which is not 
synonymous with the group breakdown acted out in the Games. Katniss’s capacity to symbolize 
her nightmares to her children engages traumatic experiences so as to guard against their 
transference to the next generation. Her desire to face the residues of trauma and her obligations 
to the next generation involve a turn to narrative: She will “tell” them about the lasting effects of 
history rather than silently watch the traumatic logic repeat in the Games, year after year. Tying 
generations together is the communal capacity for narration, where each can make a relation to 
and meaning of the unspoken pains, pleasures, worries, and hostility previously acted out in the 
horrific group psychology of the Hunger Games. 
The medium of literature and film thus offers a transitional space to imaginatively play in 
and consider the conflicts, pleasures, vulnerabilities, and terrors of living in community with 
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others. Readers and viewers become immersed in a world overtaken by annihilating phantasies 
that cannot be contained: “covered” and “integrated” (Winnicott, 1984/2012). Entering into a 
fictional space of collapse is an imaginative experience with un-covered passion and the madness 
of groups. Here, paranoid phantasies betray an inability to tolerate separation from the (m)other, 
on the one hand, and the sameness or doubling that the sibling introduces, on the other hand. We 
see this collapse in the group under the uncaring leadership of President Coin, for whom 
regression to sibling phantasies of annihilation (her own and those around her) means finding a 
way to win no matter the costs. Like President Snow before her, she goes mad in support of such 
phantasies, disavowing others a meaningful existence. Between group passion and the group 
gone mad is repetition of a closed logic that can admit no room for actual others, where Katniss 
struggles to fight for another way to live within the group. Through this figure, Collins makes a 
plea for better games that involve competition but do not kill: in Kristeva’s (2010a) words, “a 
regime of passion…that works through its imaginary substance indefinitely” (p. 94). Fiction is 
here both eerily within and outside the self. Reminiscent of Golding’s puzzle, Collins represents 
the psychic labour of changing the rules in ways that can invite appetite without the cruelty of 
starving others out, a balance that all games worth playing may share. 
 
The Mad Group and the Question of Pedagogy 
In closing, I return specifically to the question of pedagogy as affected by group relations. 
My analysis opens the question of how a crisis in child-group relating, as evidenced by bullying 
and school violence, may refer to the adult world’s incapacity to cover the painfully vulnerable 
situation of being one among several others. Adults’ ability to enact the maternal law of seriality 
depends on their own internal sense of this law, their own capacity to make room for others. In 
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the classroom, this tension between the teacher as supporter of the law of seriality and the 
teacher as susceptible to regression may be exacerbated.23 The teacher may play the role of “king 
of the castle” in a way that repeats the sibling phantasy of annihilation. Caught in such 
transference, the child-group struggles to find and sustain cover among its own members. 
Moreover, the sibling phantasy of singularity and the impulse to annihilate manifests in 
education as a destruction of the other’s mind as different from one’s own. Such phantasies work 
against education as a place for freedom and creative expression of one’s own passionate mind.  
Should the ideals of education align with the law of seriality, there can be room for more 
than one mind. To the extent that the phantasy sibling-double is also met by an impulse to 
construct the other as “utterly different” from the self (Mitchell, 2003, p. 48), this may also be a 
condition of possibility for education and for productive group psychology. As Mitchell (2003) 
argues, hatred for the sibling precedes the production of the “other” who “can thenceforth be 
loathed or loved” (p. 48). Hatred makes possible a tie to something outside of and different from 
oneself, even if this hatred must not be the end of the story. The intervening force of the maternal 
law contains this hatred and offers play as a way to transform annihilating impulses into 
sublimated forms of representation, in games, for instance, and in the play of narrative. Notably, 
the law of seriality does not negate hatred for the other in favour of love; it exacts a limit on what 
one can do in reality. This limit operates on a different register from the dictum “love your 
neighbour as you love yourself,” or the empathic law of “putting yourself in another’s shoes.” 
Such ideals of group relating risk collapse between self and other and so work against the 
                                                
23 Britzman (2006b) narrates an example of the teacher’s regression and propensity to forget the monstrous in her 
own pedagogy in her teaching memoir, “Monsters in Literature.” She returns to an early teaching experience to 
explore the emotional stakes driving her pedagogy in a course about literary monsters. Armed with a curriculum 
made from her own concerns and worries about the social world and teaching, Britzman recalls two passionate 
“furors” driving her: “the furor to teach and the furor to teach my politics” (p. 118). Britzman’s “monstrous” 
pedagogy forgot that the teacher’s mind is one among several and that authority comes by creating a pedagogy 
based, precisely, on the law of seriality: more than one (mind) can and does exist.  
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differentiation that seriality invites. What distinguishes a “thinking group” (Britzman, 2010, p. 
101) is its capacity to work through “private madness” (Green, 1986/2005) manifest in group 
ties. When private madness cannot find a cover in narrative, the risk is a madness that becomes 
destructive to the self and/or the other.  
In education, the maternal law of seriality opens a space for the thinking mind. Such a 
mind resides in an in-between place: between experience and understanding, where narratives of 
group relating allow for thinking about group life as simultaneously an internal and external 
affair. And yet, to the extent that education falls into delusions of mastery and measures success 
in terms of control and compliance, it risks playing a game of winning at all costs, where the best 
one can hope for is that “odds be ever in your favour.” A world without the maternal law of 
seriality is a world gone mad, as evidenced in both Collins’s and Golding’s narratives. A middle 
ground for passion involves the self’s ongoing labour of symbolizing passion-filled experiences 
of love and hate, breakdown and repair. Symbolization depends on cultivating pedagogical 
spaces for constructing and playing with difference between self and other, in ways that do not 
repeat phantasied terms of singularity that ward against difference. Productive group psychology 
is here dependent on an authority, external and internal, that authorizes a discourse of passion 
and uses narration to mediate its breakdown.  
When the conditions of pedagogy fail to authorize such a discourse, the child-group may 
respond with compliance. But it might also, like Katniss, re-invent the rules of pedagogy in ways 
that the adult world can learn from. As Mitchell (2003) argues, the law of seriality is not 
necessarily generated through the decrees of the adult world. To this point, it is interesting to 
notice the ways in which young people have responded to Collins’s Hunger Games trilogy by 
taking to the Internet, itself a virtual space of group psychology. J. S. Curwood (2013; Curwood, 
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Magnifico, & Lammersnotes, 2013) notes an abundance of “online affinity groups” where 
“young people…access an authentic audience who reads, responds to, and even critiques their 
written work” (Curwood, Magnifico, & Lammers, 2013, p. 677). These “fan fiction” groups 
materialize out of members’ shared passion for the texts and a desire to share with others their 
opinions, creative productions, burning questions, and criticisms: 
Some fans produce videos, create art, and write stories. Other fans engage in role-plays, 
share news updates, and post on discussion boards. Some just lurk. Whether they are 
engaged in active participation or legitimate peripheral participation, the affinity space 
encourages young people to read, critique, and reinvent young adult literature. (Curwood, 
2013, p. 425) 
Curwood wonders what adults and teachers might learn from these online sites. Beyond specific 
curriculum activities, these online groups reveal young people’s appetite for and ability to create 
generative spaces—and groups—that cultivate diverse and passionate ties around a common 
text. Their artful responses shift the horrifying rules of the text they reference through the labour 
of interpretation. Here, the cover of the group cultivates the valuable contributions of each 
member, where it is possible to think together and where thinking is dependent on no thought 
being exactly the same.
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Chapter Four 
Minding the Gap: The Teacher’s Passion 
Late in the film Short Term 12 (Olson, Goldstein, Astrachan, Najor, & Cretton, 2013), 
Grace, the day supervisor at a short term residential facility for kids, breaks into the family home 
of one of the young people she has become attached to. Jayden is visiting her father for the 
weekend, which Grace finds alarming. The day before, she sat beside Jayden as she disclosed the 
sexual and physical abuse she had been experiencing at the hands of her father. Though Jayden is 
unaware, Grace too has a history of being abused. Driven by this history, Grace enters the room 
where Jayden’s father lies sleeping. Armed with a baseball bat, Grace is on the edge of using it 
when Jayden enters: “What are you doing? That’s a little extreme don’t you think?” she says, 
before walking down the hall. Jayden’s question lingers, leaving Grace to contemplate the gap 
between the reality and phantasy of murder. Jayden’s next question, “Are you going crazy?” 
opens the door for Grace to narrate her own history of abuse and how this has animated her 
extreme behaviour:  
When I was your age, I had to stand in a courtroom with a bunch of strangers and tell 
them all the ways that he abused me…I sent him to prison. I didn’t talk about it. I didn’t 
think about it. Until I met you. I don’t know…I don’t know what I’m doing. I was just 
trying to help you. 
In this scene, Grace describes her transference with Jayden’s situation, or, the unexpected return 
of the difficult past in her efforts to intervene in another’s difficult present.  
Grace’s response to Jayden’s father is certainly tied to the context of abuse that Jayden 
describes, but the passion of her flirtation with his murder derives from another time and place. 
Holding the bat, history collapses into the present, and Grace’s adolescence converges with the 
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one for whom she is presently in charge. It takes the questions of the other’s adolescence to bring 
her back to her own. Ironically, it is the adolescent’s question that interrupts the force of the 
transference and invites Grace to articulate in words what her actions (nearly) acted out. The two 
take their rage out on the father’s car in similar fashion as they had done the day previous with 
the foster home’s “dodo doll” after Jayden’s breakdown. They then return to the facility where 
Jayden reports her father’s abuse to the resident social worker. By the time they arrive, the 
transference returns as Grace warns Jayden of what is to come: “They’re going to ask you a lot 
of questions, and it’s going to be hard,” she cautions.  
In the same cautionary tone, Grace had already warned a new staff member of precisely 
the slippery slope of collapse that she finds herself on as she wields the bat: “Remember you are 
not their parent, you are not their therapist, you are here to create a safe environment and that’s 
it.” And yet it is also Grace who embodies the complexity of the statement she narrates so 
plainly. In relation to Jayden’s present, Grace becomes overwhelmed by the unresolved conflicts 
of her past, triggered as well by a newly discovered pregnancy and the news of her father’s 
upcoming release from prison. Her slip is also a representation of the propensity for all of us in 
the “helping professions” to become entangled in the unconscious material of the transference 
while consciously trying to make a “safe environment.” But what safe means, and who can feel 
safe in this embroiled context is not clear. Is it safe for the helping professional to be herself, 
with all the complexities of history, trauma, passion, and madness that being a person implies? 
Can a “safe space” be made from the tangle of emotional worlds within and between adult and 
child, rather than split off from them?  
Short Term 12 posits the possibility for therapeutic action as a response to passionate 
entanglements. The kind of passion represented in the adult’s breakdown is decidedly unlike 
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heroic narratives of the “good teacher” who is passionate and emotionally involved with her 
students. Counter to such narratives are those that represent the teacher as devoid of emotional 
involvement, involved for the wrong reasons, or too involved, as perhaps is Grace. The tension 
between the emotional world of the teacher and her position as professional animates this split 
between good and bad teachers. In the diverse representations that exist within the genre of the 
teacher film, we meet passionate teachers trying to “help students” by teaching “their passion.” 
We watch as they find or are unable to find their own narratives along the way. Much like Grace 
standing with a baseball bat over Jayden’s passed out father, the passion-fuelled scenes of the 
genre raise important questions on the difference between inviting the narration of conflict and 
enacting the phantasy of a solution. 
This chapter, then, considers teaching as the work of “minding the gap” between 
phantasy and reality. As in my study of the mad student and the mad group, I focus on the 
distinction between narrating breakdowns in meaning and the breaking of meaning to suggest 
that teaching with a gap in mind depends upon a teacher who can tolerate and make use of a 
theory of the passionate mind at the heart of the profession. Turning first to psychoanalytic and 
educational theorizing, I consider one of education’s persistent questions: What is the teacher’s 
use of theory in narrating emotional and pedagogical significance? Here I am interested in a 
“theory of theory” (Britzman, 2012, p. 44) able to represent the tendency to close the mind to 
new thoughts. I read the teacher’s relationship to theory through Philippe Falardeau’s Monsieur 
Lazhar (Déry, McCraw, & Falardeau, 2011). This film opens with the dead teacher and unfolds 
as a story of confronting madness through efforts to symbolize its passion. As I have explored 
through the dissertation, passion unhinged from representation leaves us vulnerable to “maladies 
of the soul” in null and destructive passion (Kristeva, 1995): here, the teacher’s suicide. With this 
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narrative of teaching, I examine how the teacher’s efforts to theorize education may keep her 
own mind alive to the self and the students in front of her.  
  
Soft and Hard Theory: A Passion for Psychoanalysis  
Mid-way through “Analysis Terminable and Interminable,” Freud (1937) outlines two 
key aspects of analytic practice. One part, “ego-analysis,” pertains to the work of interpreting 
ego defence mechanisms; a second, “id-analysis,” concerns uncovering unconscious wishes and 
desires. The analytic aim consists of strengthening the ego’s capacity to manage or “tame” id-
impulses, while ridding the patient of antiquated and often harmful ego adaptations (p. 225). The 
“cure” variously involves revision, taming, and enlightenment in the services of waging a kind of 
battle between impulses and ego functioning, where ego function aims to contain rather than rid 
the self of instinctual life. 
Detailing these therapeutic goals is not, however, the stated purpose of Freud’s (1937) 
essay. Freud asserts early on that such aims have been “sufficiently elucidated” (p. 221). And 
yet, the problem elucidated here is one of being theoretically right and practically wrong. While 
analysis might have a therapeutic aim, the analyst does not have a definitive means by which to 
accomplish it and practice is inevitably frustrated by the obstacles to theory one meets along the 
way. Freud’s counsel on how to meet these obstacles is similarly obscure: 
If we are asked by what methods and means this result is achieved, it is not easy to find 
an answer. We can only say: ‘So muss denn dock die Hexed ran!’ [‘We must call the 
Witch to our help after all!’]—the Witch Metapsychology. Without metapsychological 
speculation and theorizing—I had almost said ‘phantasying’—we shall not get another 
step forward. (p. 225) 
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Despite a “sufficiently elucidated” aim, the theory and practice of psychoanalysis is steeped in 
not knowing, uncertainty, and sometimes, a tendency toward magical thinking: the wish for an 
answer.24 Freud suggests that dwelling in the land of speculation, theorising, and even 
phantasying is the psychoanalytic way through. He emphasises that something mysterious 
persists in his human science, despite his efforts to legitimise psychoanalysis as a science of the 
mind. His intervention into (scientific) phantasies of the end of psychic conflict offers not cure, 
but a piece of advice on how one might handle disillusionment. There is no comfort to be had for 
the “poor wretch” who decides to practice psychoanalysis, except the comfort that might arise 
from keeping one’s mind in broaching what Freud terms its “unsatisfying results” (p. 248).25 
Later in the essay, Freud (1937) moves to explicitly address the question of the analyst’s 
education. The analyst needs to know what he is up against, both in himself and in the analysand. 
But these obstacles are described in broad strokes: There will be resistance, the unconscious 
works in mysterious ways, and this will make for defences to understanding. These strokes paint 
a passion for ignorance as the ground for getting to know the self and other as a split subject. 
                                                
24 Freud’s reference in this passage is to Goethe’s Faust, a poet Freud frequently turns to in writing, notes Sabine 
Prokhoris (1995). Prokhoris observes that “Freud calls the poets to his rescue whenever he senses a weak spot in his 
reasoning, or finds himself disinclined to proceed scientifically” (p. 2). This insight leads her to investigate his use 
of Faust, in particular, for what it might have to say about the status of the unconscious and Freud’s metapsychology 
in general. A second association to “Witch Metapsychology” is to the Russian novelist Vladimir Nabokov’s well-
known disdain for Freudian ideas and his reference to him as the “Viennese witch-doctor” (Appignanesi, 2007, p. 
241). The trappings of magical thinking, as well as the limits of mastering understanding, are animated in these two 
associations. As Freud himself represents in this essay, the dream for cure is elusive but also seductive.  
25 In the English translation of Freud’s essay, the original “der Ärmsten“ is translated to “poor wretch.” Another 
translation of the term is “the poorest one” (Gallop, 1988, p. 26). Jane Gallop (1988) notes the significance of 
Freud’s discussion of the analyst in these terms as having to do with an economy of responsibility or shifting 
authority that she traces over several of Freud’s essays and that form the backdrop of his defences of psychoanalysis. 
The “poorest one” here references the analyst’s susceptibility to “fall for the fiction of the transference,” including 
assertions of the analyst as having God-like powers: “the analysis, far from a powerful authority who has obligations 
for his poor childish patients, is himself sick, deluded, himself a poor wretch” (Gallop, 1988, p. 26). This reverses 
the idea of the patient as a “poor helpless wretch” (Freud as cited in Gallop, 1988, p. 25) and the analyst as 
“capricious power” (Gallop, 1988, p. 25). “Poorest” might also reference the fact that the analyst receives payment 
for his service and this also helps him stay loyal to the work, reminding the analyst (if not always the patient) that he 
is “doing it for money, not love” (Gallop, 1988, p. 24). At the heart of Freud’s discussion of the analyst as a “poor 
wretch” or “the poorest one” resides an interminable set of tensions between analyst and patient over authority and 
the powers—and weakness—of influence. 
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Analysis opens the door to this passionate playground and Freud makes a wager that this will be 
education enough. Still, he appends a warning:  
It seems that a number of analysts learn to make use of defensive mechanisms which 
allow them to divert the implications and demands of analysis from themselves (probably 
by directing them on to other people), so that they themselves remain as they are and are 
able to withdraw from the critical and corrective influence of analysis. (p. 249) 
Read against his earlier piece of advice, the analysts described here seem to have lost their 
capacity for “metapsychological speculation” (p. 225). In making this claim, Freud might have 
had in mind his own susceptibility to the blind spots of defensive mechanisms, as for example in 
the case of Dora (Freud, 1905). Freud’s (1937) solution to this “danger of analysis” is more (self) 
analysis (p. 249). If analysis can “stir up” (p. 249) instinctual longings that overwhelm the ego’s 
ability to “tame” them (p. 225), such experiences will also need a space for representation and a 
mind capable of digestion. This might also explain Freud’s earlier slippage into phantasying: 
There will be the dreams of analysis and there will need to be a subject to interpret them. 
Freud (1937) imagined the solution to this analytic hazard was a periodic return to 
analysis: “There can be no doubt” (p. 240). Robert Caper (1999) re-states the danger as a 
symptom of the analysand’s phantasied attempts to destroy the analyst’s mind and emphasizes as 
an antidote a passionate relation to metapsychological theorising (which may indeed lead one 
back to the couch). Working with Melanie Klein’s concept of projective identification, Caper 
suggests that the relationship between analyst and analysand is susceptible to falling into a “folie 
à deux” (p. 21). This shared psychosis, or what Margaret Little (1958) terms “transference 
psychosis,” occurs as the analysand succeeds in turning the analyst into an “external phantasy 
object” (Strachey as cited in Caper, 1999, p. 20). This feat of transference undermines the 
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analyst’s capacity to reality-test and to have a mind of her own. A defence against un-
differentiation, this delusional collapse between self and other holds the patient together even as 
it undermines both the analyst’s and the patient’s creativity and insight borne from 
differentiation and contact with reality. We can say the patient is mad as a way to ward off going 
mad (Leader, 2011), a madness that also tests the analyst’s sanity.  
For Caper (1999), the analyst’s capacity to remove oneself from this mindless 
relationship with the analysand depends upon the analyst’s investment in a theory. Specifically, 
the analyst needs a theory that helps her think about the patient’s projections, rather than 
mindlessly play the role they assign.26 Theorizing projection, he argues, means having “an active 
passion for the type of knowledge [psychoanalysis] brings” (p. 118). Importantly, for Caper it is 
not enough to have undergone an analysis. One must also have a “love of psychoanalysis,” 
which involves a “passion for knowledge or reality-testing” capable of coming between the 
patient and the analyst (p. 118). That is, the analyst’s passion for psychoanalysis must be able to 
put up a strong front against the “powerful and mind-numbing pull” of the patient’s projections 
(p. 118). The analyst must have a love of the mind—her own and the patient’s. The mind that 
Caper constructs here is made from theorizing the passionate ties between self and other, 
projections and identifications, and phantasy and reality. In response to the patient’s projections, 
what is needed is not a knee-jerk answer or acting out, but rather a narrative and good analysis. 
“A passion for knowledge or reality-testing” (p. 118) allows for second thoughts. Such thoughts 
can make significance from passionate attachments where there might otherwise be shared 
madness. A third term of psychoanalytic theory opens the gap between the experiences we dream 
                                                
26 Caper also has in mind Freud’s advice to analysts that they ought to “model themselves…on…a surgeon of earlier 
times” (as cited in Caper, 1999, p. 19). The analyst-surgeon can “probe” the unconscious, but must remember that 
“the factors governing the patient’s ultimate recovery are beyond his control” (p. 19). Such an analogy helps the 
analyst assume a “realistic modesty” (p. 19), but only when kept in mind.  
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and the significance of them, between the other’s emotional reality and making our own. The 
analysis of the transference opens a world of insight, if one can bear the work of thinking its hard 
content.  
Where Freud (1937) and Caper (1999) call for theorizing transference between the 
analyst and the patient, Britzman (2012) finds transference in our relationship to theory. Her 
discussion is key because she implies a difference between theorizing and theory. Moreover, her 
discussion directly implicates the question of pedagogy. Responding to a statement frequently 
uttered in the field of education, “What is the use of theory?” she suggests that what is important 
in learning is not simply coming to know theory. More important is finding a way to use theory 
as part of a broader project of making significance, what she describes as the  “emotional uses of 
theory” (p. 46). Britzman argues that our passion for theory can also take us into madness when 
left un-symbolized. With Britzman, I argue that theorizing can then be a resource for mental 
health and sanity insofar as it invites us to narrate experience, including experiences with theory. 
For example, in idealizing theory, one harbours a phantasy of knowledge as able to solve 
questions of human experience. Idealization forecloses the gap necessary for making new 
meaning. Theory, here, can be used to resist thinking—a sign of “mental inhibition” (Britzman, 
2012, p. 49). So too might inhibition take shape in intellectualization. We might notice this use 
of theory when theory becomes cut off or split from practice, a common feature of educational 
discourse. This split manifests a defence against and even an attack on the mind, “a destruction 
of our chances to freely associate with new ideas and the emotional experiences we dream” 
(Britzman, 2012, p. 49). Britzman (2012) argues that in these instances theory becomes “hard” 
and is used to ward off anxiety (p. 46). Hard theory defends against the threat of “exposure” and 
“transformation” of one’s deeply held beliefs and attachments to knowledge (p. 44). Put simply, 
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hard theory can be used to defend against learning. Using theory to make significance is possible 
only when it can also be “soft theory” (p. 43).  
In contrast to hard theory, soft theorizing is what we might call labile thinking. Soft 
theory is a curious form of knowledge, “tender to the touch of our affected beliefs and to the 
styles of teaching and learning” (Britzman, 2012, p. 43). But precisely because theory can be 
soft, it can also turn hard in our passionate uses of it. For Britzman (2012), theorizing is a 
creative activity that makes the mind from affective resonances of experience, including a 
“passion for ignorance” (Lacan, 1998, p. 121) that otherwise safeguards idealized theories. What 
gives theory its “softness” is a mind curious about looking backwards and inwards, such that its 
“best material is the most unbelievable” (Britzman, 2012, p. 44). For theory to be of creative use 
rather than serve ideals, our relation to it comes also under interpretation. The point of theory, 
then, lies in its value for theorizing experience, for which an encounter with theory is yet one 
more site for learning, susceptible to breakdown. Soft theorizing, therefore, is akin to 
symbolization, the transformation of bodily experience into words and ideas that put passion into 
narrative and history (see also Britzman, 2006b).  
Theorizing, in this view, is also a resource for mental health and sanity because it does 
not forsake passionate ties to the world. Indeed, insofar as passion is the body’s discourse, as 
Kristeva (1995, 2010a) argues, theorizing drives the body into and out of meaning. Rather than a 
phantasy of mastery, mental health concerns the ability to find, make, and communicate theories 
that make bodily, emotional experience both bearable and meaningful. Theorizing is a mode of 
engaging with life’s frustrations and breakdowns in order to create “a mind of one’s own, a 
passionate relationship with one’s objects, and a sense of sanity” (Caper, 1999, p. 110). 
Hardened theory telecasts a version of madness, one that leaves us vulnerable to breaking 
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meaning rather than theorizing meaning’s breakdowns. Hard theory struggles to admit the play 
of subjectivity. A “sense of sanity,” then, comes by way of representing the subjective mingling 
of inner and outer worlds (Milner, 1950/2010). In teaching as in becoming a student, sanity is 
made difficult by defenses against the letting go that subjective and objective experience depend 
upon. This may mean holding on to theories rather than using them to re-create meaning. 
In his observation of the psychoanalytic field in the period spanning the 1930s to 1960s, 
Jonathan Lear (2003) offers an example of soft theory turned to hardened defense. Lear argues 
that, despite a proliferation of insightful and intellectually rigorous writing during this time, this 
period also produced some of the most rigid theories the profession has seen. He identifies 
pedagogy as a key problem in analytic education: “What they learned was true,” Lear says of this 
generation of analysts; “how they learned it was rigidifying” (p. 10). The creative labour of 
analytic practice became replaced by rigid investments in knowledge that hindered the bending 
and flexing of thought. Soft theorizing, we might say, was lost to hard theory. Rather than the 
creative and interminable work of development, what thrived in its place was something more 
akin to the cultivation of normality (McDougall, 1982/1990) or discipleship (Farley, 2013). As 
with Britzman and Freud, Lear works through a critical question: How does one communicate 
meaning and how does one receive a communication in such a way so that it doesn’t over-
determine thought? What is the point of communicating meaning if it isn’t to service the creation 
of more?  
This distinction between hard theory and soft theorizing suggests that the teacher’s labour 
involves re-making her passionate mind as it comes in contact with others, who come with a 
mind of their own. Such an idea opens a study of how the teacher, too, is susceptible to falling 
into a “folie à deux”—or three, four, or more. Robert Gardner (1994) describes this as the 
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teacher’s “furor” (p. 3) and Britzman (2006b), the “teacher’s illness” (p. 123). I term this 
passion, “the passion according to teaching,” after Kristeva’s (2010a) “the passion according to 
motherhood” (p. 94). By this term, I mean to signal a teacher who occupies and at times suffers 
from intense experiences of transference in relationship to students, theory, and the profession 
writ large. The teacher’s passion for teaching can also become her illness. But the cure for illness 
cannot be no passion or a defense against passion, lest the profession become a breeding ground 
for the “maladies of the soul” of which Kristeva (1995) warns. If passionate ties to the other give 
us our sense of ourselves as alive, then theory disimpassions so that our ties to others may be 
thought, and softened. Disimpassioning involves theorizing breaking points in teaching where 
madness reveals itself. Such inquiry concerns the teacher’s relationship to what is uncertain and 
at times uncannily familiar about education. It is a study in minding the gap “between teaching 
as you dream it and teaching as it is,”27 and noticing how the teacher’s passion for thinking 
affects her capacity to teach, to influence, and to take “a leap into the unknown event of 
transformation” (Farley, 2013, p. 16).  
In what follows, I consider the teacher’s passion as represented in the film Monsieur 
Lazhar and, in particular, an unlikely teacher named Bashir Lazhar. With Lazhar, I theorize the 
passion according to teaching as involving a passion for the mind, both the mind of the teacher 
and the student, as made from narrating experiences that unsettle the self, sometimes to the point 
of madness.  
 
                                                
27 The construction, “teaching as you dream it and teaching as it is,” references the film Notes on a Scandal (Fox, 
Rudin, & Eyre, 2006), based on Zoë Heller’s (2003) novel by the same name. In this narrative, the main character, 
Sheba Hart, turns to teaching to find meaning beyond the “imperative” of marriage and raising children, neither of 
which, in her words, allow her to “mind the gap…between life as you dream it and life as it is” (Fox, Rudin, & Eyre, 
2006). The film represents precisely this conflict, wherein Sheba’s desire to teach and influence becomes acted out 
in a love affair with her adolescent student.  
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The Teacher’s Madness in Film 
Philippe Falardeau’s 2011 film Monsieur Lazhar (Déry, McCraw, & Falardeau, 2011) 
provides an apt site for thinking about passion and its breakdown in teaching. The film opens 
with the image of the dead teacher, Martine Lachance, hanging lifeless in her grade six 
classroom. She is discovered by her student, Simon, who holds passionate ties to his teacher. 
Martine had been helping and comforting Simon through some difficulty at home. Not long 
before she killed herself, Simon accused her of giving him an unwelcome kiss. When he 
discovers her body, Simon’s passion takes shape in the terrible idea that Martine’s suicide was 
his fault. Holding desperately to this mad theory, we wonder what would make it possible for 
him to finally speak it, to find some distance from the idea, and thus re-find a mind capable of 
thinking the loss anew. Left to contain Simon’s and the other students’ grief, the staff and 
administration turn to meetings with parents, visits from psychologists, and the hope for a return 
to normalcy. Still, Martine’s suicide casts a shadow upon everyone’s efforts to get back to the 
normal project of teaching and learning.  
The school decides a blank canvas is in order, which takes the form of a new coat of paint 
on the classroom’s walls and the removal of all things related to Martine. It is a painful gesture, 
on the one hand, that paints over the trauma of the teacher’s breakdown. But on the other hand, 
the new coat of paint signifies the problem that a replacement teacher must also be found, a 
difficult task since “no one wants to work here now.” It takes an outsider, an unlikely teacher 
named Bashir Lazhar to fill the position. As it turns out, he is not a qualified teacher, even while 
no one is yet aware of that fact. Significantly, this non-teacher brings a particularly apt sense of 
understanding and a capacity to listen to the students in the aftermath of this event. But also, 
Monsieur Lazhar arrives at the school with a history of tragic loss. Throughout the film, he 
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stands in the precarious position of having to prove himself a refugee to the bureaucracy of the 
state’s immigration system. Bashir is an outsider in many senses: to the class, to the school, to 
Canada, and to the teaching profession. He does not, contrary to what he tells the principal, have 
a teaching background. Rather, he assumes the credentials of his dead wife, who had been 
murdered along with his children in a terrorist attack in their home in Algiers, shortly after his 
arrival to Canada. Teaching focuses his attention as he awaits word from the Canadian 
government about whether he can stay in the country. Teaching also provides him an avenue for 
working through his own losses, which keep him awake at night and give him nightmares. The 
teacher’s narrative thus unfolds alongside the students’ as both work to negotiate and represent 
the pains of their losses in the transitional space of the classroom. More than working through 
their specific traumas, however, the challenge of the class is to recuperate a sense of aliveness 
that has literally and symbolically become deadened to passionate meaning-making.  
Lazhar proves capable in his role as teacher not because he comes with a teaching 
certificate or professional knowledge about “best practices” for student learning and discipline. 
Lazhar’s starkly traditional pedagogy—rows of desks, dictation of classic texts, bare walls, a 
stern line—contrasts with that of his peers, and the students are quick to compare his methods to 
the now dead Martine Lachance’s. One has an impression early on that Lazhar is repeating his 
own education: a strict, comprehensive-based education, impermeable to the students’ desires. 
But when, for example, the psychologist scornfully suggests he add some colour to the walls 
because “the class looks like a hospital,” he responds with curiosity, stepping into a colleague’s 
classroom and noticing her difference. As this unfolds a picture of the teacher as thinker 
emerges. This is the slow work of getting to know self and other through a pedagogy responsive 
to new and different ways of being and thinking.    
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The film is useful for thinking about the distinction between theories of education and 
theorists of learning, loss, and breakdown. While theories are constructions that narrate human 
experience and the dilemmas of human development, on their own they are, in a sense, “dead.” 
Yet dead theory may also be enlivened and used to make new significance when it is taken into 
the mind. Theory cannot stand in for the work of theorizing, but is crucial to it. To be a theorist 
means occupying a space between experience and understanding, where breakdowns in meaning 
are the terrain on which teaching and learning come alive. Bashir seems to know that he cannot 
mend others or himself with new seating arrangements, decorated walls, or a school 
psychologist. Though he may agree with the psychologist that the students are “not sick,” he 
does not share her pleasure at announcing the diagnosis that the students are “more at ease” and 
that her work with them can come to a close: “In a few weeks, they’ll be cured? Tremendous!” 
he retorts. Still, he worries, not only about how the students are handling the loss of their teacher, 
but about their education writ large: “I’m so anxious about school,” he tells his colleague with 
colourful walls: “I worry for the kids. I imagine them grown up but still speaking like children.” 
Even more, Bashir worries about his obligation, articulated with a return to the metaphor of 
colour: “And it’s my fault, because I’ve forgotten to put some colour in their lives...I feel guilty 
for having abandoned them.” Here, rather than a choice between traditional or progressive ideals, 
the choice is represented as being between an education that leaves children to their own devices 
and one which is responsive to the unknown future. If this makes the teacher anxious, then Freud 
reminds us that there can be no cure. There is no solution to the dilemmas of education, as with 
grief, and neither decorated walls nor ordered rows can stand in place of an attentive teacher 
alive to his work and the students in front of him.  
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What matters for teaching and learning is the relation between the teacher’s passion and 
the capacity to bear the vulnerabilities and demands that position him as a teacher and threaten to 
upend the work. The contrast between Bashir’s passion for the mind and Martine’s suicide is 
striking. It sets into tension the difference between representing breakdown and destroying 
meaning. Martine’s suicide, in this view, is itself a failure of narrative and a manifestation of 
passion’s destructiveness. Indeed, what Martine’s breakdown symbolizes is pedagogical crisis, 
marked by an inability to theorize education as a project of communicating passion. Moreover, 
the contrast between Bashir—the outsider and uncertified teacher—and Martine—certified, 
familiar, and well-liked—poses yet another challenge to theories of education as they are filtered 
through institutional contexts. Ironically, Bashir represents an alternative to Martine’s 
breakdown and an education unable to think about breakdown. On this point, the teachers of the 
school prove to be well-intentioned yet ill-equipped; their theories are too hard to adequately 
respond to the teacher’s suicide. The teachers’ shared madness involves the repetition of theories 
without theorists. As a collective, they appear to believe in their knowledge of what the students 
need and this becomes collapsed with understanding. Group anxiety manifests as an inability to 
listen to the students as well as to each other’s responses to the suicide. At times both teachers 
and students seem caught by the sibling phantasy that there can be only one theory or response to 
the event (Mitchell, 2003). This phantasy may be strongest in the other teachers’ reactions to 
Simon, who insists on registering the violence of Martine’s act. One teacher accuses Simon of 
not being “normal” because he carries a photograph of Martine with drawn-in angel wings and a 
noose around her neck. Bashir offers a question to remind her that normalcy is also the teacher’s 
problem: “Is hanging yourself in class normal?”  
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From breakdown emerges magical thinking. For example, there is the phantasy that the 
students’ grief can be contained within the space of sessions with the psychologist. There is also 
split thinking, as when the psychologist justifies telling Bashir to leave the classroom during her 
sessions in order “to separate psychology from pedagogy.” And there is an idea that the students’ 
grief will emerge only in “feeling sad” but not in unconscious forms—acting out, aggression, 
silence. The principal and other teachers worry about making “waves” that would lead to 
children “break[ing] down.” They imagine efficient reparation that would mean “getting 
through” to students. And their advice to one another about how to respond shows their tendency 
to defend against what is difficult about helping others. The principal advises a teacher to “be 
strong. Breathe through your nose today,” and the staff considers expelling Simon for getting 
“more violent.” But what the adults want to expel are their own uncertainties, incapacities, and 
bad feelings, perhaps even their own sense of guilt for Martine’s suicide. Their ideas of school 
have been shattered by this event and, ironically, the truth of the situation comes through in the 
words of one student: “Everyone thinks we’re traumatized. But it’s the adults who are.” If the 
adults have, perhaps predictably, lost their minds, there is some hope to be found in the students 
who retain an ability to notice what is happening. In contrast, we might think of the teacher’s 
confusion over making waves as reflective of being caught in the strange, mad logic of what 
Winnicott (1974) calls the “fear of breakdown.” Winnicott describes this fear as a confusion of 
time: the breakdown one imagines will occur has, in fact, already happened. As the teachers try 
to predict and prevent the students’ breakdown, they avoid the death that has already occurred. 
Among the teachers, there can only be defense against further breakdown—hard theories—but 
not yet a space to symbolize the emotional significance of the breakdown that has already 
happened.  
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In the teachers’ struggle to respond, there are signs that their theories of education, and 
their relationship to it, is not up to the task of helping either themselves or the students through 
this experience of breakdown. Moreover, their theories of education may harbour states of 
madness that defend against breakdowns in meaning rather than provide a means to work 
through them. Even as teachers try to get back to the business of curriculum, we catch a glimpse 
of the unresolved matter of Martine’s suicide. When one teacher named Claire asks Bashir what 
he thinks about her stage play that acts out the violent events of early colonial history, the 
discussion enacts the teachers’ defense against the pain of their colleague’s suicide.  
Bashir: How’s the play? 
Claire: Good. The kids are enjoying it. What did you think? 
Bashir: I liked what I saw. It’s droll, candid… 
Claire: Candid, really? 
Bashir: I mean, it’s chock-full of information, joyous, but offers a Romantic vision of the 
colonial period. Yes.  
Claire: True, I could’ve talked about the Belgian Congo, the pillaging, the amputations… 
Bashir: Sorry. I’ve offended you. 
Claire: No way. It’s a welcome change from empty compliments. 
This exchange reveals the conflict over what place reality, and in particular the reality of 
violence both as a problem of history and the present, ought to occupy in teaching and learning. 
Claire can only see two options: offer a palatable and enjoyable version of history or expose the 
students to terrible violence. This teacher cannot imagine her role as one of helping the students 
interpret the difficulty of history. The narration of reality’s emotional significance takes a back 
seat to ensuring the students are not overwhelmed by reality that remains un-mediated. This 
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theory of education denies the students’ own minds—as well as the teacher’s—so that they 
cannot yet be imagined as theorists of learning from loss. When passion is lost, so too is 
educational theory bereft of theorists. Still, it is a hopeful sign that Claire asks what Bashir 
“really” thinks. 
The school’s refusal to mourn stands in contrast to the outsider, Bashir, who seems 
somehow able to step outside their group psychology to offer the students a space to narrate their 
emotional experiences of grief. In contrast to Claire’s romance of loss, one of Bashir’s lessons 
serves as an invitation for the students to theorize the place of violence in the world. He designs 
an assignment that opens a space for the students to represent something of their own experience 
of violence, as well as theorize what it is like to live in the context of violent acts. This 
assignment also provides a space for Bashir to make contact with Simon, the boy who first 
discovered Martine’s body and whose own aggressive actions hint towards conflicts he cannot 
yet speak. Simon’s presentation proposes vandalism as a “destructive” form of violence that 
exceeds the everyday understandings of this term: “Violence at school isn’t just about fighting 
and taxing and all that.” Rather, graffiti is a form of violence that, he argues, “can be social, 
political, or racist. Or it can be advertising or decoration.” He notes the “bars on ground-floor 
windows” that “they” use to “protect them and stop vandalism.” The presentation ends with a 
classmate’s question about whether vandalism and stealing are the same. Simon’s response is 
particularly impassioned: “No way! Stealing isn’t destructive. It’s not violent. Think before you 
speak, Vic!”  
Like a dream, Simon’s short presentation can be thought of as a condensation of past and 
present experience. There is the horrible fact of his having seen his dead teacher through a single 
bar of glass when faced with the barrier of a locked door. There is also his photograph of Martine 
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that he carries around and that he has “vandalized” by drawing in angel wings and a noose 
around her neck. Perhaps the presentation “advertises” the school’s (in)ability to handle the 
children’s aggression, a communication about how teachers handle destruction. Do “they” put up 
bars to “protect them”? Whose protection is at stake? Does Simon’s strong response to his 
classmate refer to his accusation of his teacher “stealing” a kiss? Does Simon now wish he had 
“thought before he spoke?” 
Simon’s presentation is striking because he uses symbols to represent destruction and 
violence. Moreover, he observes how “bars” may be erected to defend against unwelcome 
knowledge, making it difficult communicate at all. Also “barred” outside the discourse of 
education are the erotic ties that circulate in teaching and learning, and which Simon’s 
accusation of a kiss unveils. Because of Bashir’s lesson, Simon is able to begin theorizing the 
foreclosure of symbol formation. A good example of the (phantasied) difference between 
pedagogy and psychoanalysis, Bashir responds with an instruction to pay more attention to 
language: “Your argument and your photos were strong. But watch your French.” Given that the 
poster, which accompanies Simon’s presentation, includes his hand-written title, “l’ecole s’est 
[sic] de la marde” or “school is shit,” Bashir’s response indicates his own capacity to allow for 
the “destructive” “graffiti” about which Simon speaks. Bashir might also have found his own 
narrative in Simon’s presentation, given his efforts to stay in (not be barred from) Canada as a 
refugee. Bashir, we have just learned in a scene shortly before Simon’s presentation, knows too 
well the violence that can be used against people who speak out against an authority. So too does 
he recognize the destruction against the self that can arise when one cannot represent breakdown, 
as evidenced by Martine. His lesson, then, is a lesson in language, of representing breakdown 
and destruction as a way to keep in touch with madness so as not to fall into its clutches. Several 
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scenes later, Simon does indeed find new language to communicate what before he could only 
act out by shouting at his classmate.  
Simon’s presentation is followed by Alice’s, who speaks of the contradictions of 
Martine’s suicide. Alice describes the school’s job as one of taking care of students, noting that 
taking care is part of what makes it “nice.” But, she also notes a conflict: “this nice school is 
where Martine Lachance hanged herself.” In a scene of startling insight, Alice interprets the 
teacher’s suicide as an act of violence against the students for whom she was also to care: 
Martine must’ve been discouraged with her life. The last thing she did was kick her chair 
to make it fall over. Sometimes I wonder if she wasn’t sending a violent message. When 
we’re violent, we get a detention. But we can’t give Martine Lachance a detention, 
because she’s dead. 
This is a sophisticated reading of the teacher’s act, for it represents the teacher’s failure to 
represent a relationship to being “discouraged with her life,” and instead to enact dis-courage in 
in death. In her narrative, Alice speculates about the emotional state of Martine’s suicide and the 
emotional circumstances that might have lead up to it. At the heart of Alice’s presentation is a 
question about why Martine killed herself. Much more than a project of empathy, however, Alice 
also gives language to what the students lost in losing Martine. They lost their teacher to an act 
of violence, but they also lost the opportunity to represent their feelings of aggression to 
Martine.28 In her place, Bashir’s assignment gives this opportunity to explore the impact of 
                                                
28 Working with Green’s (2005) essay, “The Dead Mother,” Pitt’s (2003) theorizing of matricide as it relates to 
teaching and learning, and Britzman’s (2006b) educational memoir, “Monsters in Literature,” Farley (2014) argues 
that the teacher’s pedagogical importance lies, in part, in allowing her students the opportunity to destroy her 
knowledge. “[W]here the teacher cannot let go of idealised knowledge,” writes Farley, “s/he does so at the risk of 
deadening the complexity of emotional states, including her own, that loss also calls forth” (p. 133). Though Farley 
never says “the dead teacher” in her essay, such a figure is symbolically realized in Martine and described by 
Alice’s stark statement: “because she is dead.” The problem for pedagogy that Alice represents in her presentation 
symbolizes a key question and tension of teaching and learning, as Farley describes it: How do you destroy in 
phantasy what is already dead? 
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Martine’s death. Like Simon, Alice notices how violent messages are responded to with the bars 
of detention, perhaps a wish to lock up and keep violence far away from the self. 
Bashir reads Alice’s presentation as a sign of the children’s “desire to communicate...to 
talk about death.” He takes her interpretation to the principal and suggests it be distributed to the 
rest of the school and to parents. His hope is that it will provide an opening to symbolize their 
grief. But Madame Vaillancourt rejects Bashir’s proposition and offers in its place a hard theory 
of language closed to interpretation: a theory without a theorist. “I find the text violent,” she 
responds, “It lacks respect for Martine”—a response that conjures again the putting up of bars 
noted in both Simon’s and Alice’s presentations. Vaillancourt closes the conversation by telling 
Bashir, “I don’t want any waves, ok?” This is another version of Claire’s pedagogy. In both 
instances, the teachers leap to the happy end that skips over the difficulty of the story. For this 
principal, “waves” are conceived of as necessarily breaking meaning—an inherent impediment 
to thinking—rather than as an untold story of breakdown in need of meaning and words. Caught 
in her own “fear of breakdown” (Winnicott, 1974), the principal is unable to notice how the 
breakdown has already happened and how the students’ impetus to work through their loss in 
language is a hopeful response. Instead, she closes the gap with a hard theory that confuses acts 
of violence with theorizing violent action. In turn, Bashir responds with the only sane choice 
available. He offers a version of reality that invites her to have second thoughts: “It’s life that’s 
violent, not the text.” 
In several scenes following this exchange, we watch as the students, particularly Simon, 
struggle to exist in a place that bars out expressions of destruction, violence, and helplessness. 
He carries around his picture of his dead teacher, bullies the other children, and is tormented by 
his own mad theory that Martine’s death was his fault. One teacher observes that he is becoming 
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“more violent” and the teacher’s collective illness shows in their inability to theorize what his 
actions might be communicating and might, in turn, need from them. They can only respond with 
silence, for example, when Bashir suggests that Simon’s photo “points to a deeper problem” 
regarding both the students’ and the school’s grief. In another manifestation of the fear of 
breakdown their discussion revolves around a binary of future action: to expel or not to expel. 
They cannot yet think about the meaning of the breakdown that has already happened. They are 
stuck in the flurry of anxiety and fear that the breakdown engendered.  
Caught in an either/or scenario—“We can either help Simon or dump him into someone 
else’s yard”—the teachers fail to recognize that “helping Simon” might involve helping 
themselves ask the difficult questions that he returns to them. At every turn, the teachers put up 
bars to keep out questions of sexuality and aggression in pedagogy. When the kiss comes up at a 
staff meeting, there is still more denial and defense: “Let’s not bring that up again...She did 
nothing wrong.” At stake here is not only whether the teacher consciously did something wrong 
or not. What matters also is how these events—these waves, these breakdowns—are handled in 
the aftermath of their happening. Simon carries around the marked-up picture of his teacher and 
acts violently in the aftermath of encountering her dead body. Meanwhile, the teachers and 
principal form a group psychology that harbours resentment towards Simon’s lie about a kiss that 
speaks a difficult erotic truth about pedagogy. They can only offer detention as a means to “help 
him,” where both he and Martine’s madness is locked behind the bars of fear.  
Finally, after the students raise the topic directly, Bashir invites the students to “speak 
freely” about Martine and her death. Here, we watch Simon finally test his mad theories against 
the teacher’s mind. At Alice’s provocation, Simon accuses her of his own fear:  
Simon: Go ahead. Spit it out... 
 137 
Alice: You said it not me…Goddamn coward… 
Simon: I’ll tell you what she thinks. That it’s my fault. It’s my fault because I told on 
Madame Lachance. I didn’t want her acting like my mom.  
Alice: Simon, you liked Martine just like the rest of us. She gave you privileges and 
helped you with homework. 
Simon: She gave me the camera, but I never asked. I never asked for a kiss! 
Alice: Liar! She hugged you after you cried. 
Simon: Happy now? Saying that I was crying. You never cry. You’re perfect, a real guy. 
It’s true, she didn’t kiss me. But she hugged me, and I didn’t like it. It’s not my fault. It’s 
not my fault what happened, right? It’s not my fault? 
In this heated exchange, we can see how breakdowns can result in hard theories that defend 
against loss in favour of blame and self-punishment. Better to locate a culprit than face the 
senselessness of loss. Like the principal’s theory of the violent text, the student’s argument is a 
hard theory that harbours resentment; it does not yet represent the pain of loss that would set 
history into a site of creative interpretation. Unsurprisingly, the children and Simon in particular 
act out their mad theories before they can think them anew. In this sense, they represent their 
dead teacher by repeating her madness. They enact a desire to destroy meaning rather than 
narrate significance. But in this scene, trusting that his teacher will not bar his words, Simon’s 
theory of why Martine killed herself is finally spoken and Bashir meets it head on, to everyone’s 
relief.  
This key moment in the film speaks to the teacher’s important role in navigating the 
difference between breakdowns in meaning and destroying meaning. Bashir speaks to the class 
widely by appealing to the children’s attempts to make meaning of this event, for which he 
 138 
simply says, “There isn’t one.” In place of reason, he offers a soft theory of the classroom as a 
space for life, and tells them that this is the loss in Martine’s death. In so doing, Bashir reminds 
the students of their difference, and of the teacher’s important role as safeguarding a space for 
“life”: 
A classroom is a home for...It’s a place of friendship, of work, and courtesy. Yes, 
courtesy. A place full of life. Where you devote your life. A place where you give of your 
life. Not infest a whole school with your despair. 
It is likely that the students intuit that their teacher is not abiding by the mad logic, 
unhinged from interpretation, which they meet elsewhere in the school. He has not allowed 
himself to be overtaken by the students’ desires. Yet he has shown an interest in their minds and 
flexibility in meeting them, as for example in his admission that Balzac was a poor choice for 
dictation. He bears their frustrations and together, over the course of the school year, they 
enliven the space of education. New ways of teaching and learning are permitted and language 
becomes their shared object of passionate inquiry and play. Bashir’s pedagogy looks for the gap 
between theories and theorizing and helps the students exist within it, conveyed throughout the 
film in the image of the hallway, an open space between two sets of closed lockers. To notice 
gaps and exist within them, Bashir offers his students an aesthetic of language: metaphors and 
fables, class presentations, and stories of brave and independent wolves. His lesson is simple 
though difficult: words, theories, stories are all we have, but let’s try to keep them open to what 
we cannot yet know.  
Nowhere is this clearer than in his final lesson, a fable titled “The Chrysalis and the 
Tree,” which he reads to them, for their correction, before leaving the class for good. In this 
fable, the tree waits for the chrysalis to become a butterfly that must leave home to thrive. But 
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just before this happens, a fire destroys the chrysalis. The tree is left with only the imaginary life 
he creates of her in the form of memory, which he recounts to the birds that rest on his branches. 
If, like the tree, the “classroom is a home for...life,” Bashir’s pedagogy reminds us of the life 
found in narrative. He suggests that aliveness must be protected and encouraged. And he 
proposes that the best education creates a space that can leave others to narrate their passion-
filled thoughts. For Bashir, the life of a classroom depends on a passionate discourse that can 
represent uncertain meaning as the ground for getting to know about the self and the other. This 
is an interminable project for which there is thankfully no cure. 
 
The Teacher’s Passionate Mind 
Bashir’s passion for representing meaning and his commitment to encouraging his 
students to do the same may reflect his own outsider status, as well as his own experiences with 
loss and grief. There is, after all, much he does not know about teaching and thus much to learn 
and consider. There is also his own interminable struggle to re-make a life after devastating loss. 
For Bashir, the classroom emerges as a site of passionate possibility that ties him to his murdered 
wife and also his dead children. In contrast to his students about whom he worries will grow up 
“still speaking like children,” his own children will never grow up. Indeed, in Bashir’s use of the 
present tense to explain his fears of “having abandoned them,” he hints at his own loss. So too, 
the unconscious guilt he feels towards his own children, who he may feel he has “abandoned” 
when he left the country ahead of his family. While not necessarily a self-conscious utterance 
about his own losses, his discussions about teaching and his students may nonetheless perform a 
necessary psychic work, much like Simon’s theorizing of vandalism. 
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But the fact that his tragic past might have drawn him to the position of teacher could 
have easily manifested in a very different story of the teacher’s madness. The setting is ripe for 
the teacher’s rescue fantasies and it is not difficult to imagine a story unfolding of the hero 
teacher claiming the distraught students as defense against his own terrible losses. The 
difference, then, is not the fact of his past or that he shares an experience of loss that allows him 
to identify with the students’ experience. This matters, but how it matters is a question of his 
mind’s capacity to engage with these losses. For Bashir, it is his passion for the mind and for a 
language to represent it—in his words, a “classroom is a home for...life”—that, I think, makes 
the difference. Moreover, it is his ability to notice that an alive discourse comes by way of, not at 
the expense of, a passionate relationship to reality and truth.  
Throughout the film we see Bashir as the voice of reality. He carefully attempts to 
penetrate the mad discourse of the school with statements and questions that communicate the 
emotional significance of experience. He has, in this sense, a “passion for knowledge or reality-
testing” (Caper, 1999, p. 118), and a passionate belief in language as our best hope for surviving, 
repairing, and communicating across the span of our differences, losses, and worries. The 
teacher, here, is more than someone who knows the curriculum. While this may be learnt in time 
(and we watch Bashir struggle to figure this out), such knowledge does not make a teacher in the 
deeper sense, nor does it give a classroom its aliveness. Rather, the teacher is alive to the work to 
the extent that he is a lover of meaning-making and has a passion for the mind, his own and his 
students’. By allowing for a discourse of passion, he invites his students to find and re-find their 
own meaning, test their ideas against the minds of others, and navigate uncertainty, loss, and the 
conflicts of competing desire. The teacher is curious about breakdowns and what emerges from 
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them. In this view, the teacher’s work, exemplified in the figure of Monsieur Lazhar, is also to 
prepare students for the sadness of loss as a feature of learning to fly.
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Conclusion 
Tunnelling Through: Or, Mining the Passionate Imaginary in Education 
Looking at a world caught in the bleak alternatives between null and destructive passion, 
Kristeva (2010a) calls for “a regime of passion…that works through its imaginary substance 
indefinitely” (p. 94). Throughout this dissertation, I have gleaned from this call a critique of 
education. From the discourse of mental health “crisis,” I have re-thought education from the 
view of human passion and its maladies. I have made from Kristeva’s (1995) insistence that 
“You are alive if and only if you have a psychic life” (p. 5) a study of education as a place where 
we may come alive and fall into deadly silence in the negation of passion. I have argued across 
the preceding chapters that pedagogy can be re-imagined as a site of support that is attentive to 
phantasy—psychic life—in the service of communicating passion. And I have read phantasies of 
mastery, compliance, omnipotence, control, and cure as untold stories of passionate object 
relating, hints of conflict in need of a narrative. Education, I suggest, is where we might learn the 
transformative possibility of putting passion into symbols. So too might we learn about the 
human tendency to harbour passion in symptoms and to resist creative self- and world-making. 
From this tension, education and educational research may also become rich sites for studying 
the emotional conflicts that communicating passion risks.  
My interpretation of the aims of education and research signals a move away from the 
progressive logic of mastery over knowledge and the body. Indeed, I have argued that this 
orientation to education manifests as a defense against all that makes teaching and learning 
unruly, interminable, and even impossible. Rather, I have posited an education that can play at 
the limits of reason. In this orientation, the fault lines in conscious understanding are not barriers 
to education; they comprise its curious project. To return to Britzman (2003), “learning begins in 
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the breakdown of meaning” (p. 15). Teaching and learning can become emotionally significant 
when they are alive to passionate object relating. To make an education—a mind—from passion 
calls for negative capability, which implies an ability to create meaning where there is mystery, 
gaps, frustration, and loss. Negative capability suggests that the world is not merely given to us; 
it is rather made and re-made through the space between experience and its symbolization. This 
is Milner’s (1950/2010) lesson as well: Each of us brings something to the world and the world 
is made visible through this mingling—“without our own contribution we see nothing” (p. 33). 
Education as symbolization thus implies that learning is a project of creativity not in control of 
outcomes because we cannot know in advance how education will affect us. From the 
perspective of negative capability, education is a site for growing patient with losing and re-
finding meaning. And educational research, in turn, may be a place to trace our impatient efforts 
to rid teaching and learning of complexity. In this view, research is a pedagogical project of 
bringing into symbolization that which hides in symptoms and threatens to return in breakdown. 
In the study of educational theory and one’s own history of schooling, one can easily find the 
opposite: an education that has lost touch with narrating the passion that makes us human and 
that also makes education necessary. In this research, I’ve called such an education a “mad 
education.”  
The field of education is populated with representations of mad students, groups, and 
teachers. Such figures break rather than symbolize broken meaning. In destructive actions, acting 
out, and futility, they rather embody a broken field. Their painful embodiments also materialize 
the limits of this field. These materializations embroil educators and theorists in an interminable 
project of thinking and representing conflict, including the ways we passionately defend against 
thinking. Each figure—the mad student, the mad group, and the mad teacher—opens the field to 
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its struggles to generate a passionate subject without also tipping into the mind’s destructive 
underside. Each offers a different inflection on the passionate problem of symbolization in 
education. That is, different from hardened identities, these figures represent particular psychic 
positions that individuals can move among. Narrative, such as those offered in the films 
discussed in this research, affords us movement into and out of these different positions.  
For instance, each of us may at times identify with the paranoia of the mad student’s 
efforts to separate from idealized others and ideas. This position embodies the dilemma of being 
tied to the (m)other whose passion calls the self into existence, but from whom separation is 
needed in order to create space for new manifestations of passion. To put passion into time 
means letting go of the phantasy that self and other are “communicating vessels” (Kristeva, 
2010a, p. 146), a phantasy that may compel compliance and the manic pursuit of mastery. 
Becoming a student in a “deeper sense” (Lear, 2003, p. 58) is the labour of becoming a speaking 
subject who creates and communicates passion in symbols.  
At other times, we may find ourselves embroiled in the mad passions of the sibling/peer 
group. This position involves the struggle to contain terrifying anxieties of self-annihilation. 
Being in a group means learning to yield to the law of seriality that makes room for more than 
one and re-establishes difference where self and other collapse. To make a group, we must first 
work through the threat the other poses to the self, whereas the mad group signals breakdown, 
where control and destruction refuse to admit the struggle and need for difference.  
And finally, we may occupy the position of the mad teacher who embodies the 
susceptibility to break meaning by barring negativity from pedagogy. Here, the dead teacher 
haunts the classroom as the inhibition of theorizing breakdown. The mad teacher suffers from a 
confusion of time: To ward against past breakdown, pedagogy becomes oriented towards 
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preventing new breakdown. But when the teacher cannot represent passion and its breakdowns in 
teaching and learning as its inevitable and necessary foundation, education is an alienating 
experience of playing a role: a dead education.  
Through a study of these figures, I have also constructed a fourth position: a theorist of 
passion in education that spans all three. Making use of a “soft theory” (Britzman, 2012, p. 43) 
of passion, theorizing passion is interested in “transform[ing]…psychic accidents into the 
pleasure [jouissance] of searching for oneself by means of a third dimension” (Kristeva, 2010b, 
p. 684). This “third dimension” is the labour of narrative, of putting passion into symbols that tie 
us to the external other and the other of instinctual, bodily life. Devoid of such a discourse and its 
interpretive project, education is at risk of repeating madness, proceeding by way of delusional 
ideals of control and mastery hardened to reality and fraught with destructive and violent action. 
Nathan Kotylak, after all, knew the rules of what was excepted, acceptable, and appropriate. He 
was a “good student,” especially in apology. His capacity for destruction invites us to study all 
that unseats our “lovely knowledge” (Pitt & Britzman, 2003, p. 766) of good students and good 
teachers in order that we might re-find a softness in thinking and interpreting “the very thought 
of education” (Britzman, 2009).  
These are anxious times for a field that has lost its imagined currency—rationality—to 
technologies that are more capable of mastery than is humanly possible. The turn to expert 
knowledge manifests this anxiety—“terror” according to Phillips (1995)—and undermines the 
capacity to creatively theorize the limits of understanding and mastery. Education, as negative 
capability, depends on our ongoing efforts to represent the limits of mastery in order to re-make 
or repair what, with Kristeva (1995), we could call its soul. Where can the field turn to find the 
containment necessary for thinking anew? Where does one find the “time [and] space needed to 
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create a soul…[when] the mere hint of such activity seems frivolous and ill-advised” (Kristeva, 
1995, p. 7)? My response, as presented in this research, turns to aesthetic objects created by 
storytellers, filmmakers, artists, and theorists of emotional life: all those who represent our 
human condition in its extremes, banalities, and emotional entanglements. By reminding us that 
there is no cure for emotional life and by working against a logic that would see passion as 
frivolous, these narrators of human and pedagogical conflict also invite us to wonder why we 
would want such a cure and what we might be lost in pursuit of it. Thus, in attempting to do 
justice to the passions occupying and depending on education, I have argued for an approach that 
works to make contact with emotional life, especially its breakdowns, in the transitional space of 
representation. Such representations, I suggest, invite us to theorize passion as it circulates both 
within representation as well as in our transferences to these objects. 
My approach to emotional life also has consequences for thinking about mental health in 
education. In the current discourse of crisis and calls for “prevention, promotion, and treatment” 
(Schwean & Rodger, 2013, p.154), researchers frame mental health as an enlightenment problem 
best solved through knowledge and the application of skills. This discourse reasserts mastery 
over the mind and body and views education as a progressive project of creating rational 
subjects. Negativity is constructed as an impediment to teaching and learning, something to 
prevent with the “right” interventions. In contrast, my research interprets this narrative of mental 
health as itself a phantasy, as anxiety over the limits of influence and the belatedness of 
understanding. Rather than preventing or pathologizing emotional difficulty, I have posed mental 
health as a problem of narrating and listening for conflict, what Kristeva (1995) calls soul-
making. My hypothesis is that when people are able to communicate their passionate, 
imaginative ways of seeing and experiencing the world, something becomes possible in their 
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ability to bear times of conflict, loss, and breakdown. So too might it open them to the other’s 
humanity, in all its complexity.  
Yet the discourse of mental health in education easily forgets that our minds are made 
and re-made in relation to an outside world that is more or less open to narratives of emotional 
conflict, breakdown, and negativity. Where conflict and passionate object relating are things to 
cure or prevent with knowledge, we risk foreclosing speech to omnipotent assertions and actions. 
Lost is a space for representing and transforming passion. Indeed, emotional life as I’ve 
presented it throughout this dissertation might better be thought of as a mystery, a call for 
interpretation, and as affect in want of a story. The version of mental health that emerges from 
this research involves belated efforts to make meaning where there is frustration, anxiety, and 
desire, and to allow for these emotional conflicts. Creating a “social place” (Mitchell, 2003, p. 
xv) for phantasies of love, hate, rivalry, aggression, destruction, desire, and madness supports 
mental health as an interpretive problem made and re-made in thinking and representing the life 
of the mind. Alternatively, emotional life may go on the “rampage” (Mitchell, 2003, p. xv), 
wreaking havoc on lives and minds as the only way to find relief.  
This research thus argues that emotional life and education are intertwined, albeit in ways 
not typically imagined in the mental health discourse. I have theorized education as unable to 
cure emotional difficulty and posited the reasonable, rational subject as potentially manifesting a 
passion for no passion, rather than being the harbinger of health. In place of the rational mind, 
I’ve offered instead the passionate mind as what binds education and health. Such a mind yields 
to the authority of symbolization, to the distinction between reality and phantasy, between the 
worlds we dream and the worlds we make in narrative. It is a mind made in relation to the body 
and to other minds and forged where there are gaps in meaning and understanding. These gaps 
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give the mind its appetite for representing and searching for meaning. Yet the passionate mind is 
also susceptible to breakdown. Gaps may collapse and they may stretch too wide. We may lose 
distinctions and difference, while also at time forgetting that contact with others beckons forth 
the life of the mind. Making the passionate mind, therefore, depends on an ongoing struggle to 
symbolize these breakdowns and make contact with what is other to the conscious self, lest we 
give up on symbolizing passion altogether.  
I began this study with a news story of passion unhinged from symbolic construction. 
The destruction unleashed at the loss of a hockey game and Kotylak’s assertion that his actions 
had nothing to do with his education set into motion this research into how the field conceives of 
passion’s destructive underside. In the final months of writing, another news story broke that also 
captured public attention, albeit of a different kind. A mysterious tunnel was discovered in a 
public park near York University, its origins and uses unknown. This enigmatic construction, a 
literal manifestation of a gap with unexplained significance, symbolizes many of the qualities of 
mental life that I’m suggesting those in the field of education might attend to. To close, I offer 
this story of a tunnel as yet one more narrative of passion that gives uncanny expression to the 
claims in this research. I close with this story, moreover, to emphasize what I see as the ongoing 
struggle to give passion a social place. 
 
Hiding in Plain Sight: Underground Pedagogy  
In January 2015, a Toronto conservation officer discovered an expertly built tunnel just 
beyond the boundaries of York University. The tunnel descended three meters below ground, 
extended outwards ten meters, and was approximately two meters high. It was reinforced and 
supported by wooden beams and planks and was equipped with electricity and a pump for 
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expelling water. Entirely confounding in the origins of its construction and its purpose, Toronto’s 
“mystery hole” hit the news waves and set off a storm of theories (Edmiston, 2015, February 26). 
Online, tunnel speculation ranged from the paranoid to the playful and absurd. Among these 
included speculations of a nefarious hideout for sexual predators, a drug lab, and more hopefully 
from the perspective of the university, ambitious engineering students from York University 
testing their skills. Things got particularly curious when the police revealed that a rosary and a 
Remembrance Day poppy were found inside the tunnel, arguably a communication tactic to ease 
suspicion of terrorist activity (the assumption being that Catholicism is not religious 
radicalization). Indeed, the police revealed the rosary and poppy at precisely the moment when 
there emerged a worry over terrorism. This theory was mounted on the idea that, at the time of 
the discovery, York was slated to be one of Toronto’s venues for the 2015 Pan Am Games. On 
the social media site Twitter, droves of people began to brand it the “TerrorTunnel.” National 
security officials investigated and police appealed to the public for information and for the 
person(s) responsible to come forward, while news outlets around the world reported the mystery 
and consulted with experts on such things as tunnel construction, religion and cults, and security. 
Alongside serious investigation and concern, the mystery tunnel also became a source of many 
jokes and playful banter in classroom and on committees at York itself. 
 By the time the public was informed about the tunnel, it had been filled in. But, as 
detailed above, the gap seemed only to get deeper and wider in searches for its origin and 
significance. A site of passionate speculation, the tunnel was also a placeholder for social 
anxiety. Only a few months earlier, on October 22, 2014, a man arrived on Parliament Hill in 
Ottawa and killed an unarmed soldier standing on ceremonial guard at the Tomb of the Unknown 
Soldier at the National War Memorial. He then entered the Centre Block where parliamentarians 
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were holding their weekly caucus meetings. A shooting spree ensued that eventually killed the 
murder suspect, its echoing blasts caught by the digital technology of a cell phone camera. While 
the perpetrator’s motivations and the degree to which they are an act of terror are contested, the 
attack registered a vulnerability that many Canadians had imagined to exist outside of its 
borders. Set in relation to this event, Toronto’s “TerrorTunnel” animated cultural anxieties and 
offered an opportunity to cathartically investigate and laugh at our worries rather than be held 
captive by them. That the authorities filled in the hole before the public became aware of its 
existence suggests a keen awareness that such a mystery may be difficult to bear.  
 Several days following the tunnel’s revelation to the public, Elton McDonald came 
forward to claim responsibility for its construction. News outlets reported via the Toronto police 
that McDonald had built the tunnel with the help of a friend for “personal reasons” (Köhler, 
2015, March 20). The mystery was thus only vaguely solved, for while there was no crime 
committed, curiosity peaked about what “personal reasons” might explain McDonald’s digging 
of a secret tunnel. Anxiety turned into the pursuit of learning more about this young man: The 
public wanted a narrative. Maclean’s magazine ran a cover story on the 22-year old construction 
worker, detailing his life and his months-long project to carve out a hideaway in the parkland 
near where he grew up and still lives with his mother and sisters. Nicholas Köhler’s (2015, 
March 20) story locates McDonald’s upbringing in the public housing complex at Driftwood 
Court, a racially minoritized community known for gun violence, drugs, poverty, and gangs, as 
well as police brutality and social and political neglect. Like many other children of the area, 
McDonald grew up playing in the treed ravine. “You can get lost there,” he recounts in the 
article, “like you’re somewhere else completely.”29 For McDonald, the woods were a welcome 
escape from a world that at times was too harsh, too cruel, and too violent. As one of 
                                                
29 All quotations of McDonald are from Köhler (2015, March 20). 
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McDonald’s sisters puts it, “Elton went to school with kids who are not alive anymore.” In this 
context of loss, the article also historicizes his predilection for fixing things. According to his 
mother Tracy, “Since he was small, he was always a fixer,” to which his sister adds: “Or break it, 
then fix it.” Destruction gives way to reparation. The “hole,” or simply “H” as McDonald 
referred to it, was his latest of several attempts to carve out an underground space. The first 
attempt can be traced back to when he was in middle school. Applying knowledge gleaned from 
his construction job as well as the mentorship and tools borrowed from his unsuspecting boss, 
McDonald was ready in the summer of 2013 to try again.  
 McDonald’s “H” was a place for “getting away from regular things, away from life,” he 
tells his interviewer, from “Nothing in particular…Just life itself.” A self-described thinker 
whose “mind is working overtime,” McDonald’s private, subterranean hideaway contrasts with a 
world that is often not given over to the time and space needed for thinking. So too does it 
contrast with a crowded home life: a small house in which he lives with his mother and two 
siblings in a densely and diversely populated area of Toronto. An area of town that many might 
think of as broken, the neighbourhood struggles to claim a voice of its own and to be listened to 
and supported in meaningful ways. McDonald grew up against a backdrop of gun violence of 
particular severity. The summer of 2005, when McDonald was twelve-years-old and perhaps first 
dreaming up his plans for an underground hideout, became known as the “summer of the gun” 
(Doucette, 2012, July 28). By years end, 52 people had died by gun violence (Doucette, 2012, 
July 28). When life involves so much destruction and death, it might not be surprising that his 
wish to “get away from regular things”—from “life itself”—sends him underground to a world 
he can claim as his own. The significance of “H” is perhaps a reminder that “something outside 
of this world” exists for McDonald. As the story goes, McDonald “was going to leave the tunnel 
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there, maybe never visit for five years. Leave it to settle,” comforted by the assurance that, in 
Elton’s words, “I’d always know it’s there.” Not solely a place in reality, his hole occupies an 
important place in mind, “something outside of this world,” where “this” is an enigmatic signifier 
much like “H.” His utterance here references different worlds, perhaps pointing to an internal 
world, a psychic space that, as with “H,” needs adequate support so as not to collapse.  
But what kind of support for psychic life is adequate? Specifically, what it could mean 
for McDonald to find a social world for his passion? Indeed, McDonald’s “H” manifests the 
tendency towards putting passion out of view, maybe because it is not adequately supported in a 
social world of others. Hidden beneath the surface in a treed park and in his mind, McDonald’s 
“H” is not yet communicated passion. His passion is not yet a narrative, but more a retreat from 
the world, an external manifestation of his wish to “get away,” to “get lost” in the woods that 
were his childhood playground.  
Passion for McDonald is not the destructive chaos of Kotylak’s riot, nor is it null and 
void. Indeed, McDonald’s tunnel may literally manifest a desire to ward against (symbolic) 
collapse, a project that keeps him a version of sane. But in its form as “H” his passion is also not 
afforded—or has not claimed—a “social place” (Mitchell, 2003, p. xv, emphasis added). From 
the view of the present research, passion devoid of a social place risks turning on the self and the 
world in maladies that communicate breakdown in our individual and collective capacities to 
mind passion. From the view of this research, that is, hidden passion may be symptomatic of a 
breakdown in education, not only or necessarily McDonald’s education, but education as a social 
project for welcoming and transforming passion through its symbolization in the world.  
I have argued that education can be that social place where we learn (or fail to learn) the 
significance of passion and what it could mean to allow passion into discourse. “H” may be read 
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as an uncanny reminder that passion in education may hide underground, “outside of this world.” 
“H’s” proximity to York University further urges this association. Sitting at the borders of 
education, “H” pushes at its boundaries: What would it mean for the world of education to better 
attend to underground passion? And what would it mean for hidden passion to find new life in 
the social world of education, and the world beyond? How might passion need education and 
how might education need passion? On what grounds will they meet? 
My contention is that passion and education meet in narrative, and that narrative is 
significant because it reconnects us to bodily drives in the search for meaning. Here, too, the 
emergence of McDonald’s tunnel into social discourse is instructive, for it is also an example of 
how narratives may enliven the enigma of passion and instantiate such a search for meaning. 
Toronto’s mysterious tunnel captured worldwide attention. It confounded audiences, enlivening 
individual inquiry and group psychology. In the public imaginary, “H” became an enigmatic 
object filled with fascination and intrigue. This same space, however, also held worries over 
public safety and malevolent “others.” The public’s appetite for mystery and its susceptibility 
towards paranoia suggest the fragility of negative capability. Tunnelling its way into our 
(collective) unconscious, Toronto’s “mystery hole” enlivened a passionate interest in meaning, 
while reminding us that mysteries can also be difficult to “let settle.” The quick turn to make this 
hole into a threatening object of terror suggests, too, something threating about unknown spaces, 
gaps in knowledge, and underground worlds operating beneath the surface of conscious 
experience—threats which frequently become literalized in threatening others. Indeed, we saw 
this externalization of threat in each of the films engaged in this research: for example, in the 
relationship between Nina and her mother and between Nina and Lily in Black Swan, in the 
Capitol’s brutal orientation to the districts in The Hunger Games, and in the teachers’ paranoid 
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responses to Simon in Monsieur Lazhar. How do these others, as placeholders for unclaimed 
passion, survive with their own passion intact? McDonald’s “H,” crafted for “personal reasons,” 
invites us to wonder about the social consequences of sending passion underground, an inquiry 
that runs throughout the chapters of this dissertation.  
To symbolize passion is to make a relationship to the passionate mind in a social world 
populated by others. But symbolizing passion also depends on a world that invites narrative as 
the fragile bridge between phantasy and reality, self and other, past and present. McDonald’s 
tunnel emerged into the public sphere by accident. Once in the social sphere, his passion found 
new life and he began to imagine a social use for his passion. A builder who finds pleasure in 
breaking and fixing, he has solicited support to build a landscaping program for youth in his 
community. Hiring and mentoring young people from Driftwood Court, he aims to “make a new 
definition of cool.” The success of his current efforts cannot yet be known. But his story urges us 
to wonder what may be possible by nudging passion above ground.  
The challenge for the field of education, I suggest, is to make communicating passion a 
social and pedagogical project, and not an accidental occurrence. My hope is that the field may 
increasingly claim passion as its interminable project and proffer social spaces for its indefinite 
transformation. Neither fully inside the self, nor devoid of all personal significance, education 
serves life by serving the passionate mind. For this to be possible, however, we also need to 
welcome into thought passion’s “shadowy underside” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 21) and give its more 
difficult qualities—destruction, paranoia, compliance, hatred, omnipotence, madness—new life 
in narrative. Our best defence against the collapse of the passionate mind is to welcome a world 
of compelling, moving stories through which we might risk letting go of what we consciously 
know and play instead with what we might still think and become. 
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